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Metaphors are a puzzling phenomenon of language use. Why is it that we
can understand when a word such as princess is used in a way that deviates
dramatically from its de-contextualized conventional meaning in a sentence such
as my cat is a princess?
Two main sets of theories attempt to answer this question by positing the
involvement of different cognitive mechanisms during processing. The first one,
which I refer to as the Implicit Comparison View, claims that metaphors are
understood through a process of analogical reasoning in which the elements of a
metaphoric expression (in the example above my cat, which is known as the ‘topic’
and princess, which is known as the ‘vehicle’) are scanned for relational similarities,
i.e. ways in which the internal structure of the metaphoric elements is coherent
across elements (e.g. Gentner et al., 2001; Gentner & Bowdle, 2008). Once the
structure of both elements has been aligned, inferences are projected from vehicle
to topic in order to reach a final utterance interpretation.
A second view, which I refer to as the Category Inclusion View, sees metaphor
comprehension as a process in which the lexical meaning of the metaphoric vehicle
is spontaneously changed to represent a newly created, goal-oriented category (e.g.
Glucksberg, 2008; Sperber & Wilson, 2008). To understand a metaphor, a listener
must adjust the meaning of the vehicle given the parameters set by the metaphoric
topic together with the relevant context.
Despite there being a large body of experimental data testing the predictions
made by these theories (e.g. Bowdle & Gentner, 2005; Gernsbacher et al., 2001;
Jones & Estes, 2005; Jones & Estes, 2006; McGlone & Manfredi, 2001; Wolff &
Gentner, 2011), it has not been possible to settle this debate and tip the scale in
favor of one or the other view (see Holyoak & Stamenković, 2018, for a systematic
review of the empirical studies). Holyoak and Stamenković (2018) mention two
ways in which the existing debate on metaphor processing could be moved forward,
namely by examining different types of metaphors other than so-called nominal
metaphors (i.e. metaphors of the type ‘X is a Y’) and by examining metaphors
in languages other than English.
This dissertation attempts to do just that by examining the processing of
two types of German non-nominal metaphors: Verbal metaphors and verb-object
metaphors. This was done by investigating the role of context during metaphor
comprehension in order to further specify the available theories, and, more generally,
by drawing on the literature on situated and incremental language processing (see
Huettig et al., 2011; Huettig et al., 2012; Kamide, 2008; Knoeferle & Guerra,
2016, for reviews).
Specifically, I address three issues for which the available theories make opposing
predictions: (1) The role of the literal meaning of the metaphoric vehicle during
processing, (2) the (a)symmetry of the metaphoric elements and (3) the effect of
metaphor conventionality, familiarity and aptness during processing. I investigated
these issues across 14 Experiments making use of Eye-Tracking during reading, Eye-
tracking during concurrent processing of spoken language and visual context (known
as the Visual World Paradigm), reaction-time and self-paced reading measures
as well as offline rating tasks.
The results in relation to issue (1) suggest that, during processing of verbal
metaphors (such as The journalist’s opinion was fenced-in after the change in
regime), features associated exclusively with the literal meaning of the metaphoric
verb (the feature of physical containment) neither facilitate nor hinder processing,
despite facilitating processing of the same verbs when these were presented without a
sentential context. Regarding issue (2), the studies show that verb-object metaphors
(such as Sebastian feeds a princess, uttered when Sebastian is feeding his cat) are
not processed symmetrically: When the verbal topic feeds appears before the
vehicle princess, participants settled on a metaphoric interpretation more swiftly
upon hearing the vehicle princess than when they heard the vehicle before the
topic. Finally, regarding issue (3), metaphoric aptness (defined as the degree to
which the figurative meaning of a metaphoric vehicle captures relevant features of
the metaphoric topic) was shown to facilitate processing of both verbal and verb-
object metaphors, whereas conventionality (defined as the frequency with which
a metaphoric vehicle is used in its metaphoric meaning) and familiarity (defined
as the frequency of a specific topic-vehicle pair) had no such effect.
Overall, I interpret the results as being more consistent with the Category
Inclusion View than with the Indirect Comparison View in each one of the three
issues investigated. The current dissertation thus makes an important contribution
towards resolving the debate on the cognitive mechanisms involved during metaphor
comprehension.
Deutsche Zusammenfassung
Metaphern sind ein rätselhaftes Phänomen des Sprachgebrauchs. Warum sind wir in
der Lage zu verstehen, wenn ein Wort wie Prinzessin auf einer Weise verwendet wird,
die dramatisch von der de-kontextualisierten, konventionellen Bedeutung des Wortes
abweicht, wie z.B. in dem Satz Meine Katze ist eine Prinzessin? Zwei Theorien
versuchen, diese Frage zu beantworten, indem sie die Beteiligung verschiedener
kognitiver Mechanismen während der Verarbeitung postulieren. Die erste, die ich
als “Implicit Comparison View” bezeichne, behauptet, dass Metaphern durch einen
Prozess des analogen Denkens verstanden werden. Als Teil dieses Prozesses werden
die Elemente eines metaphorischen Ausdrucks (im obigen Beispiel meine Katze,
und Prinzessin, die jeweils “metaphorisches Tenor” und “metaphorisches Vehikel”
genannt werden) auf relationale Ähnlichkeiten geprüft, d. h., auf die Arten, in denen
die internen Strukturen der metaphorischen Elemente miteinander kohärent sind
(z.B. Gentner et al., 2001; Gentner & Bowdle, 2008). Sobald die maximale Kohärenz
zwischen den Strukturen beider Elemente etabliert wurde, werden Inferenzen vom
Vehikel zum Tenor projiziert, um eine endgültige Interpretation der Äußerung zu
erreichen.
Eine zweite Ansicht, die ich als “Category Inclusion View” bezeichne, sieht das
Verstehen einer Metapher als einen Prozess, bei dem die lexikalische Bedeutung des
metaphorischen Vehikels spontan moduliert wird, um eine ad-hoc, zielorientierte
Kategorie zu schaffen (z.B. Glucksberg, 2008; Sperber & Wilson, 2008). Um eine
Metapher zu verstehen, muss die Bedeutung des Vehikels unter Berücksichtigung der
vom metaphorischen Tenor festgelegten Parameter kontextuell angepasst werden.
Obwohl es eine große Anzahl an Experiment gibt, die die Vorhersagen dieser beiden
Theorien testen (z.B. Bowdle & Gentner, 2005; Gernsbacher et al., 2001; Jones &
Estes, 2005; Jones & Estes, 2006; McGlone & Manfredi, 2001; Wolff & Gentner, 2011)
ist es bis jetzt nicht möglich gewesen, das Problem der Metaphernverarbeitung
zu lösen zugunsten einer der beiden Theorien (siehe Holyoak & Stamenković,
2018, für eine systematische Überprüfung der empirischen Studien). Holyoak and
Stamenković (2018) erwähnen zwei Möglichkeiten, wie die bestehende Debatte
über die Verarbeitung von Metaphern vorangebracht werden könnte, nämlich (i)
durch das Untersuchen verschiedener Arten von Metaphern jenseits der sogenannten
nominalen Metaphern (d. h. Metaphern vom Typ X ist ein Y ), und (ii) durch das
Untersuchen von Metaphern in anderen Sprachen als Englisch. Diese Dissertation
versucht genau das zu tun, indem die Verarbeitung von zwei Arten deutscher
nicht-nominaler Metaphern untersucht werden: verbale Metaphern und Verb-
Objekt-Metaphern. Dies wurde gemacht durch eine Untersuchung der Rolle
des Kontexts während der Verarbeitung von nicht-nominalen Metaphern. Dabei
wurde auf die Literatur zur situierten und inkrementellen Sprachverarbeitung
zurückgegriffen (siehe Huettig et al., 2011; Huettig et al., 2012; Kamide, 2008;
Knoeferle & Guerra, 2016). Insbesondere spreche ich drei Themen an, für die
die verfügbaren Theorien entgegengesetzte Vorhersagen treffen: (1) Die Rolle der
wörtlichen Bedeutung des metaphorischen Vehikels während der Verarbeitung,
(2) die (a)Symmetrie der Reihenfolge der metaphorischen Elemente und (3) die
Effekte von Konventionalität, Bekanntheitsgrad und Angemessenheit der einzelnen
Metaphern auf die Verarbeitung. Ich habe diese Themen in 14 verschiedenen
Experimenten untersucht, bei denen Reaktions- und Lesezeiten, Augenbewegungen
sowie Offline-Bewertungen gemessen wurden. Die Ergebnisse in Bezug auf (1)
legen nahe, dass während der Verarbeitung verbaler Metaphern (wie z.B. die
Meinung des Journalisten wurde nach dem Regimewechsel eingezäunt), Merkmale,
die ausschließlich mit der wörtlichen Bedeutung des metaphorischen Verbs verbunden
sind, die Verarbeitung der Metaphern weder erleichtern noch verhindern, obwohl
diese Merkmale die Verarbeitung derselben Verben erleichtern, wenn die Verben
ohne Satzkontext präsentiert werden. In Bezug auf (2) zeigen die Studien, dass
Verb-Objekt-Metaphern (wie z.B. Sebastian füttert eine Prinzessin, wenn Sebastian
seine Katze füttert) asymmetrisch verarbeitet werden: Wenn das verbale Tenor
(z.B. füttert) vor dem Vehikel (z.B. Prinzessin) gehört wurde, war es einfacher
für die Teilnehmer des Experiments sich für eine metaphorische Interpretation der
Äußerung beim Hören des Vehikels zu entscheiden als wenn sie das Vehikel vor dem
Tenor gehört haben. In Bezug auf (3), zeigen die Ergebnisse der Experimente, dass
die Angemessenheit einer Metapher (d.h., inwiefern die übertragene Bedeutung
eines Vehikels relevante Merkmale vom Tenor erfasst) einen größeren Einfluss auf die
Verarbeitung von verbalen und verb-objekt Metaphern hatte als Konventionalität
(d.h. die Häufigkeit, mit der ein metaphorisches Vehikel in seiner metaphorischen
Bedeutung verwendet wird) und Bekanntheitsgrad (d.h. die Häufigkeit eines
bestimmten metaphorischen Tenor-Vehikel-Paares). Insgesamt interpretiere ich
die Ergebnisse als besser zu vereinbaren mit der “Category Inclusion View” als
mit der “Implicit Comparison View” in jedem der drei untersuchten Themen.
Diese Dissertation leistet somit einen wichtigen Beitrag, um die Debatte über
die kognitiven Mechanismen, die beim Verständnis von Metaphern beteiligt sind,
voranzubringen.
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A fundamental property of language is that the meaning of words is predominantly
stable. This is an obvious fact to any language user: When navigating through a city,
for example, it is necessary to know the meaning of the words we read on street signs.
We rely on the fact that words such as “stop”, “school”, “danger”, etc. have a public,
conventional meaning that is in line with the meaning those words have in our
heads, and this allows us to act accordingly. If we do not know the meaning of one
of these words, we can consult a dictionary, which lists the conventional meaning(s)
of the words in a language. If the meaning of words were not stable, there would
be no dictionaries. This layman’s notion of the stability of the meaning of words
is shared by different theories of linguistic meaning. Philosophers of language, for
example, have claimed that understanding the meaning of a sentence is equivalent to
understanding the meaning of the individual words and the combinatorial processes
through which these words are associated (Davidson, 2001). In this sense, the
meaning of any given word is assumed to be stable. This is taken as an axiom of
the construction of linguistic meaning, which is best exemplified in Jerry Fodor’s
“disquotational” view of the lexicon (Fodor, 1998, p. 56; Fodor & Lepore, 2002,
p. 95). According to Fodor, word meaning is non-decomposable. It can only be
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identified by its denotation: The meaning of the word keep is “keep”, the meaning
of the word house is “house”, and so forth.
(Psycho)Linguists tend to share a similar view, generally stating that a lexical
unit is a stable bundle of phonological, semantic and syntactic information stored
together as an entry in a mental dictionary that contains the senses of all the words
we know, known as the mental lexicon (Jackendoff, 2002, p. 130-131; Johnson-Laird,
1987; Marslen-Wilson, 1987; i.a., but see Elman, 2009, for a theory of lexical
meaning without a mental lexicon). This mental lexicon is assumed to be shared
by the members of a language community via tacit agreement (Clark, 1996), which
allows us to trust that our interlocutors will know the meaning of these words
when we use them. To go beyond the meaning of words and understand what a
sentence means, a language user has to access the meaning of the necessary words
stored in the mental lexicon and then put them together via semantic and syntactic
rules (see Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet, 2000).
There are good reasons to believe that this view is an accurate description of
how we understand language. Empirical evidence has shown that members of a
language community rapidly converge on using identical words to refer to the same
novel entities (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Garrod & Doherty, 1994; Markman &
Makin, 1998), lending support to the idea that language users do in fact use the
same words to express very similar concepts. Furthermore, studies have reliably
shown that language users exploit their knowledge about the properties of individual
entries in their mental lexicon to anticipate upcoming information, such as thematic
role knowledge (Altmann & Kamide, 1999; Taraban & McClelland, 1988; Trueswell
et al., 1994). These anticipatory effects are only plausible under the assumption that
language users reliably access a conceptual representation of the words they hear or
read, and that this representation is stable across participants in an experiment.
However, when assuming the perspective of stable lexical units that are readily
retrieved to construct meaning, some linguistic phenomena become very hard to
account for. Such is the case of metaphors. Metaphors are instances of language
use in which words from very different conceptual domains are combined in a way
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in which they seem to spontaneously create new meaning that is different from
what the individual words typically convey. Take sentences 1-3 below:
1) Some lawyers are sharks.
2a) Sebastian is feeding a princess.
2b) Sebastian is feeding a princess. [uttered only in the context of Sebastian
feeding his spoiled cat]
3) The journalist’s opinion was fenced in after the change in regime.
In these examples, some words are used in a way such that the intended meaning
of a speaker is incompatible with the word’s base-level meaning, yet a meaningful
overall interpretation of the expression is not only possible, but readily available. In
(1), the speaker putatively does not mean to say that some lawyers are large marine
predators, but instead intends to say that a subset of lawyers is particularly vicious
and aggressive. This type of metaphoric expression is known as a nominal metaphor,
and makes up the core of psycholinguistic investigations on metaphor understanding.
Examples (2a) and (2b) show a crucial aspect of metaphor processing, namely
its context sensitivity. Unlike in (1), the speaker of (2a) might be using the word
princess in its conventional sense (If, for example, Sebastian is feeding a member of a
royal family). However, when the same sentence is uttered in a constraining context,
as is the case in (2b), it becomes clear that princess is being used metaphorically
to communicate something about Sebastian’s cat that goes beyond (and might be
totally incompatible with) the conventional meaning of princess (perhaps simply
that the cat is spoiled). The difference between (2a) and (2b) shows that context
alone can trigger dramatically different interpretations based on the way in which
individual words are understood. This highlights the fact that metaphoric meaning
doesn’t just come about as the result of the interaction between two words (lawyers
and sharks, in example (1)), but is also the product of how the meaning of words
is affected by the context in which they are embedded.
Finally, it is not just nouns that can be used metaphorically. In (3), the verb
fenced in, which typically entails physical containment, is used to predicate over
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the noun opinion, which does not have a physical dimension at all. The speaker of
(3) probably means to communicate something different, namely that the journalist
was not able to freely speak her mind (or a related proposition).
Examples 1-3 can be described as novel metaphors: Their metaphoric meaning
is not conventionally associated with any specific word: it must be computed on
the spot as opposed to being retrieved, which would instead be the case of fossilized
metaphors such as the word leg in the expression The leg of the table.
Keeping the mental lexicon view in mind, how is it that we are able to derive
meaning from sentences 1-3 with relative ease despite the fact that the words
are being used in such an unconventional way? This question is essential in
metaphor processing research.
Specifically, metaphor research is concerned with trying to make sense of the
following three apparent facts about language:
(a) words have relatively stable conventional meanings
(b) metaphors are pervasive in everyday communication and in languages across
the world (Glucksberg, 1989; Lakoff & Johnson, 2008)
(c) metaphoric language is similarly effortful to understand compared to non-
metaphoric language (Gibbs, 2002)
These three facts, taken together, represent somewhat of a puzzle of metaphoric
meaning. We rely on words having stable meanings so that we can efficiently
communicate with one another. However, metaphoric meaning comes about by
spontaneously and dramatically changing this conventional meaning, and yet, it
seems to be a widespread phenomenon that need not come at a cost for the listener
to comprehend. How is this possible? Answering this question is paramount if we
want to understand how linguistic meaning is created in our minds, associated with
individual words and reliably shared within language communities.
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The past 30 years of psycholinguistic research have brought about extensive
work trying to answer this question (see the articles in Gibbs, 2008). Still, we are
far from reaching a consensus on even the most basic cognitive mechanisms involved
in the comprehension of a novel metaphor (Gentner & Bowdle, 2008; Glucksberg,
2008; Tendahl & Gibbs, 2008; Wilson, 2011).
In terms of stipulating concrete cognitive mechanisms at play, the theoretical
views on metaphor processing can be broadly split into two sets of views. The
first one, which I’ll refer to as the Implicit Comparison view, claims that metaphor
comprehension takes place through a process of analogical reasoning in which the
elements of a metaphoric expression (in sentence (1) some lawyers, which is known
as the metaphoric topic and sharks, which is known as the metaphoric vehicle)
are scanned for relational similarities, i.e. ways in which the internal structure of
the metaphoric elements is coherent across elements (Boroditsky, 2000; Coulson &
Oakley, 2005; Gentner & Bowdle, 2008; Gentner et al., 2001; Thibodeau & Durgin,
2011; Wolff & Gentner, 2011). In this view, the puzzle of word meaning is solved by
assuming that the stable conventional meaning of all individual words is retrieved
as it normally would and the metaphoric meaning of the expression is understood
by establishing systematic relationships between these meanings, as one would do
in an explicit comparison (“Some lawyers are like sharks in some relevant way”).
A second view, the Category Inclusion view, sees metaphor comprehension as
a process in which the lexical meaning of the metaphoric vehicle is spontaneously
changed to represent a newly created, goal-oriented category (McGlone & Manfredi,
2001; Rubio Fernandez, 2007; Wilson & Sperber, 2012). A listener does not
look for ways in which the internal structure of topic and vehicle are similar to
one another. Instead, the meaning of the vehicle changes by either acquiring
dual-reference (Glucksberg, 2008) or through broadening and narrowing of the
meaning stored in the mental lexicon (Sperber & Wilson, 2008). The metaphoric
topic is then understood to be a member of this category and the sentence as
a whole is understood much like a regular Category Inclusion statement such as
Apples are fruits. This way, the meaning puzzle is solved by positing that the
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conventional meaning of the metaphoric vehicle is rapidly modulated given a set
of parameters provided by the metaphoric topic and the linguistic context prior
to the construction of larger meaning structures.
Despite the large body of experimental data collected on this issue, it has
not been possible to settle the debate and tip the scale in favor of one or the
other set of theories (see Pouscoulous and Dulcinati (2019) and Holyoak and
Stamenković (2018) for comprehensive reviews). So how do listeners perform the
feat of understanding a novel metaphor?
1.1 Motivation
The central idea of this dissertation is that the debate on metaphor processing
can benefit from an empirical investigation of previously understudied metaphors,
namely non-nominal metaphors, that takes into consideration the role that
context plays during processing and incorporates the findings and methodology of
the field of situated and incremental language processing. The motivation is to take
a new perspective in order to move the debate on metaphor processing forward.
One issue with the debate on metaphor processing is that, by large, it has been
centered around nominal metaphors of the canonical form “X is a Y”, as in sentence
(1), which are also almost always studied in the absence of a linguistic context.
On the other hand, very little to no attention has been payed to the processing
mechanisms at play in metaphoric expressions such as (2b) or (3), in which topic
and vehicle are not both nouns, and in which the metaphoric interpretation is not
brought on by the interaction between topic and vehicle alone but by the interaction
between context, topic and vehicle (as is the case of 2b).
Nominal metaphors, though easy to create and to test in the lab, impose
restrictions on the type of hypotheses that can be tested. For one thing, the
syntax of a nominal metaphor is suggestive of Category Inclusion (“X is a Y”).
Furthermore, it is not possible to reverse the sequential order of presentation of
the elements of a metaphor (topic and vehicle) without changing the meaning of
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the expression as a whole. This gives researchers limited leeway when it comes
to investigating what the elements of the metaphor individually contribute to the
comprehension process and when.
It is also important to note that language comprehension does not happen
in a vacuum: It is instead embedded in and contingent upon a situational and
conversational context that shapes its interpretation. Studying nominal metaphors
outside of a context thus brings with it a lack of ecological validity that limits
the scope of theory development. In addition to this limitation, investigations
on metaphor processing typically involve the measuring of reaction times once
the entire metaphoric expression has been understood. This coarse measure of
processing time does not allow us to test theoretical predictions that require a
more time sensitive measure.
One issue for which these limitations are visible is that of metaphoric sym-
metry: The Implicit Comparison view claims that both elements in a metaphor
are processed equally and thus their relative sequential order should not matter,
making the understanding of the metaphor a symmetric process (at least during
initial stages of processing). The Category Inclusion view, on the other hand, sees
metaphor comprehension as an asymmetric process and claims that both elements
play different roles from very early on during sentence comprehension, making
their relative position essential for understanding. However, vehicle and topic of
nominal metaphors cannot be reversed without rendering the entire expression
infelicitous or changing its meaning altogether (some lawyers are sharks is not
equivalent to some sharks are lawyers). Furthermore, previous investigations on
this matter have not considered the way in which context interacts with the relative
position of the metaphoric elements as these unfold over time. As a result, the
theories remain underspecified in this regard.
To resolve this, it would be necessary to examine the processing of contextualized
metaphors that do allow for a felicitous reversal of the order of its elements. In
addition to this, given that the theoretical claims refer to the individual contribution
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of the elements, it should be studied how metaphoric processing unfolds over time
with adequately time-sensitive technology.
Another issue where the limitations of previous studies are hindering the
resolution of the theoretical debate concerns the role of literal features of
a metaphor during comprehension. Experiments testing between theories of
metaphor processing have mostly been carried out using priming paradigms where
both prime and target are sentences or words and reading or reaction times are
measured (Gernsbacher et al., 2001; McGlone & Manfredi, 2001; Rubio Fernandez,
2007; Keysar et al., 2000; Thibodeau & Durgin, 2011; but see Weiland et al., 2014,
for an ERP version of this design). These paradigms have lead to contradictory
claims about what happens to features associated with the literal meaning of a
metaphoric vehicle during processing. Processing theories make different predictions
in this matter: Category Inclusion views hold that features of a metaphorically used
word that are relevant for the literal meaning but irrelevant for the metaphorical
meaning - “has fins”, or “lives under water” in sentence (1), for example - should
be suppressed during comprehension and not remain active once the metaphor
has been understood (Glucksberg, 2001, p. 66). Implicit Comparison views, on
the other hand, believe that all features associated with the encoded meaning
of a word have to be activated in order for structural alignment to take place.
This includes those features that are associated only with the literal meaning and
are irrelevant for the metaphoric interpretation. These literal features are only
suppressed in secondary comprehension phases once structural alignment has been
completed (Wolff & Gentner, 2011).
Though some studies show that irrelevant features are rapidly suppressed
during processing (Rubio Fernandez, 2007) and hinder subsequent metaphoric
comprehension (McGlone & Manfredi, 2001) others have shown that they can in
fact facilitate subsequent metaphoric comprehension (Weiland et al., 2014) and
even remain active after comprehension has taken place (Thibodeau & Durgin,
2008). How do we overcome this impasse? One possibility would be to examine this
question by looking at a previously unexplored type of metaphor, such as verbal
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metaphors like the one in sentence (3) above. This would allow us to see which
of the previous findings on nominal metaphors can be generalized to non-nominal
metaphors, which would in turn strengthen the respective theoretical position.
A third unresolved issue worth examining is the role of conventionality, famil-
iarity and aptness of a metaphoric expression during comprehension. Metaphoric
aptness is defined as the degree to which the figurative meaning of a metaphoric
vehicle captures relevant features of the metaphoric topic (Jones & Estes, 2006).
Metaphor conventionality is determined by the frequency in which a metaphoric
vehicle is used in its metaphoric meaning in a given language (Bowdle & Gentner,
2005), while metaphoric familiarity captures the frequency of use of the entire
metaphoric expression, i.e. of topic and vehicle (Thibodeau & Durgin, 2011).
As shown by Jones and Estes (2006), several studies on metaphor processing
claim that both conventionality and aptness facilitate the processing of nominal
metaphors (Blasko & Connine, 1993; Bowdle & Gentner, 2005; D. Chiappe &
Kennedy, 1999; D. Chiappe, Kennedy, & Smykowski, 2003; Jones & Estes, 2005).
However, when taking a closer look at these studies, aptness is consistently correlated
with conventionality, making it difficult to determine which of the two mediates
metaphor processing best. This is a critical point for theory development given
that Category Inclusion views see aptness as the true mediator of processing
mode (Glucksberg, 2008, p. 80; Jones & Estes, 2006, p. 19): More apt metaphors
will be easily processed via category inclusion whereas less apt metaphors might
be processed via analogical reasoning. Implicit Comparison views, on the other
hand, attribute this mediating role of processing mode to conventionality (Bowdle &
Gentner, 2005, p. 199): Highly conventional metaphors will be processed via category
inclusion and less conventional metaphors via analogical reasoning. Additionally,
Thibodeau and Durgin (2011) suggested that not conventionality nor aptness
modulate processing mode, but familiarity, with more familiar metaphors being
processed via category inclusion and less familiar ones via analogical reasoning.
The effect of these three variables, however, has yet to be systematically
studied within the same data set. Furthermore, all evidence in this debate has
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come exclusively from de-contextualized nominal metaphors. Taking this into
consideration, a path forward towards resolving this issue could be to examine
how the three variables systematically affect processing of different types of non-
nominal metaphors, such as examples (2b) and (3). Furthermore, this presents an
opportunity to refine existing theories of metaphor comprehension by accounting
for the role of the linguistic context during processing.
Overall, this dissertation aims to make a contribution to the field of metaphor
processing by re-examining these three issues in a way in which it has not been
been previously attempted, namely by investigating the processing of non-nominal
metaphors, which have been largely ignored in previous research: Verbal metaphors,
such as in sentence (3), and verb-object metaphors, such as in sentence (2b). I
investigated their processing using the eye-tracking method in two eye-tracking
during reading studies (Rayner, 2009), in which participants’ gaze patterns are
recorded while they read at their own pace, and two Visual World studies (Cooper,
1974; Tanenhaus et al., 1995), in which participants’ gaze patterns are recorded
while they hear spoken language and simultaneously view a grid of four images.
These studies are complemented by two experiments measuring reaction times,
six offline rating tasks, and two re-analyses of the previously collected eye-tracking
data. Taken together, these 14 empirical studies aim to shed light on the mechanisms
involved in the process of understanding how metaphoric meaning is constructed
during language comprehension. The studies were conducted on two sets of novel
experimental materials that were tailored to address the three theoretical issues
previously mentioned: The issue of symmetry, the role of literal features and
the differential contribution of aptness, conventionality and familiarity during
processing. Additionally, these studies allow for an investigation of the role of
context during metaphor processing, a topic which has often been neglected for
the purpose of theory development.
More specifically, the studies in this dissertation aim to test the predictions
made by the two theoretical positions introduced earlier. The position of each set
of views on the three main topics are broadly summarized in Table 1.1.
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The issues are addressed by incorporating insights from the literature on situated
language processing, which has shown that visual scenes can rapidly influence
language comprehension during early stages of processing, even during processing
of abstract language as well as complex pragmatic phenomena (see Knoeferle &
Guerra, 2016, for a review). I also incorporate the insights of the literature on
incremental language processing (e.g. Altmann & Steedman, 1988; Eberhard et al.,
1995; Van Berkum et al., 2005; Kamide et al., 2003; Kamide, 2008; Tanenhaus
et al., 1996), which have shown that language comprehenders rapidly integrate
incoming linguistic input with their available linguistic and non-linguistic context
in an incremental way. The goal of assuming both a situated and an incremental
language processing perspective is twofold: First, it might help us resolve the
three open issues displayed in Table 1.1 by introducing new technologies and
paradigms into the theoretical debate on metaphor processing1. Second, it might
help us better understand the role that context plays during metaphor processing
1This is not to say that highly time-sensitive technology has never been used before to study
metaphors (e.g. Bambini et al., 2016; Coulson, 2012; Coulson & Lai, 2016; Lai et al., 2009; Lai &
Desai, 2016; Pynte et al., 1996). It has not, however, been used previously to test these theories
on these specific issues, with the exception of Weiland et al. (2014).
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by comparing it to the way in in which context has been shown to affect processing
of other linguistic phenomena.
1.2 Thesis Outline
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter two presents the development and
the state of the art of the current debate on metaphor processing, focusing on
the Implicit Comparison view and on the Category Inclusion view. The relevant
empirical studies are discussed with a focus on the three critical issues shown in
Table 1.1. I discuss the limitations of the way in which these two theoretical views
have been empirically tested, as well as the way in which the theories address
the role of context during processing. This chapter also introduces the benefits of
incorporating the perspective of situated and incremental language processing into
the study of metaphor processing in order to move the theoretical debate forward.
Chapter three presents the first set of studies, which address the issue of
the role of features of the literal meaning during comprehension of novel verbal
metaphors. Specifically, the studies examine whether the concept of physical
containment is activated during and immediately after the processing of verbs
of physical containment that are used metaphorically to signify difficulty, such
as fenced in in sentence (3).
Chapter four presents the second set of studies, which investigate the time-course
of comprehension of novel verb-object metaphors and the role of the linguistic
context during processing. These studies directly address the issue of symmetry:
Are metaphors understood differently as a function of the relative position of their
elements? To answer this question I draw from the insights of the literature on
incremental language processing and make use of the Visual World Paradigm.
Chapter five investigates the influence of aptness, familiarity and conventionality
on the processing of non-nominal metaphors. Two experiments from chapters three
and four are reanalyzed incorporating the results from six novel experiments aimed at
teasing apart the effect of these three variables on the processing of novel metaphors.
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Finally, chapter six presents the conclusions drawn from the individual chapters
and evaluates them in the light of the debate between theories on metaphor
processing. This chapter also presents a tentative outline of the way in which
existing theories can be refined to account for the results of this dissertation.
2
Accounting for Metaphor Comprehension
This chapter presents the two leading accounts on metaphor processing at the center
of this dissertation: The Implicit Comparison View and the Category Inclusion
View. The goal is to critically examine how these views relate to the three core issues
of this dissertation, presented in Table 1.1 of chapter one: The issue of symmetry,
the role of literal features during processing, and the effect of mediating factors.
However, before diving into these issues, it is crucial to acknowledge the historical
context that brought about both sets of theories being discussed. Before the second
half of the twentieth century, the study of metaphors was a part of the study of
literature and rhetoric, and not of linguistics or psychology (see Gibbs, 1993). This
changed with the work of the philosopher Paul Grice (Grice, 1989), who attempted
to account for the way in which people are able to understand metaphors, irony, and
other types of figurative language. After this, a lot of the subsequent work became
concerned with empirically testing (and eventually refuting) the psychological
plausibility of the Gricean view on figurative language comprehension, in what
came to be known as the “psycholinguistic turn” (Pouscoulous & Dulcinati, 2019,
p. 315). It was as a response to the Gricean views, then, that both the Implicit
Comparison View and the Category Inclusion View came to be.
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Because of the important role played by the Gricean program in the historical
development of theories of metaphor comprehension, this chapter begins with a
discussion of Grice’s ideas. I will then discuss the Implicit Comparison View and the
Category Inclusion View individually, with a focus on the way in which each view
accounts for the role of context during metaphor processing. This will be followed
by a critical examination of these two views, assessing their predictions on the three
theoretical issues displayed in Table 1.1. Finally, I will attempt to show how a
new approach could help to both resolve these issues as well as to further refine
the theories: An approach that examines the processing of non-nominal metaphors
from the perspective of situated and incremental language processing. This will
lay the groundwork for the remaining chapters of this dissertation.
2.1 The Standard Pragmatic Model
2.1.1 Paul Grice’s account of figurative language under-
standing
Prior to the mid-twentieth century, metaphors were seen as just one phenomenon
among many on a list of rhetorical devices that could be used to make a written
text more aesthetically pleasing or rhetorically convincing. It was understood as
self-explanatory that metaphors represented a transfer of meaning triggered by
comparing two terms, a view traditionally attributed to Aristotle, who described
metaphors this way in both The Poetics and in Rhetoric (as cited by Kirby, 1997; and
Levin, 1982). Scholars of figurative language were more concerned with categorizing
the different instances of this transfer-of-meaning process than with the questions
of why and how we understand metaphors.
This changed with the work of Grice (Grice, 1989), who attempted to account for
figurative language understanding by incorporating it in his comprehensive account
of communication. Grice’s analysis of language use emerges from the observation
that language is a cooperative activity. During conversation, speakers plan and
organize their conversational contributions in order to achieve a common goal with
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their listeners. By doing this, they generate expectations in the minds of their
listeners, given that they share these communicative goals and assume that their
conversational partners will act accordingly. Grice formulated this idea as the
Cooperative Principle of communication (“Make your conversational contribution
such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or
direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged”) (Grice, 1989, p. 26), and
further explicated it by stating the precise type of expectations that interlocutors
generate during conversation, known as the Conversational Maxims (Grice, 1989,
p. 26-27):
• Maxims of Quantity Do not make your contribution more or less informative
than is required.
• Maxims of Quality Make your contribution one that you believe to be true
(do not say what you believe to be false).
• Maxim of Relation Make your contribution one that is relevant to the
conversation.
• Maxims of Manner Be perspicuous, avoid obscure expressions and ambigu-
ity.
The four maxims and the cooperative principle are not to be taken as deter-
ministic laws of language. They are a set of reasonable assumptions made by
conversational partners that can account for the systematic differences between the
linguistic meaning of sentences (i.e. the conventional meaning of words plus the
grammatical rules that combine them) and the meaning a speaker intends these
sentences to take on during conversation (what Grice called “Speaker’s meaning”).
For a listener, grasping a speaker’s meaning is a process of inference to the best
explanation on the basis of the Cooperative Principle and the conversational Maxims:
When the listener perceives that the speaker is not observing the maxims with a
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given utterance, it is reasonable to infer that the speaker meant to convey additional
information that can be inferred during conversation from said utterance. Grice
called these additional pieces of meaning implicatures.
Under this model, metaphoric expressions fall under the type of implicatures
that depend on a listeners’s ability to recognize that a speaker has overtly violated
the Maxim of Quality (Be truthful!) (Grice, 1989, p. 34): If a speaker utters
something that is literally false, the listener must draw the inference that the
speaker actually meant to communicate a different proposition. So, if the speaker
utters My lawyer is a shark, the listener, after determining the falsehood of the
literal proposition, infers that the speaker meant to attribute shark-like qualities
to his lawyer via transfer of meaning (under the assumption that the speaker is
being cooperative). This leaves us with a theory of metaphor in which a listener
first computes the truth-conditional meaning of an utterance, evaluates it given
the state of the world and subsequently reinterprets it.
2.1.2 Cognitive architecture of the Gricean account
The Gricean account of metaphor comprehension was never meant as a real-time
psychological description. The goal was to provide a plausible reconstruction of the
necessary logical steps that a listener undertakes when going from an utterance’s
meaning to a speaker’s meaning (Bach, 2006). However, the Gricean account did lay
the foundations for what later came to be known as The Standard Pragmatic
Model (SPM) (Gibbs, 1986), which is a translation, in psychological terms, of
the Gricean account together with John Searle’s ideas on metaphor comprehension
(Searle, 1979). Searle’s basic tenet is that metaphors (and other forms of figurative
speech) are a type of indirect language use that is understood only if a literal
interpretation of an utterance is considered “defective” and must be discarded
(Searle, 1979, p. 114). In psychological terms, understanding metaphors would then
have to be a three-stage process: The first step requires the computation of the
literal meaning of the utterance (i.e. the truth-conditional output of assembling the
conventional meaning of the individual words with the grammatical combinatorial
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rules). In the second stage, the output of stage one is evaluated and discarded. In
the third stage, the utterance is re-evaluated given context and the appropriate
implicature is derived. Each of these stages must be seen as requiring a specific
amount of cognitive effort, operationalized as processing time, which results in the
conclusion that deriving metaphoric meaning (a three-stage process) would necessar-
ily take longer than understanding an equivalent literal utterance, which would only
need the first step of evaluating the truth of the proposition (Gibbs, 1979, 1984).
2.1.3 Arguments against the SPM
The SPM represented a step forward in figurative language research given that, for
the first time, metaphor is analyzed on par with everyday speech and not seen as a
rhetorical device used only by poets. The SPM also provided a novel explanation
of why we are able to understand and use metaphors (and figurative language in
general) in a reliable way. However, the account has been extensively criticized
both from a theoretical (Carston, 2012; Gibbs, 1984; Recanati, 2004; Wilson &
Sperber, 2012, i.a.) and en empirical (Gibbs, 1986; Glucksberg et al., 1982; Ivanko
& Pexman, 2003, i.a.) perspective, which ultimately lead researchers to reject the
SPM for metaphor processing and processing of figurative language in general.
The theoretical criticism boils down to the SPM suffering from the same issues
that apply to the traditional Aristotelian view on figurative language. First of
all, the SPM does not provide an explanation as to why a speaker would choose
to use a metaphoric expression instead of a literal one given that a metaphorical
utterance is assumed to require considerably more effort on the part of the listener to
comprehend. This would seem to be at odds with the goal of the Gricean program,
which intends to defend the generating of implicatures on a rational basis.
A more specific problem of the Gricean account regarding metaphor comprehen-
sion is the lack of explanatory power that comes from an appeal to the Maxim of
Quality. If the main mechanism at play during figurative language comprehension is
the recognition of a sentence being literally false and re-analyzing it in context, what
is the difference, from a cognitive perspective, between understanding metaphors
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and other types of figurative language, such as irony? How does a language
user know which figurative meaning to derive? The SPM does not provide an
answer to this question.
Furthermore, the Gricean account of metaphor comprehension is also inconsistent
with the rest of the Gricean communicative agenda. Wilson and Carston (2006)
points out that according to Grice, deriving speaker-meaning from an utterance
is an additive operation: Listeners make an inference given the sentence-meaning
and reinforce it with the stronger, implicated meaning. In (1) below, The weaker
meaning of some (some and possibly all) is reinforced with a stronger one (some
and not all) after computing what is known as a scalar implicature:
1) Carlos asked Maria if she had eaten all of his Nutella. Maria said she ate some
of it.
In the case of metaphor, we can’t speak of an additive process, but of one where
the sentence-meaning is in some way replaced by the derived speaker-meaning.
In (2) below, it is not the case that the literal meaning of Charlie being a large
book with legs is extended by the inference that Charlie is also very knowledgeable.
The operation here would have to be one of replacing one meaning for the other,
with no explanation as to why metaphors should behave so differently than other
types of expressions with inferential meaning.
2) Charlie is really a walking encyclopedia!
Asides from theoretical concerns, the main reason why the SPM is no longer
considered to be a viable cognitive model of metaphor comprehension is the weight
of the empirical evidence against it. The main empirical finding in this regard is
that understanding metaphors and other types of figurative expressions does not
necessarily take longer than understanding equivalent literal utterances. Ortony
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et al. (1978) had participants read metaphoric and literal sentences embedded in
either short or long supportive contexts. They found that though there was a
reading-times advantage for literal sentences when following the short contexts,
this advantage disappeared in the long context conditions. This is incompatible
with the Gricean account that posits an automatic initial processing of the literal
meaning of every figurative sentence, regardless of its compatibility with context. In
a study on verbal irony, Gibbs (1986) reported a similar finding: When embedded
in a supportive context, sentences were read just as fast regardless of whether
they were intended literally or ironically.
A crucial finding that represents the nail in the coffin for the SPM is that by
Glucksberg et al. (1982) on the automaticity of metaphor processing. Inspired by
the Stroop task, they had participants read metaphoric, literal and nonsensical
statements. Participants were instructed to answer whether the sentences were
literally true or false by pressing either a YES or NO button in front of them.
The logic of the study was as follows: According to the SPM, computing the
truth conditions of an utterance is an obligatory first step in processing, with
the derivation of a metaphorical implicature being an optional secondary step.
If this is the case, it should be equally easy for participants to recognize that a
nonsensical sentence such as Some jobs are birds is false compared to the metaphor
some jobs are jails: In both cases, the truth conditions of the literal meaning
should be computed first, so both should be easily recognized as literally false.
However, Experiment 1 of Glucksberg et al. (1982) showed that this is not the case.
Participant took significantly longer to identify metaphors as false compared to
nonsensical sentences, suggesting that participants were automatically processing
the metaphorical meaning, causing a response delay. The authors argued that
the results speak for the automatic, obligatory character of metaphoric meaning
derivation and against the SPM’s three-stage process.
The SPM started the conversation on the mechanisms involved during metaphor
comprehension. Since it was proven to be inadequate on both theoretical and
experimental grounds, it became necessary to look elsewhere for models that are
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both cognitively plausible and supported by empirical evidence. There are currently
two sets of views that fulfill these criteria (Holyoak & Stamenković, 2018): The
metaphor-as-category-inclusion and the metaphor-as-implicit-comparison views. In
what follows I will describe each of these views. Following this, I will evaluate the
evidence on the three central points of this dissertation: The role of the literal
meaning during processing, the symmetry of metaphors, and the mediating effect
of aptness, conventionality and familiarity.
2.2 Metaphor as Category Inclusion
The basic tenant of Category Inclusion models is that nominal metaphors are
processed just as their syntactic form would suggest: as category statements, in
which the first element (the metaphoric topic) is understood as a member of
the category represented by the second element (the metaphoric vehicle). This
idea was first present in the work of Roger Brown (Brown, 1958, p. 140), who
discussed how the word foot can be extended from its original meaning (a person’s
foot) to a super-ordinate category (the foundations or lower parts of things) that
encompass both the original base-level meaning and a metaphorical one such as
in the expression the foot of the mountain. Brown’s ideas were only fledged out
decades later, and there are currently two accounts based on this premise1: Sam
Glucksberg’s Dual Reference model (Glucksberg, 2001) and Sperber and Wilson’s
Deflationary Account of metaphor comprehension (Sperber & Wilson, 2008), which
is embedded in the larger cognitive framework of Relevance Theory (Sperber &
Wilson, 1986; Wilson & Sperber, 2012).
2.2.1 Dual reference
Following their groundbreaking finding of the automaticity of metaphor processing,
Glucksberg and colleagues set out to develop a novel account of metaphor comprehen-
1Others have postulated similar accounts on metaphor comprehension, such as François Recanati
(Recanati, 2004). However, Glucksberg’s and Sperber and Wilson’s accounts are the most explicit
in terms of the mental processes and representations involved, generating empirically testable
predictions.
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sion that was compatible with this empirical finding as well as with other findings and
claims made throughout the late 1970’s and 1980’s stating that processing figurative
language was not necessarily more difficult than processing literal statements (Gibbs,
1986; Lakoff & Johnson, 2008; Ortony et al., 1978). This resulted in what came to
be known as the “dual reference” or “class inclusion” account (Glucksberg, 1989,
2001, 2008; Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990; Glucksberg et al., 1997).
The starting point was the rejection of the primacy of literal meaning: Under-
standing metaphors cannot be a process of first computing the literal meaning,
discarding it and reaching a metaphoric interpretation via indirect inference. Instead,
these authors accounted for metaphoric meaning by appealing to a process of dual
reference: During processing, the meaning of a metaphoric vehicle is spontaneously
altered in order to refer to a category with a higher order level of abstraction of
which the metaphoric vehicle is a prototypical member. The expression as a whole
is understood as a category statement, indicating that the metaphoric topic is a
member of the category represented by the vehicle.
There are many established cases of words prototypically standing in for a
higher-level category in languages across the world (Newport & Bellugi, 1978). For
example, in American Sign Language (ASL), categories are expressed by referring
to their most common member.
3) HOUSE FIRE [’t-] LOSE ALL CHAIR-TABLE-BED, ETC., BUT ONE
LEFT, BED
“I lost all my furniture in the house fire but one thing was left: the bed”
Newport and Bellugi (1978) used example (3) above to show that the ASL
signs for “chair”, “table” and “bed” can stand in for the “furniture” category as
a whole. This same phenomenon can also be seen to have occurred in Hebrew,
where the word Demjanjuk, meaning “an ordinary person capable of committing
unspeakable acts” was coined after the trial of war criminal John Demjanjuk,
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accused of having been a guard at the Treblinka death camp in Poland during
the Second World War (Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990).
Less somber examples can easily be found in the genericization of brand names,
i.e. the process through which the name of a specific brand comes to represent all
products of the same category. In German, for example, the brand name Tempo is
used to refer to the entire category of disposable tissues. The brand name Labello
refers to the entire category of lip balms, which in English can also be called
chapstick and in Swedish Lypsyl, which are also brand names. This pattern of
meaning extension is not restricted to brand names, as illustrated by one poignant
example in Glucksberg et al. (1997):
4) Cambodia was Vietnam’s Vietnam
The first use of the word Vietnam in (4) refers to the base-level meaning
(i.e. the country), whereas the second refers to the superordinate category of “failed,
dragged-out military interventions”. Despite this particular novel use of the word
Vietnam, someone acquainted with the relevant political and historical context
should nevertheless be able to easily understand the meaning of (4) as a whole.
An important property of (4) that makes it different from the genericization
examples of Tempo and chapstick is that the intended superordinate category in
(4) is constructed on the fly and is not yet lexicalized. Glucksberg and Keysar
(1990) claim that metaphors instantiate precisely this type of ad hoc categories.
Independently of metaphoric expressions, it has been noted that people often make
use of newly-created categories to serve a specific purpose. For example, the category
of “things that are necessary during a pandemic” could include concrete objects
such as hand sanitizers and surgical masks as well as more abstract ones such as
the idea of social distancing. This category might not be lexicalized (yet), but
it can prove to be quite useful to understand and maintain during the event of
an actual wide-spread infectious airborne disease.
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Barsalou (1983) showed that ad hoc categories such as “things you can bring to
a picnic” - which are less established in memory than lexicalized categories - can
nevertheless be processed similarly to regular lexicalized categories in the way that
they display a coherent internal structure. Barsalou (1983) had participants rate
different potential members of both lexicalized and ad hoc categories. The results
showed that, for both types of categories, participants recognized some members as
being more typical than others, a property of categories known as gradient typicality.
Inspired by Barsalou (1983)’s findings, the suggestion made by Glucksberg and
Keysar (1990), explicated in, Glucksberg (2001, p. 52-67), is that, in a nominal
metaphor such as My job is a jail, the word jail represents both the abstract, ad
hoc, category of “involuntary, unpleasant, confining, punishing, stifling situations”
(which has the properties of ad hoc categories described by Barsalou, 1983) and the
base-level member of the category prison, which is a prototypical instance of the
superordinate ad hoc category. The ad hoc category is referred to as JAIL* .
But how does a comprehender know exactly which ad hoc category to create?
The word snake for example, could be used metaphorically to describe either
people who are vicious in character and potentially dangerous or something that
is shaped the way a snake is.
5) My lawyer was a snake.
6) The road was a snake.
Sentences (5) and (6) (taken from Glucksberg, 2001, p. 53) show just that. The
ad hoc category is in each case a different one, and one could not say that the snake
in (5) counts as a member of the category described by snake in (6). Glucksberg
(2001) (p. 53) claims that in order to create the correct ad hoc category in each
case it is necessary to use a set of dimensions for attribution provided by the
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most meaningful and relevant features of the metaphoric topic as parameters that
regulate the modulation in meaning of the metaphoric vehicle. This means that
the meaning of the metaphoric expression is derived from an interaction between
topic and vehicle in which each of them plays a different role: The topic provides
dimensions for attribution and the vehicle changes its meaning accordingly. This is
described as a process of interactive property attribution by Glucksberg et al. (1997).
2.2.2 The role of context in the formation of ad hoc cat-
egories
One problem with the dual reference account is its apparent lack of consideration
of the role that context plays during comprehension. This is illustrated in examples
(7) and (8) below.
7) My brother always eats more than he should and now he is very overweight.
My brother is an elephant.
8) My brother can remember anything you tell him because of his incredibly good
memory. My brother is an elephant.
(7) and (8) have identical metaphoric topics (My brother) and metaphoric vehicles
(elephant). However, they have very different metaphoric meanings because
they exploit different salient properties of elephants: Being very fat (7) or
having a good memory (8). Glucksberg (2001, p. 54) claims that this is due
to the fact that some topics have more relevant dimensions of attribution that
others. Lawyer, for example, is likely to be characterized on few dimensions
(e.g. skill, reputation, experience, ambition, cost) and it therefore imposes
strict constraints on how the ad hoc category might be constructed, whereas
brother provides very few constraints (one could say a lot of different things
about one’s brother), forcing the construction of the ad hoc category to depend
on contextual information.
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However, if the word brother is replaced with the word lawyer in examples (7)
and (8) the problem remains, as illustrated in examples (9a) and (9b):
9a) My lawyer always eats more than he should and now he is very overweight.
My lawyer is an elephant.
9b) My lawyer can remember anything you tell him because of his incredibly good
memory. My lawyer is an elephant.
Here, we have two identical topic-vehicle pairings with very different interpre-
tations, regardless of how narrow the set of constraints that the word lawyer is
believed to impose. As a result, it is necessary for the theory to consider the role
that context plays in the modulation of the meaning of the metaphoric vehicle.
Context doesn’t just play a role on meaning modulation of novel metaphors,
but has been shown to also modulate sense selection of ambiguous words. Tabossi
(1988) and Tabossi and Zardon (1993), for example, showed that initial access of an
ambiguous word can be influenced by prior context when the context makes salient
a characteristic feature of a word’s dominant meaning: Contextually priming the
dominant meaning of the word port (a harbor) by mentioning the word ship in the
context facilitates lexical access to the word sea in a subsequent lexical decision task
more so than to the word liquor, which is related to the subordinate meaning of port
(a type of wine) or to an unrelated control word (hand) (Experiment 3 of Tabossi,
1988). There was also no difference in priming effect between subordinate (liquor)
and control (hand) words. However, deprived of a context or in the presence of a
neutral context that did not bias the interpretation of the target word, both dominant
(sea) and subordinate (liquor) words displayed priming effects relative to the control
word (hand) (Experiments 1 and 2), in line with previous findings (Swinney, 1979).
Context-sensitivity of conceptual features has also been found in instances
of conceptual combination. Glucksberg and Estes (2000) investigated whether
conceptual combinations such as peeled apple would make features of the head
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noun (round, i.e. the shape of apples) or features of the adjective-noun phrase
(white, i.e. the color of peeled apples ) more accessible as a function of said feature’s
contextual relevance. They set up an experiment in which participants read a
4-sentence context that made either noun-level (some kids are looking for balls
to play bowling with and chose to use peeled apples) or phrase-level properties
(a chef is making a colorful fruit arrangement and uses peeled apples) relevant
(context factor: noun-relevant vs. phrase-relevant). Participants then verified
statements about either phrase-level (peeled apples are white) or noun-level (peeled
apples are round) features (feature factor: phrase vs. noun). They found that in
the noun-relevant context conditions, participants were faster at verifying noun
compared to phrase features. The reverse was true in the phrase-relevant context
conditions: Participants were faster to verify phrase features compared to noun
features. This resulted in a significant interaction between the two factors, but in no
main effects. The authors interpreted this result as suggesting that during processing
of conceptually combined phrases such as peeled apples, relevant information is
more accessible than irrelevant information, independently of whether these features
relate to the level of a phrase or of the phrase’s head noun.
Metaphoric expressions could also be seen as a type of contextually sensitive
conceptual combination: In (9a) and (9b) the words lawyer and elephant are
combined to produce a new interpretation of the expression as a whole. In each case,
however, the interpretation heavily depends on the properties of lawyer that are
made relevant by the context and not by any inherent set of dimensions provided by
the word lawyer on its own: “Fat” in (9a) and “good memory” in (9b). Accordingly,
it can be said that contextual relevance affects the availability of salient features of
the metaphoric topic, which in turn provides a different set of parameters necessary
to modulate the meaning of the metaphoric vehicle, resulting in the two very
different interpretations of (9a) and (9b).
The role that context plays in restricting the set of parameters for modulation is
more thoroughly explicated by another account that views metaphor comprehension
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as a type of category inclusion: Sperber and Wilson’s Deflationary Account of
metaphor comprehension (Sperber & Wilson, 2008).
2.2.3 Sperber and Wilson’s deflationary account
Sperber and Wilson (2008) lay out an account that is both similar to and compatible
with the dual reference model of Glucksberg and collaborators. They posit that
metaphors are understood through a process of lexical modulation: The vehicle
in a nominal metaphor undergoes adjustment of its lexical meaning given a set of
contextual parameters. This process results in the creation of an occasion-specific,
ad hoc category, very much in line with Glucksberg’s view. There are, however, two
key aspects in which the views differ, namely the scope of Sperber and Wilson’s
account and the degree of specification of their theory.
Scope of the account
Sperber and Wilson claim that metaphors are not a natural class, but are instead on
a continuum of cases in which lexical meaning is contextually adjusted (thus the use
of the word “deflationary” when referring to the account). This means that Sperber
and Wilson’s account is considerably broader in scope than Glucksberg’s, since
Sperber and Wilson believe that constructing ad hoc concepts is not only the way
through which metaphors are understood, but more generally how most words are
pragmatically enriched. Ultimately, the goal of this account is to unify all processes
involved in lexical pragmatics (Wilson & Carston, 2007). To do this, they make use
of the inferential machinery of the communicative framework known as Relevance
Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986; Wilson & Sperber, 2004; Wilson & Sperber,
1999; Wilson, 2003; Wilson & Carston, 2007; Wilson & Sperber, 2012, i.a.).
Relevance Theory takes two Gricean ideas as a point of departure, namely that (1)
a fundamental feature of human communication is the expression and understanding
of intentions and (2) that in conversation, utterances create expectations that make
it possible for the listener to understand what a speaker’s intentions are (Wilson &
Sperber, 2004). As explained in the beginning of this chapter, Grice believed that a
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listener understands a speaker’s intentions by reasoning about the speaker’s utterance
on the basis of the cooperative principle and the maxims of conversation. Sperber and
Wilson overhaul this system by claiming that listeners only need a general principle
of relevance to guide their inferential reasoning (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, p. 46).
According to this Principle of Relevance2, every utterance brings with it an
expectation of optimal relevance that provides sufficient evidence of the underlying
communicative intentions of a speaker. Relevance is defined as a property of
utterances (and other stimuli) to cognitive processes: An utterance is relevant
when it minimizes the cognitive effort necessary to process a given stimulus and
maximizes the cognitive effect achieved by processing said stimulus. The greater
the effect and the smaller the effort, the more relevant an utterance is to a hearer.
For our discussion on metaphor, the most important type of cognitive effect is that
of a contextual implication (see Wilson & Carston, 2007), which is derivable by
integrating an utterance with the context available to the listener.
The relevance-oriented comprehension heuristic is what allows a listener to
understand the meaning of asleep in sentence (10) below.
10) The audience was asleep throughout the professor’s lecture.
In (10), the speaker might mean to communicate that all members of the
audience literally had their eyes closed during the lecture and slept throughout
it (literal, conventional meaning of asleep). It is more likely however, that the
intention was to communicate that only some of them were sleeping or perhaps
yawning (ASLEEP*), in which case the speaker might be exaggerating, or that
the audience was merely bored or not attentive (ASLEEP**), in which case the
2The Principle of Relevance comes in two versions: the Communicative Principle, which refers
specifically to the way in which utterances carry the expectation to be relevant enough to be
processed by the listener, and the Cognitive Principle, which refers to the way in which cognition
in general is geared towards optimal relevance. Only the Communicative Principle is of interest
for the current discussion.
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speaker was speaking metaphorically. The correct interpretation depends on the
set of interpretative assumptions available to the listener: If, for example, the
listener knows that the professor is famous for his tedious lectures, she might
more readily understand asleep as standing in for the ad hoc category ASLEEP**,
meaning something along the lines of “boring”, because this interpretation is the
most relevant one given her assumptions: It strikes an optimal balance between
the cognitive effects it brings with it and the cost of deriving them.
As the explanation of example (10) shows, Relevance Theory provides a spe-
cific account regarding the way in which context is integrated during utterance
comprehension: To determine the appropriate meaning extension of asleep, the
listener must incorporate their knowledge about the speaker’s intentions, which in
turn are inferred from the situational context. This process is triggered by every
utterance’s presumption of optimal relevance. For metaphor processing this means
that the modulation of a vehicle will always be contingent on the relevant context
and is not only a product of the topic-vehicle interaction.
Degree of specification
Sperber and Wilson’s view is more specific than Glucksberg’s in that it provides a
more detailed classification of the different types of lexical modulation as well as
a more systematic view of the role of context during comprehension. According
to Sperber and Wilson (2008), there are two distinct types of lexical modulation
involved in metaphor comprehension (and in lexical pragmatics in general): Lexical
broadening and narrowing. Through broadening, lexical meaning is extended so
that the newly-constructed ad hoc concept expresses a broader set of senses than
the encoded meaning would. Through narrowing, the ad hoc concept becomes more
specific, excluding cases that the encoded meaning would cover.
11) It’s 2 PM right now.[uttered at 1:56 PM]
12) I’m freezing. [uttered at 20 degrees Celsius]
13) Psycholinguists like to drink. [uttered at a post-conference social event]
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In (11) we have a case in which a number has an imprecise, approximate
interpretation: the encoded meaning is broadened to accept numbers that are close
to 2 PM if it meets a listener’s expectations of relevance. In (12) we have a more
extreme case of broadening: The word freezing changes meaning to include a wider
range of temperatures. In (13) we have a case of lexical narrowing: Drink no
longer refers to ingesting liquids in general, but specifically to drinking alcohol,
and perhaps also plenty of it.
There is empirical evidence supporting the view that speakers modulate the
meaning of words when uttering sentences such as (11) by considering the listener’s
expectations of relevance (i.e., by inferring the interlocutor’s intentions through the
linguistic and situational context). Gibbs and Bryant (2008) investigated the way
in which people produce answers to questions about time. They found that when
the question was framed without a context (e.g. Could you tell me what time it is?)
participants tended to round their answers, as in sentence (11). However, when
speakers were given different clues regarding the listener’s expectations of relevance
(e.g. My watch stopped working and I need to re-calibrate it, could you tell me
what time it is?) participants consistently gave more precise answers, presumably
because they considered this to be relevant information for re-calibrating a watch
(which was the explicitly stated intention of their interlocutor).
14) Sebastian’s cat is a princess.
A metaphor such as (14) is another case of simultaneous broadening and
narrowing of the lexical meaning. The ad hoc category PRINCESS*, meaning
roughly “spoiled and needy”, is constructed by including all things that are spoiled
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and needy but are not literal princesses (such as Sebastian’s cat) and excluding
all literal princesses that are not spoiled and needy.
This leaves us with an account of metaphor comprehension that is more specific
and context-sensitive than the dual reference account regarding the sub-processes
involved in comprehension and how they interact, even though the output of the
process remains the same (the construction of an ad hoc category).
The account is also more specific regarding the parameters that facilitate
lexical modulation. Instead of these being generated by the salient features of the
metaphoric topic alone, they are a product of the set of interpretative assumptions
that the listener considers to be relevant. This can explain the differences in
meaning construction between sentences (9a) and (9b).
2.3 Metaphor as Implicit Comparison
A different approach in the study of metaphors to the one introduced in the
previous sections originates from thinking about how a metaphor highlights relational
commonalities between concepts. Whereas categorization approaches view sentences
such as (14) as primarily stating a property of Sebastian’s cat, it is also possible to
think about what this sentence says about princesses in general. Why would someone
wish to use princesses to conceptualize a cat? What is it about princesses that allows
for such a conceptualization to meaningfully take place? Another way to ask these
questions is to think about the relationship between sentence (14) and (15) below.
15) Sebastian’s cat is like a princess.
Sentence (15) is a simile that explicitly draws a comparison between the cat
and the princess. Arguably, it conveys the same information as (14), namely that
there is some relevant point of comparison between cats and princesses that can
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be highlighted. When seen this way, metaphors, similes analogies and other forms
of comparison seem to fall under the same category of processes that establish
correspondences between situations, concepts and sets of correspondences. This is
the main idea behind theories of metaphor as Implicit Comparison.
The most thoroughly developed instantiation of such a theory is that of Structure-
Mapping Theory (also referred to as analogical reasoning), developed by Dedre
Gentner and collaborators(Gentner & Markman, 1997; Gentner et al., 2001; Gentner
& Bowdle, 2008; Wolff & Gentner, 2000; Wolff & Gentner, 2011, among others).
However, there are other theories that share the idea that metaphors involve
mappings across domains. Two very prominent instances are Conceptual Metaphor
Theory (CMT) (Lakoff, 2008; Lakoff & Johnson, 2008) and Blending Theory
(Fauconnier & Turner, 2003), both developed in the tradition of cognitive linguistics.
CMT puts forth the idea that individual metaphoric expressions are mere surface
manifestations of a network of pre-existent mental mappings known as Conceptual
Metaphors, whose function is to allow us to understand abstract domains in terms
of concrete ones. According to Lakoff and collaborators, metaphors are not a
language phenomenon, but fundamentally a phenomenon of the domain of thought.
Thus, when we hear metaphoric expressions such as Pete and I have been going
in different directions for years or Our relationship hit a dead end, an initial step
in understanding them is the activation of the conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A
PATH (where LOVE is called the “target domain” and PATH the “base domain”),
that these two sentences are believed to be instantiations of. A main tenet of CMT
is the belief that metaphors are not special uses of language that require additional
mechanisms. Instead, they are part of everyday life and can be explained by the
same mechanisms as other instances of language. This is a common feature of all
the contemporary theories of metaphor comprehension discussed in this chapter
(and emerged as a response to Grice’s account). What makes CMT particularly
akin to structure-mapping is the way that it posits that metaphor understanding
requires the alignment of structural relations across the elements of a metaphor.
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This happens via the requirement that the target domain in a metaphor conserve
the cognitive topology of the base (Lakoff, 1990).
Whereas CMT studies the ways in which metaphors can shape cognition and
society, Blending Theory’s main concern is to examine how meaning is dynamically
constructed. In the domain of metaphors, the main focus is to understand how a
new mental representation arises from the combination (or “blend”) of topic and
vehicle. For this purpose, they posit an intricate network of input spaces that
contain the conceptual features of each element individually (cat and princess,
in (15)) and a blended space, which holds a superimposed mental representation
of both elements simultaneously (a “cat-princess”, or “princess-cat”). Multiple
mappings are then allowed to happen between the different spaces (Fauconnier
& Turner, 1998, 2008). As with CMT, Blending theory is related to structure-
mapping in that an underlying process of structural comparison is a requirement
for systematic mappings across domains.
The way in which CMT, Blending Theory and Structure-Mapping can be
reconciled has been extensively discussed. See, for example, Gentner et al. (2001);
Holyoak and Stamenković (2018); and Murphy (1996) on the compatibility between
CMT and structure-mapping, and Coulson and Oakley (2005) for a suggestion on
how Structure-Mapping Theory can be integrated into Blending Theory. Given that
Structure-Mapping has been spelled-out in terms of a cognitive architecture with
specific mechanisms that are empirically testable, I will take it as the prototypical
representative of Implicit Comparison views.
2.3.1 Structure-Mapping Theory
In Structure-Mapping Theory, concepts are assumed to be organized as information
about objects and their properties, relations between objects as well as higher-
order relations between relations. When processing a metaphor, these networks of
interconnected information are systematically mapped between the elements of the
metaphoric expression: A system of relations that holds for one metaphoric element
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is understood as also holding for the other by means of reasoning analogically
about the systematicities in the structure of concepts.
Analogical reasoning is spelled out as an online processing theory (Gentner et al.,
2001) and has also been computationally instantiated as the Structure Mapping
Engine (SME) (Falkenhainer et al., 1989). According to Structure-Mapping Theory,
a metaphor is understood in two stages: An initial stage of structural alignment and
a secondary one of projection of inferences from vehicle to topic (Gentner & Bowdle,
2008). The initial stage consists of establishing an explicit set of correspondences
between the relational structure of the two elements in a metaphor. This stage is
itself divided into three phases in which matches between identical properties of topic
and vehicle are established and then grouped together into structurally consistent
clusters called “kernels”. The kernels are then merged into a few structurally
consistent interpretations. These interpretations are then quantified in terms of
the number of partial matches between structures.
Importantly, structural alignment is shaped by specific constraints of structural
consistency (Gentner et al., 2001): (1) There must be a one-to-one correspondence
between the elements being mapped (these could be properties or relations that hold
for both vehicle and topic); (2) parallel connectivity, meaning that the arguments
of all the predicates that correspond must also correspond.
A critical feature of this model is that, throughout processing, the search for
commonalities is guided by a systematicity principle (Gentner et al., 2001),
stating that matches that are connected via “deep” higher-order constraining
relations (such as relations of causality) should be preferred over “superficial”
matches that are independent of one another (such as color and shape).
The second stage of processing (the projection of inferences) is also guided
by the systematicity principle: Comprehenders don’t project random properties
of vehicle to topic. Instead, they import information from vehicle to topic that
can fill missing pieces in the topic’s structure according to the shared system of
relations established during structural alignment (Bowdle & Gentner, 1997; Clement
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& Gentner, 1991). These structural inferences are what eventually become evident
in the final interpretation of the metaphoric expression.
2.3.2 The role of context in Structure-Mapping Theory
Structure-Mapping Theory (and its computational implementation, the SME) have
three important characteristics regarding the relationship between context and a
metaphoric expression that have repercussions for the way in which metaphors
are processed (Gentner et al., 2001).
Firstly, the SME begins blindly. This means that it does not need to know
the point of the comparison between vehicle and topic prior to computing the
metaphor’s meaning, which is inferred solely on the basis of the similarities in
structure of both terms. This means that the relationship between context and a
metaphoric expression is quite different to that posited by categorization theories
(specifically by Relevance Theory), which state that context guides the derivation
of the relevant features of a topic that set the parameters for lexical modulation: If
the relevant features are highlighted in advance, determining the parameters for
modulation will be easier, impacting the earliest stages of processing. Analogical
reasoning, on the other hand, does not need a context that highlights the relevant
features of the topic in order to generate a structural alignment: A context that
highlights relevant features of the topic can only influence secondary processing
stages, i.e. when inferences are projected.
However, this doesn’t mean that context does not play any role at all. According
to Structure-Mapping Theory, context can influence the early stages of processing
by facilitating access to the mappings across domains that are normally established
during the first phase of structural alignment: Such a context can be given by
providing instances of other metaphors that make use of the same alignments of
conceptual structure. This should result in a priming effect on the processing
of subsequent related metaphors (Gentner & Bowdle, 2008; Keysar et al., 2000;
Thibodeau & Durgin, 2008).
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These multi-expression metaphors are known as extended metaphors. Below
is an excerpt of Hector Lavoe’s song “Periódico de Ayer”, which provides a great
example of an extended metaphor:
Tu amor es un periódico de ayer
Que nadie más procura ya leer.
Sensacional cuando salió en la madrugada.
a mediodía ya noticia confirmada,
Y en la tarde materia olvidada.
“Your love is yesterday’s newspaper:
no one bothers reading it anymore.
It was sensational when it came out at dawn.
By noon it was a well-established fact.
In the evening it had already been forgotten.”
— Hector Lavoe, Periódico de ayer
The conceptualization of a relationship as yesterday’s news is established at the
beginning of the song and carried on across multiple lines (in fact, throughout the
majority of the piece). According to Implicit Comparison accounts, the subsequent
lines should be easier to process metaphorically because the conceptual domains
have successfully been aligned in the first line of the song, so the initial stage of
alignment in subsequent metaphors can be easily sped-up.
A second characteristic of the SME is that it can derive multiple interpretations
from the same metaphor based on the different number of possible structural
alignment matches between the elements of the metaphor. This has some interesting
theoretical consequences. The first one is intuitively true: Sometimes a single
metaphor can generate multiple meanings (see for example the discussion of sentences
(9a) and (9b) earlier in the chapter).
Generally, the SME chooses between competing interpretations by counting the
number of structural matches and following the systematicity principle. However, as
examples (9a) and (9b) show, sometimes systematicity in the internal structure of
the words by themselves is not enough to select the correct metaphoric interpretation.
For this purpose, integration with both world knowledge and context are crucial.
This is briefly mentioned by Gentner et al. (2001), who state the following: “Which
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interpretation (of a metaphor) you choose will depend on (a) which has the largest
and deepest common structure, as discussed above; (b) which best fits other knowledge
about the target; and (c) which is more relevant to the current context” (p. 237).
But when and how does context relevance come into play? If SME aligns structure
between individual concepts, it seems like context would have to come into play at
later stages, since the earlier moments of processing in Structure-Mapping Theory
are blind by design. This remains unclear.
Despite the uncertainty regarding the way in which context helps select the best
possible interpretation, the fact that the SME generates multiple interpretations of
an utterance simultaneously has an interesting theoretical consequence: It means
that a sentence can have both a literal and a metaphoric interpretation, such that
sentence (14) could generate the interpretation that Sebastian’s cat is a member of
a royal family. This is a characteristic that Structure-Mapping Theory shares with
categorization views: There is no primacy of the literal meaning. Figurative and
literal language are processed by the same mechanisms and in similar time-frames.
This is consistent with the evidence against the Gricean system discussed earlier
in this chapter (e.g. Gibbs, 1986; Glucksberg et al., 1982).
The third important characteristic of the SME that has repercussions on how
metaphor processing interacts with context is the following: According to Structure-
Mapping Theory, inferences happen as a natural consequence of structural alignment
without the need of additional machinery. Clusters of structure are carried over
from topic to vehicle in order to provide meaningful content to the metaphoric
topic in a way that maximizes structural consistency. As a consequence of this,
understanding a metaphor is a necessarily symmetric process in which both terms
contribute equally to processing (Wolff & Gentner, 2011, p. 1459). This carries
the underlying assumption that both topic and vehicle could be integrated in a
similar way with the preceding context, since their relative order should not impact
the way that the metaphor is understood.
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I will turn to this issue in more detail in the following section, where the most
prominent tests of the predictions made by theories on metaphor comprehension
will be addressed, together with a discussion of their limitations.
2.4 Empirical Testing Grounds for Theories of
Metaphor Comprehension
2.4.1 Role of the literal meaning
An issue of importance for metaphor theories is the role that the literal meaning
of a metaphoric vehicle plays during processing:
16) The journalist’s opinion was fenced in after the change in regime.
In (16), the verb fenced in entails the concept of physical containment; its direct
object is something that is not allowed to physically move. However, when we hear
that the opinion has been fenced-in, the feature of a physical barrier is not part
of the final metaphoric meaning: We do not generate the interpretation that an
opinion cannot physically move, but instead that the journalist is not allowed to
speak freely. Physical containment is in this case a type of literal feature whose
meaning is not carried over to the metaphoric interpretation in its original form.
Similarly, in (15), several properties of the encoded meaning of princess are very
noticeably not part of the overall metaphoric meaning: We do not believe the cat to
be of noble origin, nor do we think that the cat is wearing a royal dress or a tiara.
The role of these literal features during processing is one of the battlefields of
theories on metaphor comprehension, and the two main theories that I’ve discussed
so far make very different predictions in this regard.
From a category inclusion perspective, the noun opinion in (16) provides the
parameter of [+ abstract] (and the topic in (15), the cat, provides the parameter [+
domestic animal]). This parameter, together with the relevant utterance context,
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determines the way in which the metaphoric vehicle is modulated. This can be
interpreted as meaning that only those features that are needed for the construction
of metaphoric meaning (i.e. features compatible with the parameters provided
by the topic and the discourse context) are activated, while those incompatible
with the parameters are suppressed.
Support for this view comes from priming experiments. Gernsbacher et al. (2001)
showed participants either a metaphoric or a literal sentence as a prime (That defense
lawyer is a shark or That large hammerhead is a shark) and then asked them to
perform a verification task on a sentence describing a feature of the vehicle that was
irrelevant or relevant for the construction of the metaphoric meaning (sharks are good
swimmers or sharks are tenacious). They found that, after reading metaphorical
primes, participants were faster at verifying sentences describing a relevant feature
for the metaphoric interpretation compared to when they read a literal prime. They
also found that verifying sentences about a metaphor-irrelevant property took longer
after reading a metaphor than after reading a literal statement. They interpreted
these results in terms of activation of relevant features and suppression of irrelevant
ones: When the word shark is used metaphorically, features such as “vicious” are
enhanced and features such as “good swimmer” are inhibited. This result suggests
that, after a metaphor has been understood, irrelevant literal features are no longer
active, given that the meaning of the vehicle has been successfully modulated.
Rubio Fernandez (2007) conducted a similar study with the key difference that
the target was a single word and it was shown at varying intervals. She found that
at short intervals (0 milliseconds and 400 milliseconds) literal features that were
not relevant for the metaphoric interpretation were primed by the metaphor and
only actively suppressed when presented 1000 milliseconds after the prime. This
suggests that these irrelevant literal features are indeed initially activated after a
metaphor has been comprehended and are only suppressed at a later point.
McGlone and Manfredi (2001) deployed a reversed version of this paradigm
and showed participants irrelevant (sharks can be blue) or relevant (sharks can be
ruthless) literal features as primes and then metaphorical sentences (some lawyers are
2. Accounting for Metaphor Comprehension 41
sharks) as targets. They found that relevant features facilitated whereas irrelevant
features hindered comprehension compared to a baseline condition without a
prime, suggesting that literal properties of the vehicle are suppressed early on
during processing.
From the perspective of Implicit Comparison, on the other hand, the activation of
different types of features of the meaning vehicle is not contingent upon parameters
provided by the topic. According to Structure-Mapping Theory, the structures
of the metaphoric elements have to be thoroughly scanned for similarities during
the first stage of processing (Gentner et al., 2001). This forcefully requires all
features of both vehicle and topic to be initially activated, because in order to
find similarities in structures, it is necessary to first activate all knowledge of
both structures individually.
Support for this view comes from an event-related potential (ERP) version of
the metaphor paradigm. Weiland et al. (2014) showed participants a masked prime
(presented on screen for only 67 ms) consisting of a word representing a feature
associated only with the literal meaning of an upcoming metaphoric vehicle and
irrelevant for the construction of metaphoric meaning (furry, for the metaphor These
lobbyists are hyenas) followed by the metaphor itself. They found that the N400
effect (computed as the difference in stimulus-related average electrical responses
between the metaphor and a sentence in which the vehicle appears in its literal
meaning, such as These predators are hyenas) was reduced when participants saw the
literal prime compared to when they did not see any prime at all. This suggests that
literal features can indeed ease comprehension of a metaphor, even when they are
completely irrelevant for the constructed metaphoric meaning (furry is not generally
part of the final interpretation of the metaphor my lawyer is a hyena). This result
is incompatible with that of McGlone and Manfredi (2001), who had found that
literal features irrelevant for the metaphoric meaning (sharks can be blue, for the
metaphor some lawyers are sharks) hindered comprehension of the metaphors.
The Implicit Comparison View also makes explicit predictions regarding the
activation pattern of literal features after the metaphor has been understood.
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They claim that, once a metaphor has been understood, the pattern of mappings
between topic and vehicle, which arises as a consequence of structural alignment,
remains activated and is available for subsequent processing (Gentner et al., 2001),
allowing for further mapping from one domain to another. This is referred to as
“incremental mapping”, and has been formalized computationally as the Incremental
Structure-Mapping Engine (Forbus et al., 1994). Evidence for this view comes
from investigations on extended metaphors. Gentner and Boronat (1992) had
participants read question-answer pairs where the answer was always identical
(No, she was doing a slow simmer) and the question either shared the same
metaphoric mapping with the answer (Was Anna still boiling mad when you saw
her?) or had a different type of mapping (Was Anna still a raging beast when you
saw her?). Participants read the answer significantly faster when the metaphoric
mappings were shared across question and answers compared to when they weren’t.
It has also been found that novel metaphors prime subsequent novel metaphors
that share the same conceptual mappings between domains (Keysar et al., 2000)
and even that conventional metaphors can prime subsequent novel metaphors
(Thibodeau & Durgin, 2008).
These findings are somewhat challenging to account for from the perspective of
Category Inclusion, which seems to posit that metaphor comprehension occurs only
locally: If the meaning of the metaphoric vehicle is altered so that irrelevant literal
features are suppressed, how can these features be re-activated to prime subsequent
related metaphors? One answer, coming from within Relevance Theory, is given by
Carston (2010). She claims that, in an extended metaphor, the multiple related
words that are semantically associated are mutually reinforcing, resulting in an
enhanced activation of the literal meaning (which she calls the “lingering” of the
literal meaning). This can lead to the entire literal meaning of the extended metaphor
to be meta-represented and considered as a sort of “imaginary world”, where the
individual metaphors are understood literally. This leads to metaphoric meaning
only being derived in later stages of processing (Rubio-Fernández et al., 2016).
Consider the extended metaphor in Hector Lavoe’s song, presented in the previous
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section. If hearing only the line Your love is yesterday’s newspaper, a listener might
locally adjust the expression yesterday’s newspaper to create an ad hoc category
meaning something along the lines of “a past event that is now irrelevant”. However,
when the song continues, the semantically related words reading, sensational and
fact reinforce each other, so that the listener imagines a world in which love is
literally the newspaper from yesterday. Further metaphoric meaning is derived later
by reasoning about the similarities between the imaginary world and the real world.
Regarding the activation of literal features, the difference between Implicit
Comparison views and the view of Carston (2010) seems to be that Carston (2010)
would predict a facilitation effect of metaphors on subsequent related metaphors
based on semantic reinforcement of related words, whereas Gentner et al. (2001)
predicts a general activation of structural mapping patterns after any metaphor
has been activated. In other words, the Implicit Comparison view predicts that
literal features of a metaphor remain active after a metaphor is understood because
these are part of a complex network of mappings between the encoded meanings
of the metaphoric topic and the metaphoric vehicle. The Category Inclusion view
of Carston (2010), on the other hand, predicts activation of the encoded semantic
features of a metaphoric vehicle (i.e. “lingering” of the literal meaning), not of
a network of systematic mappings.
To sum up, the empirical findings discussed in this section show a muddled view
on the role that literal features play during metaphor comprehension. Whereas it
has been suggested that literal features, when activated before the metaphor is read,
hinder subsequent processing (McGlone & Manfredi, 2001) and are immediately
suppressed after the metaphor is understood (Gernsbacher et al., 2001), others claim
that these features can actually ease subsequent processing of a metaphor when
activated prior to metaphor presentation (Weiland et al., 2014), active for at least
400 milliseconds after processing (Rubio Fernandez, 2007), and facilitate processing
of subsequent related metaphors in the setting of an extended metaphor (Gentner
& Boronat, 1992; Keysar et al., 2000; Thibodeau & Durgin, 2008). Outside of
the setting of an extended metaphor however, these features should not remain
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activated (which can be inferred from Carston, 2010). This lack of agreement in
the literature shows that there is need for further evidence in this debate, given
its repercussions for theory development.
2.4.2 Are metaphors processed symmetrically?
A further critical aspect in which the theories differ is the role that the topic
and vehicle play during the construction of metaphoric meaning. The implicit
comparison view sees both elements playing the same initial role. In Structure-
Mapping Theory, aligning the structures of the elements of a metaphor requires
the same mechanisms to apply to each of them individually and then to the two
of them combined: Structurally consistent kernels are found and then grouped
together, forming large clusters of shared structure. This means that processing is
fundamentally symmetric: The order of the elements does not matter, since the
goal of processing is just to determine what the similarities are in the structure of
the elements. Only in later stages of processing, when inferences are projected from
vehicle to topic, does processing appear to be directional. However, this is only an
epiphenomenon of the way in which structure-mapping attempts to fill missing holes
in the structure of the metaphoric topic (Clement & Gentner, 1991). In practice, this
means that the sequential order of the elements should not be a determining criterion
for whether or not a comprehender can derive meaning from a metaphoric expression.
The Category Inclusion view, on the other hand, assigns role-specific tasks to
topic and vehicle (e.g. Glucksberg, 2001, p 55-56): The topic’s job is to provide
parameters for modulation. It guides the interpretation of the upcoming stream
of information by informing the comprehender of the relevant set of dimensions
that are going to be necessary to process the upcoming metaphoric vehicle. Upon
encountering the vehicle, an ad hoc category is constructed on the basis of the
vehicle’s encoded meaning and the dimensions provided by the topic and the
contextual relevance constraints. If the vehicle were to be encountered prior to the
topic, processing would necessarily have to be different: Deprived of all the necessary
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parameters for lexical modulation, the vehicle’s encoded meaning would have to be
activated in full, only to be reassessed later, after encountering the metaphoric topic.
Wolff and Gentner (2011) addressed this issue experimentally by examining
the comprehension times of reversed metaphors: They showed participants highly
directional nominal metaphors (a rumor is a virus), their reversed counterparts (a
virus is a rumor), literal category statements (the apple is a fruit) or scrambled
statements (the cat is a library). Participants were asked to quickly give a
comprehension judgment (in the form of a yes/no answer) after the sentence
had been presented for 1200 or 1800 milliseconds (in Experiment 1); 600 or 1200
milliseconds (in Experiment 2); and 500 or 1600 milliseconds (in Experiment 3).
The reasoning was as follows: If initial stages of metaphor processing are symmetric,
then forward and reversed metaphors should be comprehensible at comparable
rates in the earliest time windows, whereas literal category statements should
consistently be judged as more comprehensible and scrambled statements as more
incomprehensible than the metaphors in every time window.
The results confirmed their hypothesis and showed that at the earliest time
windows (500 and 600 milliseconds) participants gave comparable judgments to the
metaphors and reversed counterparts. The literal category statements were deemed
to be significantly more comprehensible than both types of metaphoric, while the
scrambled statements were deemed to be the least comprehensible of all. The
authors argue that this is evidence in favor of an initial alignment stage in which
both topic and vehicle are evaluated equally regardless of their position: If during
initial stages of processing the order of the metaphorical elements mattered, then
we should have seen significantly lower comprehensibility ratings for the scrambled
compared to the regular metaphors.
However, this evidence is only indirect, since it is based on the absence of
an effect: The fact that participants were similarly likely to rate forward and
reversed metaphors as comprehensible is not an unequivocal indicator that they
are being processed equally. This is an important point, seeing that forward
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and reversed metaphors can have diametrically different meanings, as evidenced
by sentences (17) and (18).
17) My butcher is a surgeon
18) My surgeon is a butcher
This stark difference in meaning makes it difficult to draw direct conclusions on
comparable comprehension rates: It is simply not felicitous to compare these types
of forward and reversed metaphors. Wolff and Gentner (2011) also put participants
through an extensive practice round prior to testing: Participants went through
64 practice trials (which included metaphors and reversed metaphors) prior to the
actual 72 experimental items. This makes it possible that participants developed a
task-specific comprehension strategy. That being the case, the results could be seen
as a reflection of this strategy and not of how metaphors are normally comprehended.
A further important point pertains to the role of context. Wolff and Gentner
(2011) tested the hypothesis of symmetry on nominal metaphors presented indi-
vidually. However, as examined previously in this chapter, categorization views
(Relevance theory in particular) highlight the role of context for the construction of
metaphoric meaning: The parameters for modulation are not provided by the topic
exclusively but by a combination of topic, a listener’s assumptions and background
information, as well as the relevant discourse context. A more ecologically valid
test of the theories would have been to provide participants with a brief context
before every forward and reversed metaphor.
2.4.3 Mediating factors: conventionality, aptness and fa-
miliarity
The final issue to be discussed is the possibility that metaphor comprehension
is not a unitary process and that different processing routes could be available
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depending on underlying mediating factors such as grammatical form, individual
differences between comprehenders, semantic properties of the stimuli or the
influence of context.
In fact, the literature on metaphor processing has provided evidence for various
factors having a mediating effect on comprehension. Three haven been given
particular importance throughout the years: the first one, metaphoric aptness,
is defined as the degree to which the figurative meaning of a metaphoric vehicle
captures important features of the metaphoric topic (Jones & Estes, 2006). Sentence
(19) could be said to be fairly apt: The property “ruthless” of the lexical item shark
is made salient (since this is one of the only few properties of sharks which can be
used to describe the personality traits of a human being, as opposed to “having
fins” or “living underwater”) and it can capture (arguably) relevant features of the
topic my landlord with relative ease (since in some contexts the word landlord has a
negative connotation and it is associated with ruthless individuals, see for example
the German word Miethai). The second key factor that mediates comprehension
is metaphor conventionality, which is determined by the frequency in which a
metaphoric vehicle is used in its metaphoric meaning in a given language (Bowdle &
Gentner, 2005): The metaphoric vehicle in sentence (19) (shark) might be frequently
used in this particular way, so (19) is a fairly conventional metaphor. The third
mediating factor is conceptually related to conventionality and tries to capture
the frequency of use of the entire metaphoric expression, i.e. topic and vehicle,
and is known as metaphoric familiarity (Thibodeau & Durgin, 2011): Whereas
sentence (19) might be highly familiar, (20) below might not be, even though their
conventionality would be thought of as being the same:
19) My landlord is a shark.
20) Eva is defending a shark. [in a context in which she is a landlord’s lawyer]
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Both of the leading views on metaphor comprehension – Implicit Comparison
and Category Inclusion – state that different metaphors might follow different
processing routes during comprehension. The key difference between the theories in
this regard is which one of the three factors (aptness, conventionality or familiarity)
is viewed as responsible for the shift between processing routes.
Category Inclusion views state that in most cases metaphors will be understood
via category inclusion. However, there are instances in which such a strategy will
fail and language users will resort to analogical reasoning in order to derive meaning
from a metaphoric expression. Specifically (in what he informally referred to as the
quality-of-metaphors hypothesis), Glucksberg (2008) states that metaphors with
low aptness values might not be easily understood via category inclusion and will
instead most likely be understood as an implicit comparison through analogical
reasoning. This is a consequence of the way in which categorization is thought
to operate: If the topic and discourse context provide parameters that are not
compatible with the retrieved features of the metaphoric vehicle it will require a
deeper analysis of the structure of both elements, thus engaging in the first stage
of analogical reasoning: structural alignment.
Implicit Comparison views, on the other hand, see analogical reasoning as the
default mechanism applied to any given metaphoric expression. However, this
can be modulated either by a metaphor’s conventionality (Bowdle & Gentner,
2005) or familiarity (Thibodeau & Durgin, 2011), which both refer to frequency of
exposure to either the vehicle (conventionality) or the topic-vehicle pair (familiarity).
The reasoning is as follows: Through repeated exposure, the literal meaning of
a metaphoric vehicle will become progressively more associated to its figurative
meaning and will more likely be processed as a category statement. Eventually,
the metaphoric vehicle will become completely fossilized and its meaning will be
merely retrieved from memory (such as the word legs when speaking of a chair or
a table). This view is known as the “career of metaphor hypothesis” (Bowdle &
Gentner, 2005): When hearing the word shark used metaphorically to describe a
landlord for the first time, it will necessarily require analogical reasoning. However,
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the more often this specific metaphoric vehicle (according to Bowdle & Gentner,
2005) or this specific topic-vehicle pair (according to Thibodeau & Durgin, 2011)
is heard, the more likely it is that it will be processed as a category statement
given that repeated exposure strengthens the association between the vehicle’s
literal and figurative meaning. Eventually, the word shark acquires the secondary
meaning “ruthless” and it is processed in the same way as a word with multiple
stored meanings such as bank or bug.
The influence of familiarity, conventionality and aptness on metaphor processing
has been shown experimentally on numerous occasions (Blasko & Connine, 1993;
Bowdle & Gentner, 2005; D. Chiappe & Kennedy, 1999; D. Chiappe, Kennedy, &
Chiappe, 2003; D. Chiappe, Kennedy, & Smykowski, 2003; Jones & Estes, 2006):
More apt metaphors are understood faster and better than less apt ones, more
conventional metaphors are understood faster and better than less conventional
ones (Gentner & Wolff, 1997), and more familiar metaphors are understood faster
than less familiar ones (Thibodeau & Durgin, 2011). What does this tell us about
the comprehension mechanisms involved?
Bowdle and Gentner (2005) investigated this by examining the differences in
comprehending metaphors and similes. Their logic was as follows: Similes (my lawyer
is like a shark) explicate a comparison between two terms and trigger analogical
reasoning, whereas metaphors have the surface form of Category Inclusion and are
more likely to be understood as category statements. Thus, by examining which type
of metaphors people prefer in the simile or category statement form, it is possible to
draw conclusions about the processing route taken: analogical reasoning or category
inclusion. They showed that (1) less conventional metaphors were preferred in
the simile form compared to more conventional ones, which were preferred in the
category statement form (Experiment 1); (2) less conventional metaphors were
read faster in the simile vs category statement form, whereas more conventional
metaphors showed the opposite pattern; and (3), when repeatedly exposed to the
figurative meaning of a metaphoric vehicle throughout an experiment, participants
then showed a preference for new metaphors using this same vehicle to be formulated
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as category statements and not as similes. Because of this, the authors concluded
that conventionality of a metaphoric vehicle determines whether a given metaphoric
expression is processed through analogical reasoning or through Category Inclusion.
A problem with deciding whether conventionality or aptness is the true mediator
of processing route is the fact that these two factors are often correlated. In fact,
they were correlated in the materials used by Bowdle and Gentner (2005). This
seems to be the case in several other studies on metaphor processing as well: Jones
and Estes (2006) found high correlation values between aptness and conventionality
for 18 different published experiments, leading them to question the interpretation
of Bowdle and Gentner’s results. To address this, they created a new set of materials
in which conventionality and aptness where completely orthogonal and used these
materials to re-run Bowdle and Gentner’s (2005) experiments. They found that,
in all three experiments, aptness and not conventionality accounted for the form
preference and reading time differences reported by Bowdle and Gentner. Their
conclusion was that, in line with categorization views, how good a metaphor is,
and not its conventionality, predicts whether people will process it as an implicit
comparison or as a category inclusion statement.
A counter-argument to Jones and Estes’ (2006) conclusion was later provided by
Thibodeau and Durgin (2011). They argued that familiarity is a third mediating
factors needs to be considered in this discussion. According to them, familiarity and
not aptness is the driving factor that will determine the mechanism through which
a metaphor will be understood. This could be interpreted as an addendum to the
Career of Metaphor Hypothesis: Through repeated use of specific topic-vehicle pairs,
a vehicle’s literal meaning strengthens conceptual links to its metaphoric meaning,
eventually leading to the fossilization of the figurative meaning of the vehicle.
2.5 Going Forward
The points raised in this chapter should make it clear to the reader that the debate
on metaphor processing is far from resolved. Specifically, the three key issues
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raised - the role of the literal meaning, the symmetry of processing and the effect
of mediating factors - deserve a closer examination. One way to move the debate
forward would be to consider what the opposing theories do have in common.
Both Implicit Comparison Views and Category Inclusion Views across the board
state that metaphor comprehension does not require any additional machinery
than the one routinely used to comprehend literal language (Coulson & Oakley,
2005; Gentner et al., 2001; Glucksberg, 2001; Lakoff, 2008; Sperber & Wilson,
2008). So if metaphors aren’t special, why don’t we approach the study of metaphor
comprehension the same way that the study of literal language has been approached?
In this regard, two points are worth mentioning:
1) Regardless of theoretical inclination, a common characteristic of metaphor
research has been to examine the processing of metaphors both in isolation
(i.e. without any context) and only once the entire metaphoric expression has
been presented and understood. This is particularly noticeable in the work
that has been the most important for theory development (e.g., Bowdle &
Gentner, 2005; Gernsbacher et al., 2001; Glucksberg et al., 1997; McGlone
& Manfredi, 2001; Rubio Fernandez, 2007; Wolff & Gentner, 2011). How-
ever, research on language-vision interactions and on incremental language
processing (see for example Knoeferle, 2015; Tanenhaus et al., 1996) has
shown that understanding language involves an ongoing and simultaneous
integration of different types of information (visual and linguistic, among
others) in order to update our beliefs and our mental representation of a given
event, as well as to generate expectations about incoming (linguistic) input.
Expectations about upcoming linguistic information can be guided by (1)
possible referents that have been established in the previous linguistic context
(Altmann, 1999), (2) the visual context (Knoeferle et al., 2005), (3) semantic
and world-knowledge constraints imposed by the head of a phrase, such as
verbs (Ferretti et al., 2001), and the strengthening of these constraints via
available visual referents (Altmann & Kamide, 1999), among others. Thus, in
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order to study the contribution of the individual elements of a metaphor to
the overall interpretation during real-time processing, it would be immensely
beneficial to consider the way in which processing unfolds over time as well
as how it interacts with the context in which the metaphoric utterance is
embedded.
2) Metaphor research aimed at theory development has focused almost exclusively
on English nominal metaphors. Holyoak and Stamenković (2018) conducted
a large-scale review of studies on metaphor comprehension. They surveyed
a pool of 4900 articles on metaphors published in scientific articles since
1976. Of these, they selected 77 that exclusively dealt with testing theoretical
accounts of metaphor comprehension on healthy adult participants. The
conclusions of the authors are damning:
Perhaps the most obvious limitation of much of the work on metaphor
over this review period is its unbalanced focus on nominal metaphors
when testing between theories. (. . . ) Besides advocating investigation of
a broader range of metaphors, we would also call attention to the need
to broaden the range of languages and cultures in which metaphors are
investigated. (Holyoak & Stamenković, 2018, p. 643)
In a field populated by contradicting results advocating for opposing theories, it
is imperative to seek out different sources of evidence. Specifically, evidence from
non-nominal metaphors in languages other than English.
This dissertation tackles the three key issues discussed in this chapter by
directly improving on points (1) and (2). Ultimately, the goal is to seek out
empirical evidence that can help solve the long-standing debate on metaphor
comprehension. The next three chapters embody this attempt: They present a
series of experiments that meet the challenge raised by Holyoak and Stamenković
(2018) by investigating two different types of non-nominal metaphors: Verbal
metaphors and verb-object metaphors. Importantly, this investigation is carried
out in German, an underrepresented language in metaphor research.
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Before moving on to the empirical part of this dissertation, the last section of
this chapter introduces some of the findings in language-vision interactions and
incremental language processing that will set the stage for the next chapters.
2.6 Language-Vision Interactions and Incremen-
tal Language Processing
Sentence processing does not occur in isolation. Instead, language comprehenders
actively seek out different sources of information that they can integrate together in
order to update their previous beliefs and construct a more complete picture of an
event, a situation, or a speaker’s communicative intention. This idea, fundamental
to Relevance Theory as described earlier in this chapter, is also essential to research
on language-vision interactions (see Huettig et al., 2011; Knoeferle & Guerra, 2016;
Knoeferle, 2019; Tanenhaus & Trueswell, 2006, for reviews).
The starting point for this field was the pioneering work of Cooper (1974), who
showed that there is a close temporal adjacency between language understanding
and the processing of visual stimuli. In the study, participants heard stories while
simultaneously being presented with images of potential referents while their eye
movements were monitored, something that years later came to be known as the
Visual World Paradigm (VWP) (see Huettig et al., 2011, for a comprehensive review
of the method). The results of this study showed that participants looked at the
visual representations of objects immediately after they were mentioned in a story,
highlighting the rapid way in which language and visual processes interact.
It wasn’t until the mid-1990s that the VWP started to be widely used by
psycholinguistic researchers. A team of researchers from the University of Rochester
lead by Michael Tanenhaus began studying the interaction of language and visual
perception to answer questions about syntactic ambiguity resolution (Tanenhaus
et al., 1995), the role of phonology in lexical access (Allopenna et al., 1998), the
influence of prosody on sentence comprehension (Dahan et al., 2002), among others.
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The VWP has successfully been deployed to answer question about the type
of expectations that develop during language comprehension and how these can
guide the processing of incoming linguistic stimuli. This line of research, developed
primarily by Gerry Altmann and collaborators, focuses on using the visual context
as a reflection of what participants in an experiment anticipate that a linguistic
discourse will refer to next.
In a now classic study, Altmann and Kamide (1999) showed participants a visual
scene depicting an agent and four possible objects that the agent could interact
with. The authors found that when participants heard sentences (such as the boy
eats cake) that included verbs with particular selectional restrictions (eats requires
an object with the feature [+ edible]) participants’ eye movements, upon hearing
the verb, anticipated the direct object by focusing on the only object in the visual
context that was compatible with the verb’s selectional restrictions (a picture of a
cake, as opposed to a picture of a ball, a toy car or a train set).
Kamide et al. (2003) followed-up on this finding and showed that even when
a verb does not on its own provide enough evidence for participants to anticipate
a verbal object, the combination of a verb and an agent can do just that: Upon
hearing the man will ride. . . participants looked more at a visually represented
motorbike than when they heard the girl will ride. . . .
These findings support a view of language processing according to which language
comprehenders construct a dynamic mental representation of an event that is
updated as soon as more information becomes available, and this information is
in turn used to generate expectations about the nature of further input. This
is crucial for our purposes since it suggests that it is necessary to consider the
incremental processing of a metaphor in order to assess the relative contribution
of each one of the metaphoric elements to a comprehender’s dynamic mental
representation. This will be particularly important when we turn to the question
of metaphoric symmetry in chapter four.
Through eye-tracking technology it has also been shown that the processing of
visual stimuli interacts with the processing of written abstract language. Guerra
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and Knoeferle (2014) showed participants a video of two playing cards that either
moved closer together or further apart. Participants then read German sentences
that dealt with semantic dissimilarity such as Frieden und Krieg sind bestimmt
verschieden (“Peace and war are certainly different”) or similarity, such as Kampf
und Krieg sind freilich entsprechend (“Battle and war are certainly similar”). Their
results showed that when the motion of the cards was conceptually aligned with
the direction of the semantic relation (close~similar; far~different), participants
were faster at reading the second of the presented nouns (Experiment 3) as well
as the adjective (Experiments 1 and 2) than when there was no such conceptual
alignment. The result was interpreted as evidence for an abstract co-indexing
link between spatial distance and semantic similarity. One characteristic of the
eye-tracking during reading method is that it allows for a rough mapping of the
results onto different stages of language processing (Clifton et al., 2007; Rayner,
1998; Vasishth et al., 2013, for a counterargument). The fact that Guerra and
Knoeferle (2014) found effects in first-pass reading times (considered a measure
of early stages of processing) can be interpreted as a sign of the early and rapid
integration of language processing and the visual context.
It’s important to note that Guerra and Knoeferle (2014) investigated the effects
of the visual context on the processing of concepts that have been retrieved from
memory, such as the meaning of the words “war” and “peace”. But how does the
visual world interact with processing concepts that are not retrieved from one’s
mental lexicon, but are instead constructed on the fly, such as metaphors?
This question has been previously approached from the perspective of language
production. Sato et al. (2015) investigated whether showing participants images
depicting spatial containment would encourage them to produce expressions in
which spatial containment is used metaphorically to speak of abstract difficulty.
They found that even when the sentences they produced were thematically unrelated
to the images viewed, participants still produced more metaphors drawing from the
domain of spatial containment than when they saw a neutral picture as prime. The
authors, who work within the CMT framework (Lakoff & Johnson, 2008), interpreted
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the result as evidence for an activation of the Conceptual Metaphor DIFFICULTY
IS CONTAINMENT after having seen the pictures, leading to the production of
individual linguistic metaphors derived from this specific Conceptual Metaphor.
So if visual depictions of spatial containment can facilitate the production of
metaphors that have spatial containment as part of their literal meaning, can
depictions of physical containment facilitate the comprehension of containment
metaphors? It is generally assumed that there is at least some overlap between
mental representations accessed during language production and the ones accessed
during language comprehension (Gambi & Pickering, 2017). Some theories even
specify that the representations are completely identical (Pickering & Garrod, 2004)
or at least coincide in their semantics (Levelt et al., 1999).
Given this background, it is worth exploring whether activating the feature
of spatial containment could facilitate comprehension of metaphors of difficulty
that have spatial containment as part of their encoded meanings in a way that is
analogous to what has been posited by Sato et al. (2015) for language production.
This would give us insight into the role of literal features during online processing of
metaphoric expressions, one of the main issues discussed in this dissertation. With
this in mind, I now turn to the first set of empirical studies, which examines how
visual depictions of literal features affect processing of subsequent verbal metaphors.
3
The Role of Features of the Literal
Meaning
The studies in this chapter were designed to investigate the first of the three
major issues of this dissertation, namely the role of the literal meaning of the
metaphoric vehicle during processing.1 Specifically, this chapter examines the role
of spatial containment during processing of metaphors in which verbs of spatial
containment are used to convey abstract difficulty. The following questions are
addressed: Does activating semantic features associated only with the encoded literal
meaning of a metaphoric vehicle (i.e. spatial containment) influence processing of
novel verbal metaphors? And do said features remain active after a metaphor
has been understood?
The theoretical views presented in chapter two provide different answers to these
questions. The Implicit Comparison View states that the encoded meaning of both
elements in a metaphor must be processed fully in order for their structures to be
aligned (given that structural alignment is a process that begins blindly) (Gentner
et al., 2001). This means that all features associated with the literal meaning of
1This chapter is a slightly modified version of Rodriguez Ronderos, Guerra & Knoeferle
(under review). Camilo Rodríguez Ronderos, Ernesto Guerra and Pia Knoeferle conceptualized
and designed the experiments. Camilo Rodríguez Ronderos and Ernesto Guerra analyzed the
data. Camilo Rodríguez Ronderos wrote the article with feedback from Ernesto Guerra and Pia
Knoeferle.
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a metaphoric vehicle must be activated during the first stages of processing, so
activating literal features prior to comprehension should facilitate processing of the
metaphoric vehicle (Weiland et al., 2014). It is also likely that these features remain
active after the metaphor has been understood, because the pattern of structural
mappings between topic and vehicle can be used for subsequent processing, as has
been shown to be the case for extended metaphors (Gentner & Boronat, 1992;
Gentner et al., 2001; Thibodeau & Durgin, 2008).
The Category Inclusion View, on the other hand, states that the meaning of the
metaphoric vehicle is modulated early on in processing given the parameters provided
by the metaphoric topic (Glucksberg, 2008). This means that features related to
the literal meaning of a vehicle that are not compatible with these parameters will
be suppressed, so activating them prior to comprehension should hinder processing
of the metaphoric vehicle, resulting in an interference effect (McGlone & Manfredi,
2001). These features should also remain suppressed immediately after processing
has been completed (Gernsbacher et al., 2001) or at least after 1000 milliseconds
(Rubio Fernandez, 2007). In an extended metaphor however, literal features can
“linger” (Carston, 2010) and facilitate access to subsequent related metaphors
(Rubio-Fernández et al., 2016). Importantly, this facilitation is caused by a simple
activation of literal features and not by an activation of a network of systematic
relations between topic and vehicle.
I conducted 4 experiments to investigate the predictions made by the theories. In
Experiments 1 and 2 (eye-tracking during reading), participants saw short animated
clips depicting physical containment. They then read sentences in which verbs
of physical containment were metaphorically used to signify difficulty, such as in
sentence (1) below, and then answered questions about either the sentences or the
videos.
1. It was difficult for the journalist to see his opinion fenced in after the change
in regime.
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The two animated clips both showed a ball with identical movement. The only
difference between videos is that in one of them, a box hovers over the ball and
appear to trap it. The ball then struggles to escape and comes to a halt. This is
meant to elicit a mental representation of physical containment, given that the most
important feature of this scene is the entrapment of the ball. In the second video,
the ball simply appears to move freely in the absence of a box and comes to a stop on
its own, with no box to be seen. Stills from both videos can be seen in Figure 3.1).
The goal of these two experiments was to study how seeing a video depicting
physical containment - which I take to be a prominent semantic feature of the
encoded meaning of the verbs used in all our sentences, yet incompatible with
the meaning of the individual metaphors - interacts with the processing of verbs
of spatial containment used metaphorically. I compared this to how the same
sentences are processed after seeing a video clip that does not share the conceptual
feature of containment with the verbs. In these two experiments participants also
answered questions about what they saw in the video after reading the sentence.
This should provide insight on the role that literal features might play after a
metaphor has been understood.
In Experiment 3 (self-paced reading), I examined how participants would
naturally answer the same questions asked in Experiments 1 and 2 (after sentence
comprehension) when the video clips are followed by literal sentences instead of
metaphors. Doing this provided a baseline measure to interpret the results of the
question-answering times of Experiments 1 and 2.
Finally, Experiment 4 (lexical-decision task) investigated how the video clips of
Experiments 1-3 interact with the verbs of spatial containment from Experiments 1
and 2 when said verbs are read in the absence of a context (i.e., when participants
are expected to retrieve the encoded, literal meaning only).
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3.1 Experiment 1
I began the investigation by asking the following question: Will watching video
clips of spatial containment facilitate or hinder comprehension of metaphors made
up by verbs of spatial containment? Additionally, how will the activation of
spatial containment interact with processing the metaphorically used verbs after the
metaphors have been understood? Experiment 1, an eye-tracking during reading
study, was designed to answer these questions.
3.1.1 Participants
Forty-eight monolingual university students who were native speakers of German
(ages 18–31) were recruited and tested at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.
All participants were right handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
They received 8 euros as compensation upon giving their written informed consent.
This study was covered by the ethics vote of the psycholinguistics lab of the
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.
3.1.2 Materials and design
I created 40 critical items consisting of German metaphorical sentences. All sentences
had an identical syntactic structure, namely a main clause with an infinitive subject
clause, as exemplified in (2). In the infinitive subject clause, a verb of physical
containment, which always appeared in the same position, was used metaphorically
to denote abstract difficulty. In the main clause, it was asserted that the situation
described in the infinitive clause was “difficult”. All critical sentences can be found
in Appendix A.
(2) Es war für den Redakteur /schwierig adj /, seine / Meinung target noun
/ nach dem Regimewechsel / umgittert verb / zu sehen.
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It was for the journalist/ difficult adj /, his / Opinion target noun / after
the change in regime/ fenced-in verb / to see
“It was difficult for the journalist to see his opinion be fenced-in after the change
in regime.”
Sentence norming
Prior to running Experiment 1, I conducted a norming study of the target sen-
tences to make sure our metaphors were readily understandable. A sample of
15 participants, who did not participate in the main study, were asked to rate
80 sentences on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being totally incomprehensible and 7
being totally comprehensible. The 80 sentences were made up of the critical 40
metaphoric sentences and 40 semantically incoherent filler sentences (e.g. It was
sad that Thomas drank the car so fast). Order of presentation of the sentences was
randomized. The goal of the norming task was to establish whether any of the critical
metaphorical sentences would be rated as incomprehensible (meaning a rating of 3.5
or lower) and whether the metaphorical sentences were rated significantly higher
than the semantically incoherent sentences.
Results of the norming task
Four of the forty critical sentences were rated lower than 3.5 on average and were
dropped from the investigation. The remaining 36 sentences were used in all
following experiments.
To determine whether these 36 sentences were in fact understood, an ordered
logistic regression model was fitted to the data (Gelman & Hill, 2006). The model
was constructed to see whether our critical items and the semantically incoherent
fillers could predict the 1-7 ratings. The results show that a change from level 0
(semantically incoherent) to level 1 (critical item) was associated with an increase of
odds ratio of 7.96 (t= 17.5, p<0.001) This means that for metaphorical sentences,
the odds of being rated higher were 7.96 times those of incoherent sentences, holding
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constant all other variables. The data therefore strongly suggests that participants
were able to determine a difference in meaning between the semantically incoherent
sentences and the novel metaphoric sentences.
Furthermore, the ratings collected on the norming task were used to refit the
statistical models of Experiments 1 and 2. These results are reported in chapter five.
Filler sentences
Seventy-two filler sentences were constructed to reduce the likelihood of strategic
behavior and to mask the purpose of the investigation. I thus had 24 German
idioms as fillers with similar syntactic structure to our critical items, as well
as 24 novel metaphors different to the critical items. The remaining 24 filler
sentences were literal statements.
Visual primes
Two critical videos were created using Adobe Photoshop. Each video showed a ball
bouncing with identical motion: In one of them (used in the “contained” conditions)
the ball was seen to be captured by a moving box, forcing the ball to a still stand.
In the other (used in the “not-contained” conditions), the ball bounces freely and
stops on its own. Figure 3.1) shows a series of stills for each of the videos.
Furthermore, inspired by Experiment 1 of Guerra and Knoeferle (2014), two
versions of each video were created: One with a printed word from each critical
sentence on the ball and one without any printed word. Participants thus saw,
for example, a video of a box trapping a ball (or a ball bouncing freely) that had
the word opinion written on it, and subsequently read sentence (2), in which an
“opinion” is said to be fenced in. This was done to maximize the possibility that
participants would establish a relation between the visual context and the written
sentence. For the filler trials, 4 other animated videos were created that were
randomly paired with the 72 filler sentences.
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Figure 3.1: Stills from the video used in the ’contained’ and ’not-contained’ conditions
of experiments 1-4
Comprehension questions
To investigate the role of literal features after a metaphor has been comprehended, I
included a comprehension question after every trial. For critical trials, the question
was always about the video, either (a) referring to the ball (Was the ball in the
box?) or (b) to the metaphoric topic that may or may not have appeared written
on the ball in the video (Was the opinion in the box?). Trials with incorrect
answers were discarded from the analysis.
The idea of having these two different questions was that they might allow us to
investigate different ways in which literal features could be activated after metaphor
comprehension: It could be the case that literal features are simply activated
because they are seen in the video and mentioned in the sentence, in which case
question (a) should be easier to respond to when the video-prime seen prior to the
metaphor activates the literal feature of containment. This would be compatible
with the Implicit Comparison View and with Carston’s (2010) “lingering” of the
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literal meaning view. Alternatively, literal features could remain activated because
they are part of a network of systematic associations between topic and vehicle
established during structural alignment, as suggested by Gentner and Boronat
(1992); Gentner et al. (2001) and Thibodeau and Durgin (2008). This would
result in a facilitation effect when answering question (b), considering that question
(b) suggests the parallel in structure between video and sentence by effectively
“blending” together both representations. Finally, it could be the case that literal
features are always suppressed, in which case neither type of question should be
easier to answer when the video activates the literal feature compared to when the
video does not activate it. This would be compatible with the Category Inclusion
view (Glucksberg, 2008). I return to these positions and how they relate to the
experimental design when discussing the predictions for the question-response times.
Design
Experiment 1 had a 2X2X2 Latin square design with three factors: “containment”
(contained vs. not-contained), “question type” (video-question vs. noun-question)
and “prime type” (no-label vs. noun-label). “Containment” refers to whether the
video showed the ball bouncing freely (not-contained conditions) or being trapped
by a box (contained conditions) (see Figure 1). This factor addresses the question
of whether literal features can facilitate comprehension of a metaphor when they
are activated before the metaphor is understood.
“Question type” refers to whether the comprehension question inquired about the
video (video-question conditions) or about the metaphoric topic (the opinion in (2))
(noun-question conditions). This factor addresses the question of the different ways
in which the literal features could remain active after comprehension of the metaphor.
Finally, “prime type” refers to whether the metaphoric topic was written on
the ball (noun-label conditions) in the video prime or whether the video prime
had no written language in it (no-label conditions). This factor was inspired by
Guerra and Knoeferle (2014), who in their investigation of the association between
physical distance and semantic similarity had the target words that appeared
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in the sentence also appear in the videos that participants saw before reading
the sentence (Experiment 1 of their investigation). I added it as a factor to the
present Experiment in order to compare whether or not there are differences in the
association between literal features and their metaphoric meaning as a function of
the way in which they are primed: Either by “boosting” their association to the
metaphor (noun-label conditions) or by having the association be implicit (no-label
conditions). Furthermore, this factor served as a type of “sanity check” for the
experiment: Since the word written on the video was then read in the sentence,
there should be a clear identity priming effect brought about from seeing the target
noun (opinion) in the video and then reading it in the sentence. If we don’t find such
a facilitation effect, it would strongly suggest that participants were not integrating
the information conveyed by the video when reading the sentence.
The dependent measures used in the experiment were three eye-tracking measures
commonly associated with different temporal processing stages (Rayner, 1998) in
each of the three regions of interest (i.e., the adjective, the target noun, and the
verb region): First-pass reading times, defined as the duration of all fixations made
in a region until the first time the region is abandoned either to a subsequent or to
a prior word; Regression path duration, defined as the duration of all fixations from
the first fixation in a region up to but excluding the first fixation to the right of this
region; and total reading times, defined as the sum of the duration of all fixations
in a region. These three measures were chosen since they can provide insight about
the point in time in which effects might arise: if effects are found in first-pass or
regression path duration, it would suggest that they occur during early stages of
processing, whereas if they are found only in total reading times, it would suggest
taht such an effect happens only during later stages of processing.
3.1.3 Predictions by region
The first set of predictions concerns the effect of the video on reading comprehension.
I focused on analyzing three specific word regions where it would be possible for
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effects to arise: the adjective, target noun, and verb regions. The motivation for
choosing these regions is presented in the following subsections.
Adjective region
The motivation for expecting effects to appear in the adjective region does not
come from the debate on literal features of a metaphoric expression, but is instead
based on previous literature on the interaction between the visual world and written
language processing. In Guerra and Knoeferle (2014) the authors found that
visually depicted spatial distance facilitated reading comprehension of adjectives
denoting abstract similarity. They reasoned that this facilitation effect might
be due to an existing co-indexing link between spatial distance (close, far) and
semantic distance (similar, dissimilar). They borrowed this idea from Conceptual
Metaphor Theory, which hypothesizes the existence of such a link (Lakoff & Johnson,
2008). Conceptual Metaphor Theory also posits the existence of a link between
the concepts of difficulty and containment, present in the Conceptual Metaphor
DIFFICULTY IS CONTAINMENT.
Thus, to the extent in which this hypothesized Conceptual Metaphor can be
accessed during online comprehension in order to process an adjective denoting
difficulty (akin to the way in which a video showing spatial distance facilitated
comprehension of an adjective denoting semantic similarity in Guerra and Knoeferle
(2014)), watching videos of spatial containment might ease processing of said
adjective. If this is the case, it should be possible to find a main effect of
containment in the adjective region, with shorter reading times in the contained
vs. not-contained conditions.
Target noun region
By adding the word in the target noun region to the video (noun-label conditions),
I expected a clear repetition priming effect to appear when participants encountered
this word in the sentence. Concretely, if participants were able to integrate the
written word from the video with the subsequently read sentence, a main effect of
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prime type in all dependent measures should appear, with the noun-label conditions
being overall faster to read than the no-label conditions.
Verb region
The predictions for this region are directly derived from the debate on metaphor
processing presented in chapter two. I expected a facilitation effect on an early
measure, such as first-pass reading times, provided that the video relates to the
literal meaning of the verb. This finding would suggest that features related to the
literal meaning of a verb (in this case, physical containment) are initially active
even though they might be absent from the intended metaphoric meaning. This
would be in line with the results of Weiland et al. (2014), who observed that masked
primes consisting of features of the metaphoric vehicle reduced the N400 effect
found upon encountering the metaphoric vehicle, and would also generally support
the Implicit Comparison view of metaphor understanding.
Alternatively, if activating the spatial representation of containment interferes
with processing the metaphorically used verb, this should translate to longer reading
times in the contained vs. not-contained conditions. This would be in line with
the findings of (McGlone & Manfredi, 2001) and generally with Category Inclusion
accounts that claim that literal features irrelevant for understanding the metaphor
are actively suppressed during processing. Because of this, activating them should
cause an interference effect. Another option is that the features are suppressed,
but not to the degree in which pre-activating them via the video should cause
interference. If this is the case, this could result in a null-effect of the video
prime on reading the verb.
3.1.4 Post-sentence comprehension question
The main prediction for the response patterns to the post-comprehension questions
was that if the feature of physical containment is active after participants have
understood the sentence, it should be possible to find a main effect of containment
on question-answering times, with overall shorter answering times in the contained
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vs. not-contained conditions. This would suggest that the feature of containment
activated in the contained conditions (the ball is trapped by the box) was not
suppressed after the metaphor was understood and facilitates answering both
question (a) Was the ball in the box? and (b) Was the opinion in the box?. This
would be consistent with the Implicit Comparison view.
If, on the other hand, the features activated by the video are suppressed after
the metaphor has been understood, there should be either an interference or
a null-effect of containment on answering question times, consistent with the
Category Inclusion view.
However, because there were two types of questions, it would be possible to
observe different patterns of activation of the literal feature that would bring
about a more nuanced view of the role of literal features after a metaphor has
been comprehended. These patterns could be important to further inform theories
of metaphor comprehension. Because of this, I present here a tentative way of
linking possible question-answering patterns to the theoretical views on metaphor
processing, even though these links were not explicated in this way before conducting
Experiment 1.
Of particular importance for a nuanced view on the role of literal features are
the response times in the video-question ( (a) Was the ball in the box?) compared to
those in the noun-question ((b) Was the opinion in the box?) conditions, especially
in the no-label conditions (i.e. when there was nothing written on the ball seen
in the video-prime): In the video-question no-label conditions, participants saw a
video without a word printed on the ball and then answered question (a) above
after reading the metaphor. In the noun-question no-label conditions participants
answered question (b) instead.
Implicit Comparison views suggest that after a metaphor is understood, literal
features remain active because they are part of the network of established mappings
between topic (in this case, the target noun opinion in sentence (2)) and vehicle (the
verb fenced in in (2)), which can be used to reason analogically about subsequent
linguistic input. If this holds, there should be both a facilitation effect of contained
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vs. not-contained levels in the video-question conditions (signifying a sustained
activation of the feature “containment”) and a facilitation effect of contained vs. not-
contained levels in the noun-question conditions (signifying a sustained activation
of established mappings between different conceptual domains). This is because
question (a) is a reference to the video alone, requiring only information about
the feature of containment in order to answer it. If the feature is active, this
should result in a facilitation effect compared to when it is not active (i.e. the not-
contained condition). Question (b), on the other hand, is a complex combination
of information about the sentence (given the presence of the target noun) and
the video (given the reference to the box, which could have only been seen in
the video), so a facilitation effect for answering this question in the contained
vs. not-contained conditions would suggest that not only the feature of containment
has been activated (as would be the case in the video-question conditions), but
also its relationship with the metaphoric topic (the target noun).
Carston (2010), on the other hand, suggests that literal features might “linger”
after a metaphor has been understood, but only as semantic features, not as part of a
network of systematic associations between topic and vehicle. In extended metaphors,
literal features will reinforce each other and trigger a meta-representation of the
literal meaning, but not otherwise. That being the case, there could a facilitation
effect of contained vs. not-contained video-prime on the question-response times in
the video-prime no-label condition, but this should not be the case for the response
times in the noun-prime no-label conditions.
3.1.5 Procedure
Participants’ eye movements were recorded using an Eyelink 1000 plus desktop head-
stabilized tracker, produced by SR Research. At the beginning of each experimental
session, the eye-tracker was calibrated with a 9-point calibration procedure to ensure
accurate monitoring of the participant’s dominant eye (which was the only eye
tracked). The procedure was performed and repeated until there was less than
a maximum error of 0.5 degrees. If it was not possible to meet this criterion,
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Figure 3.2: Example of the progresssion of a trial in experiments 1-3
the experiment was aborted and participants were replaced. Re-calibration was
performed after every pause in the Experiment, i.e. twice more. After calibration,
participants saw three practice trials before the experiment began. Each trial in the
experiment consisted of three phases (see Figure 3.2): First, participants saw an
animated video presented on the screen for 8 seconds. The video disappeared and
a sentence appeared on the screen. Participants read the sentence and pressed a
button on a Cedrus response pad that was in front of them when they had finished
reading. The sentence then disappeared and a question appeared on the screen.
Participants had to answer this question by pressing either the YES or NO button
on the pad (position of YES and NO buttons on either right or left side of the
pad was counterbalanced across participants).
3.1.6 Analysis & results
Analysis of eye-tracking data
Prior to analysis, an intercepts-only regression model was fitted to the data in order
to observe the distribution of the residuals. These were not normally distributed
(which violates the assumptions of the linear model), and thus a box-cox test (Box
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& Cox, 1964) was performed (see Vasishth & Nicenboim, 2016, for more information
on this procedure and why it is necessary). The test showed that the reading times
measures needed to be transformed using a Lambda value of -0.7, which was used
for transforming all eye-tracking measures and regions. Cases in which participants
gave an incorrect answer to the comprehension question were also excluded from all
analyses. This procedure was followed for all subsequent experiments. Accuracy for
comprehension questions in experiment 1 was above 85% in all conditions. I analyzed
all data in the experiments using the R statistical programming environment and the
LME4 package for regression analysis. To test the predictions, I fitted mixed-effects
linear regression models to every measure and every region.
For constructing the statistical models, I followed the recommendations of Barr
et al. (2013). First, I tried fitting the largest possible random effects structure
granted by the experimental design (in this case, random intercepts and slopes
by items and subjects for both independent variables). If the model failed to
converge, I reduced the random effects structure step-wise until a converging
model was found by first removing the random correlations, then the random
intercepts, followed by the interaction effects and the main effects. I used the
same maximally converging random effects structure for all dependent measures
in every region for the sake of consistency.
All models included trial order as a fixed effect, since it significantly improved
the model fit. The models were fitted using an ANOVA-style, sum-contrast coding
scheme, which tests for main effects and interactions (unless explicitly stated
otherwise). Alpha thresholds for assessing statistical significance for eye-tracking
reading data were Bonferroni-corrected, following the recommendations of von
der Malsburg and Angele (2017).
The final random effects structure used for every model is shown in Table
3.12. Figures 3.3, 3.4, 3.5 show bar-plots of the results in the adjective, noun,
and verb region respectively. Figure 3.6 shows the results of the post-sentence
comprehension question response times.
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A note on all tables in this chapter reporting the results of regression analyses (as
well as in all subsequent chapters): For every variable, the tables report the regression
coefficient, followed by the confidence intervals (in brackets) and the t-value. Stars on
the t-values depict the statistical significance cut-offs, based on the variable’s p-value.
Results of eye-tracking, adjective region
No significant main effects or interactions were found in any measure for this region.
Results of eye-tracking, target noun region
As predicted, there was a significant main effect of prime-type in all three measures,
with shorter reading times in the noun-label vs. no-label conditions. This means
that when participants saw the word opinion in the video this facilitated reading
the same word when it appeared later in the sentence. The experiment was
therefore sensitive enough to detect identity priming effects, which suggests that
participants were actively integrating the information processed during the video
with the information from the sentence.
Results of eye-tracking, verb region
No significant main effects or interactions of our manipulated variables were found
in any measure for this region.
Analysis and results of question response times
Question-response times were time-locked to the appearance of the question on the
participant’s screen. A box-cox test determined that the response times needed to
be log-transformed in order to normalize the residuals of the model. I thus fitted a
linear mixed-effects regression model to the log-transformed reaction times. This
model was fitted only to correct responses, which were over 92% of all trials.
The results pattern can be seen in Figure 3.6 and the output of the model is
summarized in Table 3.4. There was a main effect of question type, showing that
participants were significantly slower at answering questions in the noun vs. video
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first−pass regression path Total reading times






       
   













   




reading times for ADJ region (with 95% CI bars)
Figure 3.3: Summary of results for the ADJ region, Experiment 1
conditions. There was also a main effect of prime type, indicating that participants
were faster to answer questions in the noun-label compared to the no-label condition,
and a main effect of containment, showing that there was an overall facilitation in
the contained vs. not-contained conditions. There were also significant interactions
between question type and prime type and containment and prime type, reflecting
that the noun-question and video-question conditions had very different response
time patterns. The three-way interaction was not significant.
However, these results are not straight-forward to interpret since a response bias
was discovered after running the experiment: The correct answer to the question
asked was always NO in the not-contained conditions and YES in the contained
conditions. It is therefore not possible to tell whether the facilitation effect was
caused by the difference in the conditions (contained vs. not-contained) or by the
differences in correct answer (YES vs. NO).
The noun-question/no-label was the only exception to this: Here, the correct
response was NO in both contained and not-contained levels. Because of this, I
re-fitted the statistical model for the question-response times using a treatment
contrast coding scheme in order to look at the noun-question/no-label condition
exclusively. This type of contrast coding allows for direct comparisons between
the condition set as the intercept of the model and the other individual conditions.
This model showed no significant difference between contained and not-contained
levels of the noun-question/no-label. This model is shown in Table 3.10.
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first−pass regression path Total reading times






       
   













   




reading times for NOUN region (with 95% CI bars)
Figure 3.4: Summary of results for the TARGET NOUN region, Experiment 1
first−pass regression path Total reading times






       
   













   




reading times for VERB region (with 95% CI bars)
Figure 3.5: Summary of results for the VERB region, Experiment 1
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question−response times, Experiment 1 (with 95% CI bars)
Figure 3.6: Summary of results for the question response time, Experiment 1
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Table 3.1: Regression analysis of reading times in the ADJECTIVE region of Experiment
1
Dependent variable:
First-pass Regression path Total reading times
(1) (2) (3)
Prime Type 0.0003 0.0001 −0.0002
(−0.0001, 0.001) (−0.0003, 0.001) (−0.001, 0.0004)
t = 1.444 t = 0.581 t = −0.795
Containment −0.0002 −0.0003 −0.0005
(−0.001, 0.0003) (−0.001, 0.0001) (−0.001, 0.00000)
t = −0.744 t = −1.389 t = −1.956
Trial Order −0.00000 −0.00001 −0.00003
(−0.00002, 0.00001) (−0.00003, 0.00000) (−0.00004, −0.00001)
t = −0.293 t = −1.512 t = −3.105∗∗
Interaction −0.00002 −0.0001 0.0001
(−0.0004, 0.0004) (−0.001, 0.0004) (−0.0004, 0.001)
t = −0.107 t = −0.494 t = 0.338
Intercept 1.394 1.397 1.400
(1.393, 1.395) (1.396, 1.398) (1.399, 1.401)
t = 3,233.003∗∗∗ t = 2,739.009∗∗∗ t = 2,625.450∗∗∗
Observations 1,180 1,180 1,180
Log Likelihood 4,162.329 3,965.666 3,910.930
Akaike Inf. Crit. −8,300.659 −7,907.333 −7,797.859
Bayesian Inf. Crit. −8,239.780 −7,846.453 −7,736.980
Note: ∗p<0.017; ∗∗p<0.0033; ∗∗∗p<0.00033
significance thresholds are bonferroni-corrected (alpha/3), values
shown per cell are regression coefficients, confidence intervals and
t-values ( in that order)
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Table 3.2: Regression analysis of reading times in the TARGET NOUN region of
Experiment 1
Dependent variable:
First-pass Regression path Total reading times
(1) (2) (3)
Prime Type −0.002 −0.002 −0.002
(−0.002, −0.001) (−0.003, −0.001) (−0.002, −0.001)
t = −5.490∗∗∗ t = −6.144∗∗∗ t = −5.230∗∗∗
Containment 0.0002 0.0004 0.00003
(−0.001, 0.001) (−0.0003, 0.001) (−0.001, 0.001)
t = 0.430 t = 1.221 t = 0.075
Trial Order −0.00000 −0.00001 −0.00004
(−0.00002, 0.00002) (−0.00003, 0.00001) (−0.0001, −0.00002)
t = −0.072 t = −1.265 t = −3.687∗∗∗
Interaction 0.0003 −0.00002 0.0002
(−0.0004, 0.001) (−0.001, 0.001) (−0.0005, 0.001)
t = 0.800 t = −0.054 t = 0.507
Intercept 1.398 1.402 1.407
(1.397, 1.399) (1.401, 1.403) (1.405, 1.408)
t = 2,294.932∗∗∗ t = 2,344.835∗∗∗ t = 2,192.578∗∗∗
Observations 1,111 1,111 1,111
Log Likelihood 3,559.108 3,578.840 3,505.177
Akaike Inf. Crit. −7,094.215 −7,133.679 −6,986.355
Bayesian Inf. Crit. −7,034.059 −7,073.523 −6,926.198
Note: ∗p<0.017; ∗∗p<0.0033; ∗∗∗p<0.00033
significance thresholds are bonferroni-corrected (alpha/3), values
shown per cell are regression coefficients, confidence intervals and
t-values ( in that order)
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Table 3.3: Regression analysis of reading times in the VERB region of Experiment 1
Dependent variable:
First-pass Regression path Total reading times
(1) (2) (3)
Prime Type 0.001 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0001, 0.001) (−0.0003, 0.001) (−0.0003, 0.001)
t = 2.180 t = 0.760 t = 0.792
Containment −0.0001 −0.0001 0.0001
(−0.001, 0.0004) (−0.001, 0.0004) (−0.0003, 0.001)
t = −0.496 t = −0.459 t = 0.611
Trial Order −0.00002 −0.00001 −0.0001
(−0.00003, −0.00000) (−0.00003, 0.00000) (−0.0001, −0.0001)
t = −2.234 t = −1.383 t = −9.256∗∗∗
Interaction −0.0004 0.0002 −0.0002
(−0.001, 0.0001) (−0.0003, 0.001) (−0.001, 0.0003)
t = −1.683 t = 0.891 t = −0.736
Intercept 1.405 1.408 1.413
(1.404, 1.406) (1.407, 1.409) (1.412, 1.413)
t = 2,726.656∗∗∗ t = 2,704.316∗∗∗ t = 3,084.624∗∗∗
Observations 1,148 1,148 1,148
Log Likelihood 3,877.586 3,866.024 4,012.204
Akaike Inf. Crit. −7,731.172 −7,708.049 −8,000.409
Bayesian Inf. Crit. −7,670.623 −7,647.499 −7,939.859
Note: ∗p<0.017; ∗∗p<0.0033; ∗∗∗p<0.00033
significance thresholds are bonferroni-corrected (alpha/3), values
shown per cell are regression coefficients, confidence intervals and
t-values ( in that order)
3.1.7 Discussion
In Experiment 1, no difference in reading times between conditions in the adjective
region was found. More importantly, there were no differences in the verb region,
the main interest region of the experiment. However, the presence of the effect
of priming type in the TARGET NOUN region suggests that the absence of an
effect of containment might be interpreted meaningfully: It could be the case
that no effect of containment on reading times of the verb was found because
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Table 3.4: Regression analysis of response-times in Experiment 1
Dependent variable:













Containment*Prime Type interaction −0.027
(−0.049, −0.004)
t = −2.267∗
Containment*Question Type interaction 0.012
(−0.011, 0.035)
t = 1.032











Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,145.674
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 1,210.843
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
values shown per cell are regression coeffi-
cients, confidence intervals and t-values (
in that order)
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the feature of containment is not relevant for the construction of the metaphoric
meaning and it is thus ignored during processing, exerting neither facilitation nor
interference. This interpretation would be broadly compatible with the Category
Inclusion view, which would posit either an interference effect of the literal feature
on metaphor comprehension or a null-effect.
However, it might also be possible that no effect was found given the temporal
distance between presentation of the visual prime and reading of the metaphorically
used verb. Perhaps this distance made it so that, when reading the verb, participants
no longer held the activated feature of containment in working memory. It has
previously been stated that people struggle holding a large number of meaningful
units in working memory (no more than 7, Chen & Cowan, 2005; Miller, 1956). This
lays the groundwork for Experiment 2, in which I changed the sentence structure
so that the verb could be temporally closer to the video prime.
Results from the post-sentence comprehension questions present an intricate
pattern. There was a main effect of question type, with longer response times in
the noun-question conditions than in the video-question conditions. There was a
main effect of containment, with shorter response times in the contained compared
to the not-contained conditions in all but the noun-question/ no-label conditions
(as evidenced by the interaction effect between containment and question type).
At first glance, the results seem to support the idea that when the conceptual
feature of containment was activated by the verb it generally facilitated responses,
resulting in shorter response times in the contained vs. not-contained conditions
in all but the noun-question/no-label conditions. This could suggest that the
simple feature of containment was activated after the metaphor was understood,
but not the more complex mapping between containment and the metaphoric topic
(which would have caused an difference in the noun-question/no-label conditions),
compatible with Carston’s (2010) view on the “lingering” of the literal meaning, but
incompatible with the stronger view of Gentner et al. (2001), according to which
the pattern of mappings should remain available for further processing.
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There is, however, a simpler explanation. As mentioned in the results section,
the correct responses were confounded with the conditions contained and not-
contained conditions, with contained conditions always requiring a YES response
and not-contained conditions a NO response in all but the noun-question/ no-label
conditions, were the correct response was NO in both levels of containment. It
is therefore likely that it was simply easier for participants to answer YES than
to answer NO, explaining the main effect of containment. Additionally, the effect
of question type could be due to the fact that questions in the “noun” conditions
(which varied according to the target noun in every trial, 33 characters on average)
were on average longer than the questions in the “video” conditions (which were
always the same, i.e. Was the ball in the box?, 30 characters). It is possible that
participants just took longer to read the questions in the noun compared to the
video conditions and thus took longer to answer the question.
The only comparison not affected by these two issues was that between contained
and not-contained levels of the noun-question/no-label condition. For these two
levels, the question and correct response remained the same (i.e. NO). There was
no significant difference between these two conditions. It’s important to note,
however, that the YES/NO confound affected only the question response times
and not the eye-tracking data, since participants only responded YES or NO to
the comprehension question, but no such action was required when reading the
metaphoric sentence. I address the issue of the interpretation of question-response
times in Experiment 3, where I examine the response patterns to the same questions
in the absence of metaphorical verbs. For now, I turn to Experiment 2, where I
attempted to replicate the pattern of reading times displayed in Figure 3.5 using
sentences with a different syntactic structure.
3.2 Experiment 2
The goal of Experiment 2 was to determine the robustness of the results of
Experiment 1. First, I altered the sentence structure in order to minimize the
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temporal distance between prime and verb. I did this because I thought it was likely
that participants were not able to use the information extracted from the visual prime
to facilitate processing of the metaphoric verb due to working memory constraints.
This possibility finds some support in the literature on working memory, where it
has been noted that people have a relatively low average number of sequentially
presented meaningful units that they can remember (somewhere between 3 and 7,
Chen & Cowan, 2005; Miller, 1956). I also increased the number of participants,
from 48 to 64, to obtain higher statistical power. I did this following a power analysis
via simulation using the R package SimR (Green & MacLeod, 2016). For the power
analysis, I took the model of the total reading times for the verb region as starting
point. The simulations suggested that with 64 participants the experiment would
have over 80% power to detect a main effect of containment on total reading times
of the verb region, assuming a true effect size of Cohen’s d= 0.15, i.e. somewhat
smaller than the rule of thumb for a “small” effect size (Sawilowsky, 2009). By
doing this I aimed to either detect an effect that was not detected in the previous
experiment, or to replicate the reading-time pattern and null-effect of Containment
in the verb region of Experiment 1 with higher statistical power.
3.2.1 Participants
Sixty-four native speakers of German (ages 18–31) with normal or corrected-to-
normal vision were recruited and tested at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.
None of them participated in Experiment 1. They received 8 euros as compensation
upon giving their informed consent. This study was covered by the ethics vote of
the psycholinguistics lab of the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.
3.2.2 Materials, design and procedure
The materials, design, and procedure were identical to those in Experiment 1, except
for the syntactic structure of the critical sentence, which now displayed a leftward
movement of the subject clause. This allowed for the verb to appear as the fourth
word in the sentence, making it temporally closer to the video-prime than it was in
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Experiment 1. The structure of the sentences was as follows:
(3) Dass seine / Meinung target noun / umgittert verb / wurde nach dem
Regimewechsel, war / schwierig adj / für den Redakteur.
“That his / opinion target noun / fenced-in verb / was after the change
in regime, was /difficult adj/ for the journalist”
“The fact that his opinion was fenced-in after the change in regime was difficult
for the journalist.”
3.2.3 Predictions
The predictions were motivated by the results of Experiment 1: If the absence
of an effect of containment on the verb region was due to the temporal distance
between verb and video, moving the verb closer to the video should correct this.
Specifically, if priming physical containment facilitates processing of verbs of spatial
containment used metaphorically, this should be reflected in shorter reading times
in the contained vs. not-contained conditions in the VERB region.
With regards to the question-answering times: The overall facilitation effect
of contained versus not-contained in experiment 2 was confounded with the type
of response (“YES” for contained and “NO” for not-contained) in all but one
relevant comparison: The noun-question/no-label conditions. We did not find a
significant difference between these two conditions. In Experiment 2 I hoped to
replicate the question-answering pattern in general, and the results of the noun-
question/no-label conditions in particular.
3.2.4 Results
Eye-tracking
Results for all regions and measures are shown in Figures 3.7, 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10.
The output of the statistical models can be seen in Tables 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8.
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Adjective No significant effects of containment or of prime type were found in
this region, replicating the pattern found in Experiment 1.
Target noun The main effect of prime type was replicated on all measures, with
the noun-label conditions showing overall shorter reading times than the no-label
conditions. This shows that participants were able to successfully relate the video
to the sentence, leading to a reliable priming effect.
Verb The analysis failed to show an effect of containment on any measure, as
was the case in Experiment 1. There was also no effect of prime type and no
significant interaction of containment and prime type.
Question-response times
Question-response times were analyzed in the same way as in Experiment 1. As
can be seen in Figure 3.10, the results are very similar to those of Experiment
1. All previous findings were replicated with the exception of the main effect of
containment: There was a main effect of question type and of prime type. There
was an interaction between containment and question type and an interaction
between question type and prime type. This model can be seen in Table 3.8.
As in the previous experiment, I re-fitted the model using a treatment-contrast
scheme in order to directly compare contained and not-contained levels of the noun-
question/no-label condition. This model showed no significant difference between
these conditions, replicating the result found in Experiment 1 (see Table 3.10).
3.2.5 Discussion
In Experiment 2 I tried to facilitate the interaction between video prime and
metaphoric verb by increasing statistical power and decreasing the temporal distance
between verb and video. The experiment still failed to show an effect of containment
in the verb region. Besides this, the effect of prime type was replicated on all
measures in the target noun region: Seeing the word opinion written on the ball
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first−pass regression path Total reading times






       
   













   




reading times for ADJ region, Experiment 2 (with 95% CI bars)
Figure 3.7: Summary of results for the ADJ region, Experiment 2
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reading times for NOUN region, Experiment 2 (with 95% CI bars)
Figure 3.8: Summary of results for the TARGET NOUN region, Experiment 2
first−pass regression path Total reading times






       
   













   




Reading times for VERB region, Experiment 2 (with 95% CI bars)
Figure 3.9: Summary of results for the VERB region, Experiment 2
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Table 3.5: Regression analysis of reading times in the ADJECTIVE region of Experiment
2
Dependent variable:
First-pass Regression path Total reading times
(1) (2) (3)
Prime Type 0.0005 0.0002 0.0005
(−0.0002, 0.001) (−0.001, 0.001) (−0.0004, 0.001)
t = 1.356 t = 0.445 t = 1.029
Containment 0.001 0.0002 0.001
(0.0001, 0.001) (−0.0005, 0.001) (−0.0002, 0.001)
t = 2.329 t = 0.660 t = 1.389
Trial Order −0.00001 −0.00002 −0.0001
(−0.00003, 0.00001) (−0.00004, 0.00001) (−0.0001, −0.00003)
t = −0.619 t = −1.480 t = −3.907∗∗∗
Interaction 0.0001 0.0002 0.00001
(−0.001, 0.001) (−0.001, 0.001) (−0.001, 0.001)
t = 0.433 t = 0.479 t = 0.026
Intercept 1.603 1.606 1.612
(1.601, 1.604) (1.605, 1.608) (1.610, 1.614)
t = 2,303.281∗∗∗ t = 2,069.854∗∗∗ t = 1,926.601∗∗∗
Observations 1,634 1,634 1,634
Log Likelihood 4,709.178 4,530.882 4,406.515
Akaike Inf. Crit. −9,394.356 −9,037.763 −8,789.029
Bayesian Inf. Crit. −9,329.571 −8,972.978 −8,724.244
Note: ∗p<0.017; ∗∗p<0.0033; ∗∗∗p<0.00033
significance thresholds are bonferroni-corrected (alpha/3), values
shown per cell are regression coefficients, confidence intervals and
t-values ( in that order)
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Table 3.6: Regression analysis of reading times in the TARGET NOUN region of
Experiment 2
Dependent variable:
First-pass Regression path Total reading times
(1) (2) (3)
Prime Type −0.006 −0.006 −0.006
(−0.007, −0.004) (−0.007, −0.005) (−0.007, −0.005)
t = −9.825∗∗∗ t = −10.309∗∗∗ t = −12.163∗∗∗
Containment 0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0002
(−0.001, 0.001) (−0.001, 0.001) (−0.001, 0.001)
t = 0.465 t = −0.334 t = −0.469
Trial Order −0.00002 −0.00005 −0.0001
(−0.0001, 0.00000) (−0.0001, −0.00002) (−0.0001, −0.00004)
t = −1.618 t = −3.415∗∗ t = −4.296∗∗∗
Interaction 0.001 0.0002 0.0004
(−0.001, 0.002) (−0.001, 0.002) (−0.001, 0.002)
t = 1.021 t = 0.294 t = 0.575
Intercept 1.607 1.613 1.621
(1.605, 1.608) (1.611, 1.615) (1.619, 1.623)
t = 1,744.954∗∗∗ t = 1,728.147∗∗∗ t = 1,625.652∗∗∗
Observations 1,491 1,491 1,491
Log Likelihood 3,908.996 3,884.676 3,796.362
Akaike Inf. Crit. −7,793.993 −7,745.352 −7,568.724
Bayesian Inf. Crit. −7,730.306 −7,681.666 −7,505.037
Note: ∗p<0.017; ∗∗p<0.0033; ∗∗∗p<0.00033
significance thresholds are bonferroni-corrected (alpha/3), values
shown per cell are regression coefficients, confidence intervals and
t-values ( in that order)
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Question−response times, Experiment 2 (with 95% CI bars)
Figure 3.10: Summary of results for the question response time, Experiment 2
Table 3.7: Regression analysis of reading times in the VERB region of Experiment 2
Dependent variable:
First-pass Regression path Total reading times
(1) (2) (3)
Prime Type −0.0004 −0.001 −0.001
(−0.001, 0.0003) (−0.002, −0.0004) (−0.002, −0.001)
t = −1.165 t = −3.061∗∗ t = −3.779∗∗∗
Containment −0.0005 −0.0002 −0.0004
(−0.001, 0.0003) (−0.001, 0.0005) (−0.001, 0.0003)
t = −1.153 t = −0.550 t = −1.129
Trial Order −0.00004 −0.00005 −0.0001
(−0.0001, −0.00002) (−0.0001, −0.00002) (−0.0001, −0.0001)
t = −3.886∗∗∗ t = −4.105∗∗∗ t = −8.117∗∗∗
Interaction 0.0001 0.0001 −0.0002
(−0.001, 0.001) (−0.001, 0.001) (−0.001, 0.001)
t = 0.270 t = 0.191 t = −0.370
Intercept 1.613 1.616 1.627
(1.612, 1.615) (1.614, 1.617) (1.626, 1.629)
t = 2,206.844∗∗∗ t = 2,209.841∗∗∗ t = 2,151.451∗∗∗
Observations 1,566 1,566 1,566
Log Likelihood 4,459.908 4,456.508 4,402.584
Akaike Inf. Crit. −8,895.816 −8,889.016 −8,781.167
Bayesian Inf. Crit. −8,831.541 −8,824.741 −8,716.892
Note: ∗p<0.017; ∗∗p<0.0033; ∗∗∗p<0.00033
significance thresholds are bonferroni-corrected (alpha/3), values
shown per cell are regression coefficients, confidence intervals and
t-values ( in that order)
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Table 3.8: Regression analysis of response-times in Experiment 2
Dependent variable:













Containment*Prime Type interaction −0.018
(−0.036, −0.00003)
t = −1.963∗
Containment*Question Type interaction 0.029
(0.011, 0.047)
t = 3.178∗∗











Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,252.506
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 1,321.499
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
values shown per cell are regression coeffi-
cients, confidence intervals and t-values (
in that order)
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in the video facilitated reading times of that same word once it appeared in the
sentence. This confirms that participants were able to use the information presented
in the video to ease processing of the target noun, and that they were nevertheless
unable to use the feature of “containment” presented in the video to speed up (or
slow-down) reading times in the verb region. This suggests that during processing of
the metaphoric verb, participants largely ignored the feature of physical containment,
seeing as it neither interfered with nor facilitated processing. This is consistent
with a Category Inclusion view of metaphor comprehension that states that literal
features are not initially activated if they are not necessary for the construction
of the appropriate ad hoc category during metaphor processing.
However, it could also be the case that the lack of effects in the verb region
is caused by inadequate materials: Activating the feature of spatial containment
could indeed facilitate or hinder processing, but the participants were not able to
activate this feature from these specific videos. It is thus necessary to assess whether
these videos could modulate processing in an environment in which they would be
expected to do so reliably, namely when the verbs are processed in their encoded,
literal meaning only. If the videos facilitate access to the literal meaning of the
verbs, the current interpretation of the results of Experiments 1 and 2 becomes
more plausible. I address this issue in Experiment 4.
The results of the question response task broadly replicated the findings of
Experiment 1. It was easier for participants to answer the question in the contained
vs. not-contained levels of the video-question conditions. In the noun-question
conditions, there was an effect of prime type, with the no-label conditions showing
slower response times than the noun-label conditions.
The noun-question/no-label conditions did not show a significant difference
between contained and not-contained levels, just as in Experiment 1. This finding
is important because the noun-question / no-label conditions were the only ones
without a confound between condition and correct answer. Furthermore, there
was an effect of prime type in the noun-question conditions, with the “noun-label”
conditions showing longer response times than the “noun-label” conditions.
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As mentioned in the discussion of Experiment 1, these results could be interpreted
as meaning that when reading the sentence, the conceptual feature of containment
is activated, facilitating responses in the contained vs. not-contained conditions
and/or interfering with the responses in the noun-question/no-label conditions.
This interpretation, however, is contingent upon the assumption that the
response patterns were caused by the interaction of processing video and metaphor
and not by the YES/NO response confound or by other external factors. I sought
to test this assumption in Experiment 3.
3.3 Experiment 3
Question-response times in Experiments 1 and 2 show an overall facilitation effect
for contained vs not-contained conditions, except for the noun-question/no-label
conditions, which showed no difference between contained and not-contained levels.
In Experiment 3, I set out to test whether these results were caused by the interaction
of video-prime, metaphor and question, or whether they are independent of the
presence of the metaphoric sentence. To do this, I ran a version of Experiment 2 in
which the sentences read by participants did not contain any metaphors whatsoever:
If the same pattern of results as in the previous two experiments is visible, it would
suggest that the results are not related to the processing of verbal metaphors. Since
the reading patterns of these sentences are irrelevant for this question and only
the question-response times were of interest, Experiment 3 was not run as an eye-
tracking study. Instead, it was implemented as a self-paced reading reaction time
task: Participants first watched the video-prime and then read the (non-metaphoric)
sentence. When they were done reading, they pushed a button in front of them
and were presented with the comprehension questions, which they answered by
pushing either a YES or NO button. Only the response times to the comprehension
questions were measured, time-locked to the appearance of the question on the
screen, as was the case in Experiments 1 and 2.
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3.3.1 Participants
Sixty-four native speakers of German (ages 18–31) with normal or corrected-to-
normal vision were recruited and tested at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.
None of them participated in Experiments 1, or 2. They received 8 euros as
compensation upon giving their informed consent. This study was covered by the
ethics vote of the psycholinguistics lab of the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.
3.3.2 Materials and design
To construct the materials in Experiment 3, I modified the sentences from Experi-
ment 2 by replacing the verb with a non-metaphorical verb (e.g. ignored instead of
fenced-in) that did not have the feature of spatial containment as part of its literal
meaning, as presented in (4):
(4) “Dass seine Meinung ignoriert wurde nach dem Regimewechsel, war für den
Redakteur schwierig”
“The fact that his opinion was ignored after the change in regime was difficult
for the journalist”
The design was identical to that of the previous experiments, with the factors
containment, question type and prime type. The experiment was programmed using
the open source software Open Sesame and was run on a PC. The only dependent
measure in this experiment was question-response time.
3.3.3 Procedure
Participants were instructed to wear noise-reducing headphones throughout the
experiment to avoid being distracted by the other participants. Each trial consisted
of three phases: First, participants saw the same animated video presented in
Experiments 1 and 2. They then read a sentence and pressed the space bar on
the keyboards that was in front of them (which was different to the procedure of
Experiments 1 and 2, were they pressed a key on a Cedrus response pad, not a
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computer keyboard). The sentence then disappeared and a question appeared on the
screen. They had to answer this question by pressing either the letter F or J (whereas
in Experiments 1 and 2 they pressed either the left or right key on the response pad),
which were counterbalanced across participants to stand for either YES or NO.
3.3.4 Predictions
The predictions for Experiment 3 were derived from the results of Experiments 1 and
2: If the same pattern of results is found in Experiment 3 as the one observed in the
previous two Experiments, it would suggest that the results of the question-response
times of Experiments 1 and 2 were not a consequence of the way participants
processed the metaphoric sentences. If a different pattern than this is found, it
would suggest that the results found in Experiments 1 and 2 were (at least partially)
caused by the way participants processed the verbal metaphors. In this sense,
Experiment 3 serves as a baseline against which the results of the question-response
times of Experiments 1 and 2 can be interpreted.
Of particular interest is again the noun-question/no-label condition given that,
as in the previous two Experiments, this was the only condition were both levels
of the factor containment (contained vs. not-contained) had the same correct
response (i.e. NO).
3.3.5 Results
I fitted a linear mixed effects regression model to the log-transformed reaction
times. Main effects of containment, prime type and question type were found.
Additionally, significant interactions of containment and question type, containment
and prime type, question type and prime type, and question type, prime type
and containment were found. The results are shown in Figure 3.11 and the model
details are given in Table 3.9.
Re-fitting the model with treatment contrasts, as I did for the previous experi-
ments, showed a significant difference between contained and not-contained levels
of the noun-question/no-label conditions, with the contained condition showing
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Question−response times, experiment 3 (with 95% CI bars)
Figure 3.11: Summary of results for the question response time, Experiment 3
significantly shorter responses than the not-contained condition. The details of
this model are shown in Table 3.10.
3.3.6 Discussion
The pattern of results is very similar to that found in Experiments 1 and 2. This
suggests that the response times founds in those experiments were modulated by
factors other than the metaphorical verb, since there was no metaphorical verb
in Experiment 3. This confirms the simpler explanation for the result pattern of
Experiments 1 and 2, namely that the results likely follow from a general response
bias (Easier to answer YES than NO and easier to answer to shorter than to longer
questions), and are not a product of metaphoric interpretation.
However, the results of the noun-question/no-label condition require further
explanation. In Experiment 3, both contained and not-contained levels of the noun-
question/no-label condition were significantly different from one another, whereas
in Experiments 1 and 2, no significant difference between these levels was found. It
is thus likely that this difference between experiments is the only one that might
be related to the presence of the metaphorical sentences in Experiments 1 and
2: If in the absence of a metaphor there are shorter response times in the not-
contained compared to the contained level of the noun-question/no-label condition
(Experiment 3, i.e. our baseline result), then the lack of a difference between
conditions in the presence of a metaphor (Experiments 1 and 2) could be interpreted
as a facilitation effect of the contained compared to the not-contained condition.
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Table 3.9: Regression analysis of response-times in Experiment 3
Dependent variable:













Containment*Prime Type interaction 0.071
(0.008, 0.133)
t = 2.219∗
Containment*Question Type interaction −0.099
(−0.165, −0.033)
t = −2.936∗∗











Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,822.472
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 1,958.213
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
values shown per cell are regression coeffi-
cients, confidence intervals and t-values (
in that order)
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Table 3.10: Model fitted with treatment-contrast coding for response times of
Experiments 1-3. ’Containment’ shows effect in noun-question/no-label conditions only
Dependent variable:
Response times per Experiment (in log-milliseconds)
(1) (2) (3)
Containment −0.066 −0.074 −0.064
(−0.157, 0.024) (−0.154, 0.006) (−0.121, −0.007)
t = −1.436 t = −1.803 t = −2.185∗
Intercept 7.506 7.913 7.947
(7.416, 7.596) (7.831, 7.995) (7.880, 8.013)
t = 162.766∗∗∗ t = 188.551∗∗∗ t = 235.400∗∗∗
Observations 1,111 1,491 2,113
Log Likelihood −559.837 −602.232 −549.023
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,145.674 1,256.464 1,150.046
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 1,210.843 1,394.452 1,297.098
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
values shown per cell are regression coefficients, confidence intervals
and t-values ( in that order)
This would suggest that in Experiments 1 and 2 the feature of containment might
have made it easier to answer the questions in the noun-question/no-label condition,
which would be in line with the predictions made by Implicit Comparison views.
However, this is very tenuous evidence at best (especially when considering that
the regression coefficients in all three experiments are very similar, see Table 3.10),
and would need to be confirmed by a follow-up experiment in which the absence
and presence of a metaphoric verb is directly manipulated.
This interpretation, as well as the interpretation of the results of the gaze
record of Experiments 1 and 2, relies on the assumption that participants can
indeed derive the conceptual feature of containment from the prime videos and
that this feature interacts with the way the verbs are processed. Experiment 4
directly addresses this issue.
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3.4 Experiment 4
This experiment dealt with the question of whether or not the videos used in
Experiments 1-3 can activate a mental representation of containment that leads
participants to process verbs of physical containment more readily than when
they first see an unrelated video.
3.4.1 Materials and design
Experiment 4 was a web-based lexical decision task in which participants saw the
same video clips from Experiments 1-3 as primes and then read the same verbs from
Experiments 1 and 2, which were presented here without context. The experiment
thus only had the factor containment with the levels contained and not-contained.
3.4.2 Procedure
A sample of 259 German native speakers (120 female; ages 18-31) was recruited
online via the platform “clickworker”. The experiment was designed and run using
an instance of the IBEX farm (Drummond, 2013) coupled with the Penncontroller
extension (Zehr & Schwarz, 2018), which allows for a simple integration of video
and linguistic stimuli. On each trial, participants first saw a video prime and then
a target word in the middle of the screen, and had a total of 5 seconds to decide
whether the word was a real word by either pressing F (“not a real word”) or J (“real
word”). After one practice item, participants were presented with six experimental
trials (two critical, four fillers). There was a one second pause in-between trials.
Figure 3.12 shows the progression of a single trial in the experiment. The study
was cleared by the data protection office of the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.
3.4.3 Predictions
If the video in the “contained” condition is not capable of eliciting a mental
representation of “containment” that can aid lexical recognition of verbs of physical
containment, there should be no difference in reaction times between conditions.
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Figure 3.12: Example of the progresssion of a trial in Experiment 4
If, on the other hand, the video in the “contained” condition is indeed capable of
eliciting a mental representation of “containment” that can ease lexical recognition
of verbs of physical containment, shorter reaction times in the contained condition
should appear compared to the not-contained condition.
3.4.4 Analysis and results
Prior to the analysis, participants who got less than 4/6 correct responses were
excluded (n=9), leaving the total number of participants at 250. Reaction times were
log-transformed following the results of a box-cox test (Box & Cox, 1964). A linear
mixed effects model was then fitted to the data. The results showed a significant
difference between the two conditions, with the contained condition displaying
shorter reaction times compared to the not-contained condition. The effect size had
a value of Cohen’s d = 0.21 (i.e. a “small” effect size according to Cohen (1992)).
The results are presented in Figure 3.13 and the model summary in Table 3.11.







   









   




Lexical decision task, experiment 4 (with 95% CI bars)
Figure 3.13: Summary of results for the lexical decision task, Experiment 4
Table 3.11: Regression analysis of response-times in Experiment 4
Dependent variable:









Akaike Inf. Crit. 840.571
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 861.282
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
values shown per cell are regression coeffi-
cients, confidence intervals and t-values (
in that order)
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Table 3.12: Random effects structure for models in Experiments 1-4
Models of Eye-tracking data Models of forced choice data
Exp1 (0 + prime type * containment
||item) + (0 + prime type *
containment || subject)
(1 + type || subject) + (0 + type |
item)
Exp2 (0 + prime type * containment ||
item)+ (0 + prime type *
containment || subject)
(1 + type || subject) + (0 + type |
item)
Exp3 (0 + question type * prime type *
containment || item) + (0 +
containment * question type *
prime type ||subject)
Exp4 (1|subject) + (1|item)
3.4.5 Discussion
Experiment 4 showed that the video-clip primes used in Experiments 1-3 facilitated
the retrieval of the encoded, literal meaning of different verbs of physical containment.
This finding suggests that participants were able to derive the conceptual feature
of physical containment from the videos in the contained conditions, since this is
the key feature assumed to be shared by video and verbs.
3.5 Interim Conclusion
As outlined in chapter two, theories of metaphor processing make different predic-
tions regarding the role of conceptual features related only to the literal meaning
during and immediately after processing of novel metaphors. Category Inclusion
views believe that these literal features should not play a role during processing and
might even hinder comprehension (McGlone & Manfredi, 2001). Furthermore, they
should be rapidly suppressed after the metaphor has been understood (Gernsbacher
et al., 2001; Rubio Fernandez, 2007). Implicit Comparison views, instead, claim
that features related to the literal meaning of a metaphor are initially active. This
is caused by an alignment stage in which encoded meanings are fully retrieved
prior to the projection of inferences (Gentner & Bowdle, 2008). This means that
literal features should facilitate early stages of processing, as shown by Weiland
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et al. (2014), and can remain active after comprehension, easing understanding of
subsequent, related novel or conventional metaphors (Thibodeau & Durgin, 2008).
In the experiments presented in this chapter, I looked at how priming the
conceptual feature of spatial containment would interact with the processing of
verbal metaphors in which physical containment is a crucial part of the literal
meaning but (arguably) not of the metaphoric interpretation. The results of two
eye-tracking experiments showed that the videos neither facilitated nor hindered
processing of the verbs used (e.g. fenced-in), regardless of whether the verb appeared
early on or late in the sentence (Experiments 1 and 2). This absence of an effect was
accompanied by a reliable priming effect of the target noun that appeared in both
video and sentence, suggesting that participants were actively integrating the input
of the video with the input of the sentence. Furthermore, Experiment 4 showed
that the videos did elicit a priming effect on those same verbs in a de-contextualized
lexical decision task, in as much as the contained video elicited shorter response
times to the subsequent verbs than did the not-contained video.
Data from the question-response times showed that participants were overall
faster answering questions in the contained vs. not-contained conditions. They were
also overall slower to answer questions about the interaction between video and
sentence (Was the opinion in the box?) than about just the video. Since these
effects were present in both the experiments with a metaphoric verb (Experiments
1 and 2) and our baseline experiment without a metaphoric verb (Experiment
3) they do not tell us much about how the metaphors interacted with video and
question type during processing.
However, in the absence of a metaphor (Experiment 3), participants were
significantly faster at correctly answering the question in the noun-question/no-
label not-contained condition (Was the opinion in the box?, when there was no word
written on the ball and the ball bounced freely) compared to the noun-question/no-
label contained condition (Was the opinion in the box?), when there was no word
written on the ball and the ball was trapped by the box). In Experiments 1
and 2, there was no difference between these conditions. This suggests that, in
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the presence of a metaphor, there could be a facilitation effect of the contained
compared to the not-contained noun-question/no-label conditions, which might
mean that the metaphor itself activated the feature of spatial containment which later
facilitated response times to the post-sentence questions. However, the evidence
for this is very tenuous since the overall question-response pattern in all three
experiments was similar.
I interpret the data as showing that the feature of physical containment is
ignored during comprehension of verbal metaphors of containment and neither
facilitates nor hinders processing. Failing to find a significant difference between
conditions is not equivalent to finding that there is no difference between them.
However, given the results of Experiment 4 and the fact that in Experiments 1 and
2 there was a significant effect of prime type (showing that some aspects of the
prime were indeed integrated with the sentence), I believe that the absence of an
effect of containment in Experiments 1 and 2 can be interpreted as meaningful.
I see this as being in line with a metaphor processing view that does not ascribe
an important role to literal features of the metaphoric vehicle during initial stages of
processing. Such is the case of Category Inclusion views (Glucksberg, 2001; Sperber
& Wilson, 2008), which claim that the meaning of the vehicle is quickly modulated
given the dimensions provided by the topic. In this process, features of the literal
meaning that are not compatible with the dimensions provided by the topic do
not need to be activated. However, pre-activating these features does not interfere
with the lexical modulation of the metaphoric vehicle either.
It could be that metaphor processing varies according to syntactic class such
that nominal metaphors are processed differently than verbal metaphors. This
would mean that nominal metaphors could be understood via Implicit Comparison
(following Gentner & Bowdle, 2008) and verbal metaphors via lexical modulation
(Torreano et al., 2005). This view has previously been stated by Cardillo et al. (2010)
and Schmidt et al. (2010). However, evidence from a neuroimaging study suggests
that on a neural level, the distinction between verbal and nominal metaphors
might is not a meaningful one. Cardillo et al. (2012) investigated processing of
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both nominal and verbal metaphors using functional magnetic resonance imaging
technology: In the experiment, participants read nominal (The reception was an icy
swim) and verbal (The flowers purred in the sunlight) metaphors while their brains’
blood oxygenation levels were measured. The results showed that the activated
regions associated with processing each type of metaphor greatly overlapped, with
no significant differences between nominal and verbal metaphors. This suggests that
the neural processes associated with processing both of these types of metaphors
might not differ, which points to the underlying cognitive mechanisms likely being
the same. With this reasoning in mind, it is likely that the present results could
generalize beyond the case of verbal metaphors.
In terms of how these results relate to the literature on the interaction between
language and the visual world it is possible to draw the following conclusions:
Guerra and Knoeferle (2014) found a facilitation effect of visual primes of distance
on processing of semantic similarity. They argued that this was indicative of an
abstract co-indexing link between distance and similarity. Experiments 1 and 2
of the current chapter failed to find such a link between videos of containment
and adjectives of difficulty. It could be the case that these co-indexing links are
constructed and stored in memory via repeated, conventional use: Perhaps speaking
of semantic similarity in terms of distance is a more common occurrence than
speaking of difficulty in terms of containment, leading to facilitation effects in
the former but not in the latter case.
In a production study, Sato et al. (2015) found a priming effect of metaphors of
difficulty after participants saw images of physical containment, an effect which we
failed to find in the present language comprehension study. This difference in results
could be explained by a difference in conventionality of the types of metaphors used:
Sato et al. (2015) counted the production of spatial prepositions such as in and out
(e.g. Bobbie fell in love working in the potato factory) and of idiomatic expressions
(Nick said time is full of shit) as instances of a containment-as-difficulty metaphor.
These types of conventional, “fossilized” metaphoric expressions are likely to be
processed differently than novel metaphors (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005; Keysar et al.,
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2000) making the results difficult to compare, given that the materials in our study
were all novel verbal metaphors (It is not clear whether participants in the study
by Sato and collaborators even produced any novel metaphors at all).
There are some caveats with the overall interpretation of the results of Ex-
periments 1-4, specifically regarding the way in which Experiment 4 compares to
Experiments 1 and 2: First, in Experiment 4 each participant saw only 2 critical
items, whereas in Experiments 1 and 2 participants saw the full set of 36 items. It
could therefore be the case that repeated exposure to the video primes interfered
with an underlying true priming effect that our experimental set-up in Experiments
1 and 2 could not detect. It is also possible that the lack of an effect was due to the
verbs being embedded in a sentence, regardless of whether the context encourages a
literal or metaphoric interpretation of the verb. This is unlikely, considering that in
Experiment 2 the Video-Prime and the verb were almost as temporally adjacent
as in Experiment 4, but it cannot be ruled out completely. Further research is
necessary in order to determine the exact nature of the prime-verb relation and the
different contexts under which a priming effect of contained video on containment
verbs could arise. Nevertheless, the experiments presented in this chapter can be
seen as a step forward in understanding how metaphors are processed outside of
the narrow realm of nominal metaphors.
Now I turn to the next critical issue: The question of symmetry of metaphoric
processing. The following chapter presents two eye-tracking Experiments designed
to address this issue using a modified version of the VWP.
The fact that participants direct their visual attention
towards objects in a concurrent scene whose names
they hear is not particularly surprising. After all,
one of the purposes of language is precisely to direct
visual attention. More interesting (and perhaps more
constraining, theoretically) are the conditions under
which language-mediated eye movements occur to-
wards objects that are not referred to in the language.
— Altmann & Kamide, 2007, p. 511.
4
Metaphoric (A)symmetry: the Case of
Verb-Object Metaphors
In chapter two, I explained how one of the key differentiating predictions of
categorization and Implicit Comparison views is whether or not the metaphoric
topic and vehicle play the same role during the construction of figurative meaning.
The Implicit Comparison view sees both elements playing the same initial role:
The structure of the elements needs to be aligned in order for inferences to be
projected, meaning that initial processing has to be role-neutral. On the other
hand, the Category Inclusion view stipulates role-specific tasks: The meaning of
the metaphoric vehicle is contextually adjusted to create an ad hoc category, while
the metaphoric topic provides the necessary parameters that steer the way in which
the ad hoc category is constructed. In this chapter, I examine this question with
empirical evidence from two experiments using the Visual World Paradigm.1
As mentioned in chapter two, a big problem with testing these predictions is the
fact that the order of the elements of a nominal metaphor cannot be reversed without
altering the meaning of the expression as a whole. Wolff and Gentner (2011) worked
1A version of this chapter presenting the results of Experiment 5 was published in Rodriguez
Ronderos, Guerra, et al. (2020). Camilo Rodríguez Ronderos and Pia Knoeferle conceptualized
the study. Camilo Rodríguez Ronderos created and normed the materials and conducted the
experiment. Camilo Rodríguez Ronderos and Ernesto Guerra analyzed the data. Camilo Rodríguez
Ronderos wrote the paper with feedback from Pia Knoeferle and Ernesto Guerra.
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around this constraint by showing that participants in two experiments accepted
reversed metaphors (a virus is a rumor) as meaningful at the earliest time intervals
(500 and 600 milliseconds) in a way that was not significantly different from the way
in which they accepted forward metaphors (a rumor is a virus) as a meaningful.
This is consistent with an initial alignment stage, in which the structure of the
elements of a metaphor is aligned regardless of their relative position. However,
this piece of evidence does not tell us anything about the way in which participants
incrementally construct a mental representation of the metaphoric expressions as a
function of the order of the elements. As discussed in chapter two, it also does not
take into consideration the way that the relationship between topic and vehicle is
influenced by the preceding linguistic context. These two facts make it necessary
to find better testing grounds for this particular hypothesis.
One way forward is to look for metaphoric constructions that do allow for a
felicitous reversal of the order of their elements (outside the limited scope of English
nominal metaphors), and that do consider the effect of the preceding context
on comprehension. Such constructions occur in German in cases in which the
metaphoric vehicle appears as the accusative object of a sentence, as in (1) below:
(1a) Sebastian füttert topic eine Prinzessin vehicle.
“Sebastian feeds topic a princess vehicle”
(1b) Sebastian wird eine Prinzessin vehicle füttern topic.
“Sebastian will a princess vehicle feed topic”
An important feature of German syntax is that it alternates from an SVO to
an SOV surface sentence structure in the presence of an auxiliary verb. From
an incremental semantic processing point of view, this means that our mental
representations can be constructed differently, depending on which information
comes first: the main verb (1a) or the accusative object (1b). This difference is
ideal for testing the contribution that each element of the metaphor (the vehicle or
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the verbal topic) is making by reversing the order of presentation and examining
the activation patterns of the figurative and literal meanings of the expression.
It’s important to note that the metaphor in (1) does not have the canonical topic-
vehicle structure present in metaphors such as my lawyer topic is a shark vehicle.
In (1), there is no explicit mention of the metaphoric topic. Instead, the verb füttert
can be seen as the “verbal topic”, given that it is the only element of this expression
that provides information about the nominal topic of the metaphor: Füttert,
embedded in an appropriate relevant context (see (2b below)), will most likely
activate the metaphoric topic Katze, given that the verb provides enough semantic
and contextual constraints for participants to anticipate its most likely referent.
The idea that füttert will activate the metaphoric topic Katze given a supporting
visual context is supported by research on incremental language processing (see
chapter two for a brief introduction). Specifically, research on the anticipation
of post-verbal objects has shown that the information provided by a verb can be
reliably used to generate expectations about the semantic features of an upcoming
object. Altmann and Kamide (1999) found that when participants hear sentences
that include verbs with restricting thematic roles (such as eats in the sentence
the boy eats cake) participants’ eye movements anticipated the direct object by
moving towards the only depiction of an edible object in the given visual array
upon verb onset presentation.
This effect has been replicated successfully with larger samples (Hintz et al., 2017)
and 2-year-old children (Mani & Huettig, 2012). Importantly, Kamide et al. (2003)
found that even when a verb does not provide enough constraining information on
its own (such as ride), participants incorporate their knowledge about the sentential
subject (the girl will ride. . . vs. the man will ride. . . ) to anticipate an upcoming
object based on an available visual context (more looks to a visually represented
motorbike when the man was the subject compared to when the subject was the girl).
This line of research raises the question of whether anticipating an upcoming
verbal object is driven by verb semantics alone or by the contextual plausibility
granted by the previous linguistic context. Metusalem et al. (2012) asked a related
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question in an investigation of the role of event knowledge during incremental
language processing. Their goal was to show that information about an event
provided by a (linguistic) context could activate information that is compatible with
the event at hand yet incompatible with the unfolding linguistic input. They found
that words that are contextually incompatible can nevertheless elicit a reduced
N400 effect if they can be said to belong to the general domain of the event at hand
(“semantically related”), compared to contextually incompatible and semantically
anomalous words. This finding would suggest that regardless of grammatical and
thematic fit, information that is relevant to the overall construction of a mental
representation of an event can facilitate processing. But what would happen if the
information provided by the verb was at odds with the information provided by a
linguistic context? Would participants’ ability to anticipate an object be impaired or
would they preferentially rely on verbal or contextual expectations during processing?
The experiments in this chapter are designed to answer this question as well
as the question of the role-specificity of the elements of a metaphor: In (1) The
verb is biased towards expecting the verbal object to be an animal (or perhaps
a toddler), since the verb füttern carries this information as part of its thematic
role constraints. But, (1) can be preceded by two different contexts, such as (2a)
and (2b) below, that seem to shift the expectations for the upcoming verbal object
from Katze (an animal), to Prinzessin (a human), regardless of the thematic role
assignment constraints that might be associated with the verb füttern on its own:
(2a, literal context)
Sebastian liebt eine berühmte Adlige. Er hat sie in einem Schloss kennengelernt
und seitdem sind sie unzertrennlich. Die Adlige ist schwach und abhängig, und
kann sehr hilfsbedürftig sein. Deswegen tut Sebastian alles für sie, wenn sie Hunger
hat. Er wird sich immer um sie kümmern wollen.
“Sebastian loves a famous noble woman. He met her in a castle and they have
been inseparable since. The noble woman is weak and dependent and can be very
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needy. That’s why Sebastian would do anything for her when she’s hungry. He
will always want to take care of her.”
(2b, metaphoric context)
Sebastian liebt eine wunderschöne Katze. Er hat sie in einem Tierheim adoptiert
und seitdem sind sie unzertrennlich. Die Katze ist verwöhnt und launisch, und
kann sehr wählerisch sein. Deswegen würde Sebastian alles für sie tun, wenn sie
Hunger hat. Er wird sich immer um sie kümmern wollen.
“Sebastian loves a beautiful cat. He adopted her in a shelter and they have since
been inseparable. The cat is spoiled and moody and can be very fussy. That’s why
Sebastian would do anything for her when she’s hungry. He will always want to
take care of her.”
Two things can be said about the change in interpretation brought on by the
different preceding contexts:
(a) Verb-Object metaphors such as (1) are highly sensitive to the preceding
context: Without the relevant contextual information of what the verb might
be referring to, one should be less likely to understand that Prinzessin is in
fact a spoiled cat. More generally, given that the meaning of novel metaphors
is not retrieved from memory but constructed on the fly for every individual
expression, the relationship between a metaphor and its context is crucial in
order to determine if a metaphor is felicitous and if can be processed easily.
(b) Contextually derived expectations might be able to override the on-line
expectations of thematic roles generated by a verb alone. This would suggest
that the thematic role constraints of a verb might not play the most important
role during sentence processing. Instead, the overall construction of a mental
representation of an event might be what determines how post-verbal object
anticipation operates, in line with the findings of Metusalem et al. (2012).
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The overall goal of the two VWP experiments in this chapter is to examine
how German verb-object constructions are processed as a function of the relative
position of the verb and direct object. In Experiment 5, verb-object constructions
were embedded in a linguistic context that either biased towards a novel metaphoric
or a literal interpretation of the verb’s direct object. Participants then saw a visual
grid with four pictures and had to click on the picture that best represented the
story after hearing the target utterance. In Experiment 6, the target utterance
was not preceded by any linguistic context at all.
These two experiments will help us understand (i) what the elements of a
metaphoric expression contribute to processing (and when they do so), (ii) how
interpretation biases (literal vs. metaphoric) imposed by a preceding linguistic
context interact with the verb’s thematic role constraints, and (iii) what the




Thirty-two native speakers of German (aged 18 to 31) with normal or corrected-
to-normal vision gave their informed consent and received 12 Euros each for their
participation. The number of participants was determined via an a-priori power
analysis through simulations using data from a pilot study (see Appendix C for
details of the pilot study) with the help of the R package SimR(Green & MacLeod,
2016). The power analysis determined that with 32 participants statistical power
would be above 80% assuming a true effect size (for the difference between Early-
Metaphoric and Late-Metaphoric in the vehicle region) with a Cohen’s d value of
0.2. All participants were right handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision. This study was covered by the ethics vote of the psycholinguistics lab of
the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.
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4.1.2 Materials and design
Linguistic stimuli
For Experiments 5 and 6, 36 verb-object metaphors were created. In Experiment 5,
these were paired with a literal and a metaphorical context (as seen in Table 4.1 ).
The 36 items were selected from an original pool of 38 according to the results of a
ratings task conducted with an independent group of participants (see norming study
1 below). The literal and metaphoric contexts and target utterances were matched
for length within every item (±2 characters) as well as for syntactic structure. The
last sentence in each item was identical across conditions with the exception of
the disambiguating word: In the literal conditions, participants heard the literal
disambiguating word (Adlige, “noble woman”) and in the metaphoric contexts they
heard the metaphoric disambiguating word (Katze, “cat”) (see Table 4.2). This
word was always the same word used in the written context to describe the given
referent. After the norming tasks were completed, all sentences were recorded by a
female native speaker of German. All critical items are included in Appendix B.




Sebastian liebt eine berühmte Adlige. Er hat sie in einem Schloss
kennengelernt und seitdem sind sie unzertrennlich. Die Adlige ist
schwach und abhängig, und kann sehr hilfsbedürftig sein.
Deswegen tut Sebastian alles für sie, wenn sie Hunger hat. Er
wird sich immer um sie kümmern wollen.
English
Translation
“Sebastian loves a famous noble woman. He met her in a castle
and they have been inseparable since. The noble woman is weak
and dependent and can be very needy. That’s why Sebastian
would do anything for her when she’s hungry. He will always
want to take care of her.”
Metaphoric
Context
Sebastian liebt eine wunderschöne Katze. Er hat sie in einem
Tierheim adoptiert und seitdem sind sie unzertrennlich. Die
Katze ist verwöhnt und launisch, und kann sehr wählerisch sein.
Deswegen würde Sebastian alles für sie tun, wenn sie Hunger hat.
Er wird sich immer um sie kümmern wollen.




“Sebastian loves a beautiful cat. He adopted her in a shelter and
they have since been inseparable. The cat is spoiled and moody
and can be very fussy. That’s why Sebastian would do anything
for her when she’s hungry. He will always want to take care of
her.”




Sebastian fütterttopic eine Prinzessinvehicle, und wird
unablässig der Adligen beistehen.




Sebastian fütterttopic eine Prinzessinvehicle, und wird
unablässig der Katze beistehen.




Sebastian wird eine Prinzessinvehicle fütterntopic, und
wird unablässig der Adligen beistehen.




Sebastian wird eine Prinzessinvehicle fütterntopic, und
wird unablässig der Katze beistehen.
English Translation “Sebastian will a princess feed and will relentlessly the
cat support”
Visual stimuli
For every item, a grid of 4 pictures was created: One depicting the literal meaning
of the metaphoric vehicle, one the metaphoric meaning and two unrelated distractor
images. The images used were chosen from a pool of freely available photographs
found on a popular search engine. Figure 4.1 shows the visual grid created for the
target item in Table 4.2. The top-right image depicts the metaphoric interpretation
of the vehicle (Prinzessin understood as a cat), while the bottom-left image depicts
the literal interpretation (Prinzessin understood as a princess). The position of
the images was randomized across items and participants.
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Figure 4.1: Example of a visual grid for a critical item in Experiments 5 & 6
Norming study 1: metaphor aptness and familiarity
20 monolingual German native speakers (ages 18-31) rated the goodness of the
metaphoric expressions given their context on a scale from 1 (meaning “incompre-
hensible”) to 7 (meaning “perfectly comprehensible”) after having to choose from 3
possible sentences the correct intended metaphoric meaning. This was meant to
ensure that the created novel metaphors could actually be easily understood. Items
with a mean aptness score below 4 were dropped from the main experiment.
Additionally, participants also rated the familiarity of the metaphors, by in-
dicating whether they had ever heard the target metaphoric vehicle used in this
specific metaphoric meaning before on a scale from 1 (meaning “never before”)
to 7 (meaning “very often”).
The aptness results showed that every item was assigned its correct meaning
over 80% of the times, with the exception of items 1 (52%) and item 24 (75%).
These two items were also the only ones to be rated below 4 by participants (Item
1: 2.63; item 24:3.35). They were therefore excluded from the main Experiment.
The remaining 36 items, which were used in Experiments 5 and 6 as well as 11-14
(presented in chapter five) are included in Appendix B.
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Norming study 2: Gated completion task
In order to assess whether the verbs chosen for the study could indeed generate
expectations about possible upcoming objects independently from context, 20
monolingual native speakers of German (ages 18-31) were asked to take part in a
gated sentence-picture completion task. None of the participants had previously
taken part in the first norming task, nor did they take part in the subsequent
study presented in this chapter.
Participants read only subject and verb of the 36 critical items on a computer
screen. These incomplete sentences were visible for 2 seconds, after which they
disappeared from the screen and a visual grid appeared containing the same four
pictures that were to be shown in Experiment 5 (see Figure 4.1 ): Target, competitor,
and two distractor images. The goal was to make sure that the subject-verb pairings
could elicit a consistent expectation of the target picture (the cat, in Figure 4.1 )
as the upcoming object. Participants had a maximum of three seconds to select the
picture that they thought would best describe a possible direct object of the sentence.
The results of this norming task were used to adjust both pictures and verbs
of those items in which the target picture was selected less than 75% of the times.
The pretest was then re-run with a different set of 15 monolingual German native
speakers who did not take part in any other of the experiments in this chapter.
The results of this second (and final) norming study showed that the selected
sentences together with the selected pictures generated strong expectations regarding
upcoming verbal objects: For every critical item, participants selected the target
image as the appropriate object over 75% of the times. Final results of the norming
study are shown in Figure 4.2 .
Filler items
72 combinations of written contexts + spoken utterances were created and used as
filler items. These included metaphoric utterances, idiomatic, and literal sentences.
For the filler trials, there was always one target image and three distractors, so that
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Figure 4.2: Summary of results of the picture-selection norming task of the materials of
Experiment 5
participants could easily and reliably establish the appropriate referent. Item (3)
below is an example of a filler item. All filler items are included in Appendix B.
Design
The experiment had a 2x2, repeated-measures design with the factors Contextual
Bias (literal vs metaphoric) and Verb Position (early vs. late). “Contextual Bias”
refers to the type of linguistic context that participants read prior to hearing
the target utterance. “Verb Position” describes whether the target utterance
heard had its lexical verb before or after the direct object. This resulted in four
different versions of every item for each of the four experimental conditions, as
seen in Tables Table 4.1 and 4.2 .
4.1.3 Predictions
The higher-order prediction of Experiment 5 refer directly to the theoretical debate
presented in chapter two: If both elements (verbal-topic and vehicle) of the metaphor
contribute equally to the construction of the metaphoric meaning (as per Wolff
& Gentner, 2011), then we should expect the pattern of activation of literal
and figurative meaning to be similar regardless of the order of presentation of
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the elements, i.e. regardless of whether the verb precedes or follows its direct
object. If, on the other hand, each element has a role-specific contribution (as per
Glucksberg, 2001, p. 55), we should see different activation patterns depending
on the order of presentation.
Concretely, if the Implicit Comparison view holds, we should find that when
participants hear the metaphoric vehicle (Prinzessin), the relationship between
looks to the princess (literal picture) and the cat (metaphoric picture) should be
similar in the early verb and late verb constraint conditions. If, on the other hand,
the Category Inclusion view holds, we should find differences in this relationship
across conditions. In particular, we should find that when participants hear the topic
prior to the vehicle, they should be able to settle on a metaphoric interpretation
of the vehicle more easily upon hearing the metaphoric vehicle than when they
hear the vehicle prior to the topic.
The second prediction for Experiment 5 concerns the type of information
necessary for the anticipation of a verb’s likely upcoming object. Altmann and
Kamide (1999) showed that when hearing a verb, participants preferentially directed
their gaze to a picture of an object that is most typically associated with this verb.
But what happens when the information provided by a linguistic context suggests
that the upcoming verbal object will be a different one to that most typically
associated with the verb?
This is the case of the literal early-verb condition: the linguistic context guides
participants to expect the visual representation of the literal princess to be the
upcoming referent, but the verb (füttert) suggests that the image of the cat should
be the most likely referent, as can be seen by the results of the second norming
study. There are (at least) three possible scenarios: Participants could rely on (i)
the verb or (ii) on the context to anticipate an upcoming object, or they could
(iii) not anticipate any object whatsoever. Accordingly, in the literal early-verb
condition, we would either expect (i) a preference for looking at the cat (compared
to the princess) or (ii) a preference for looking at the princess (compared to the
cat), or (iii) no significant preference for either one in the verb region.
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4.1.4 Procedure
Participants’ eye movements were recorded using an Eyelink 1000 plus desktop head-
stabilized tracker, produced by SR Research. At the beginning of each experimental
session, the eye-tracker was calibrated with a 9-point calibration procedure to
ensure accurate monitoring of the right eye, which was the only one tracked. The
procedure was performed and repeated until there was less than a maximum error
of 1 degree. If it was not possible to meet this criterion, the experiment was
aborted and participants were replaced. Re-calibration was performed after every
pause in the Experiment, i.e. twice more. After calibration, participants saw three
practice trials before the experiment began.
Each trial in the experiment consisted of five phases (see Figure 4.3): First,
participants read a 4-sentence context (see Table 4.1 ) and clicked anywhere on the
screen when they were ready to continue. They then saw 4 pictures on the screen:
One representing the literal (princess) and another the metaphoric (cat) meaning
of the target sentence as well as two distractor images (see Figure 4.1 ). After two
seconds of image preview, participants heard the target utterance while the pictures
remained on the screen (see Table 4.2 for an example of a critical item). Their
task was to click on the image that they thought best fit both the written context
and the spoken sentence. They could only move the mouse once the utterance had
been played in its entirety. On 1/3 of the trials (36 trials, filler trials only) they
answered multiple choice questions on the content of either the written text (12
trials), the pictures (12 trials), or the spoken utterance (12 trials).
4.1.5 Analysis
I quantified participants’ viewing preference by measuring the log-ratio (Arai et al.,
2007) between looks to the metaphoric picture divided by looks to the literal
picture when participants heard the topic (füttert or füttern, “feeds”) and the
vehicle (Prinzessin, “princess”). Log-ratio values are centered around 0, where
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Figure 4.3: Example of the progresssion of a trial in experiments 5-6
positive values indicate a preference for the metaphoric picture and negative values
a preference for the literal picture.
Additionally, I measured log-ratio values for the parts of the sentence that
followed the metaphoric expression by dividing it into three different regions of
interest. This resulted in the fitting of 5 different statistical models on 5 different
sentence regions. The regions can be seen in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Regions of interest for a critical item in Experiments 5 & 6
Region Example Item Comment
Vehicle eine Prinzessin (“A
Princess”)






position in sentence varied between
conditions
UND und wird (“and will”) This region was identical across all critical




This region was identical within every item
(it was always an adverb), position in
sentence was identical within every item
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Region Example Item Comment
DIS der Katze (metaphoric
conditions)(“the cat”)
or der Adligen (literal
conditions) (“the noble
woman”)
Word is identical to the word in the written
context, position in sentence identical
within every item, word changes according
to experimental condition. Word
disambiguates the intended referent (thus
the name, DIS).
This specific distribution of regions for analysis is different to the one planned
before the Experiment was run. The original planned analysis compared the first and
second element in each condition to the element in the other condition that had the
same position: The first element in the verb-early conditions (füttert) was compared
to the first element in the verb-late conditions (Prinzessin) and the second element
in the verb-early conditions (Prinzessin) was compared to the second element in the
verb-late conditions (füttern). I chose to deviate from the original analysis because
I considered that the one presented here was a more appropriate direct comparison
seeing that it compares equal to equal (i.e. comparing hearing the word Prinzessin in
the verb-early condition to hearing the word Prinzessin in the verb-late condition).
This allows for a more straightforward interpretation of the results as well as for
the fitting of more appropriate statistical models. The change in analysis does not
change the conceptual predictions for the experiment nor the interpretation of the
results. The original analysis and results are presented in detail in Appendix C.
I fitted five linear mixed-effects models to the data, one for each one of the five
regions of interest illustrated in Table 4.3. The model-fitting process followed
the recommendations of Barr et al. (2013). All models included the factors
Contextual Bias, Verb Position and their interaction as fixed effects as well as
trial number as a control variable.
Models were coded using a treatment contrast scheme in order to tailor the
contrasts to specific hypotheses of the experiment, as recommended by Schad et al.
(2020). When using treatment contrast, one condition is used as a baseline (the
intercept of the model), with the coefficients of the predictor variables representing
direct comparisons between a predictor and the baseline group while keeping all
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other predictors at a fixed level. This differs from the ANOVA-style, sum-contrast
traditionally used (which was used to analyze the experiments in the previous
chapter), in which the intercept represents the overall mean of all conditions, and
the coefficients of the predictor variables represent the effect of a specific factor
compared to the overall mean. Further details on why this specific contrast-coding
scheme was used can be found in Appendix C.
Importantly, when using treatment contrast the coefficient of the intercept
tests the null-hypothesis of whether the outcome value (i.e., log-ratio) is equal
to zero. This means that the intercept term will tell us if there is a preference
for either literal (negative log-ratio) or metaphoric (positive log-ratio) picture in
the condition chosen as the baseline judging by whether or not the intercept is
significantly different from zero.
As in the previous chapter, all tables reporting the results of regression analyses
are structured as follows: For every variable, the tables report the regression
coefficient, followed by the confidence intervals (in brackets) and the t-value. Stars on
the t-values show the statistical significance cut-offs, based on the variable’s p-value.
4.1.6 Results
Non-gaze Data
Context reading times To check if there were any differences in reading times
of the contexts prior to listening the target sentence, a linear mixed-effects model
was fitted to the data using the square root of the reading times as the dependent
measure. This dependent measure was chosen following the results of a Box-Cox
test. The model showed no significant differences between reading times of the
two types of contexts. The results are shown in Figure 4.4.
Picture Selection Times For all trials where participants selected the correct
picture, I analyzed the time it took them to select said picture starting from the
offset of the target utterance. A linear mixed-effects model was fitted to the picture
selection times. The picture-selection times were transformed using an inverse
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square root transformation, following the results of a Box-Cox test. The statistical
model fitted on the data included trial order as a control variable and random
intercepts and slopes for both main effects (context bias and verb position) and
their interaction by items and subjects. This model showed no significant differences
between conditions. The results are shown in Figure 4.5.
Comprehension questions The goal of including comprehension questions on
1/3 of all filler items (i.e. in 24 trials of the experiment) was to make sure that
participants remained attentive throughout the entire experimental session. The
results show that participants were overall very accurate at answering comprehension
questions. The mean response accuracy was 93%, with median accuracy being 94%.
The minimum score for an individual participant was 84% and the maximum was
100%. Based on these scores, no participants were excluded from the analysis.
Picture Selection Of the total 1150 trials in the data, participants clicked on
the correct target picture 1086 times. The 64 times they clicked on a picture other
than the target were all found in the metaphoric conditions. This means that overall
accuracy was above 99%, and accuracy in the metaphoric conditions above 98%.
Gaze Data
Vehicle Region The model for the vehicle region included random slopes for
context bias by subjects and context bias and verb constraint by items. This model
was fitted three times: the first one coding the metaphoric-early condition as the
intercept, the second one doing the same with the metaphoric-late condition and
the third one with the literal-early condition. This was done in order to asses the
significance values of different conditions when these were coded as the intercept
in the model. All models can be seen in detail in Table 4.4 .
The first version of the model (metaphoric-early condition as intercept) showed
a significant difference between early and late metaphoric conditions. Additionally,
the intercept of the model was positive and significantly different from zero. This
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Figure 4.5: Summary of picture-selection times, Experiment 5.
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result suggests that there is a difference in viewing pattern when hearing the vehicle
depending on whether the vehicle appeared after or before the verb. The second
version of the model (metaphoric-late as intercept) showed a significant difference
between metaphoric-late and literal-late. The intercept of this model was negative
and significantly different from zero. This suggests that when they heard the vehicle
prior to the verb, participants mostly considered the literal picture (the princess)
as the likely referent, whereas they mostly considered the metaphoric picture when
hearing the vehicle after the verb. As for the literal conditions, the third model
showed no significant difference between literal-early and literal-late conditions.
This finding suggests that the gaze preference differences between early and late
conditions found in this region were specific to metaphor comprehension.
Verb Region The model for the verb region included random intercepts and
random slopes for both factors by items and random slopes for both factors by
subjects. This model was fitted three times, analogously to the model of the vehicle
region. The models are shown in Table 4.5 .
The first version of the model (metaphoric-early condition as intercept) showed
a significant difference between metaphoric-early and literal-early and a significant
interaction between both factors. The intercept of the model was positive and
significantly different from zero, signifying an overall preference for the metaphoric
picture throughout the region in the metaphoric-early condition. This suggests
that when hearing the verb prior to the vehicle after having read a metaphorically
biasing context, participants anticipated the object that was compatible with both
context and the verb’s selectional preferences (the cat).
The second version of the model (metaphoric-late as intercept) showed a signifi-
cant difference between metaphoric-late and literal-late conditions. Furthermore,
the intercept of the model was significantly positive, suggesting that participants
quickly re-evaluated their assessment from the previous region and preferred the
“cat” as the most likely referent.
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Finally, the third model (literal-early condition as intercept) showed a significant
difference between early and late literal conditions. The intercept of the model was
not significantly different from zero, suggesting that participants did not reliably
anticipate the object that was compatible with context (the princess) or the object
compatible with the verb’s selectional preferences (the cat) and only preferred to look
at the princess when they heard the verb after the object (Late-Literal conditions).
UND Region The model for the “und” region included random intercepts and
random slopes for both factors by items and random slopes for both factors by
subjects. As with the previous regions, the model was fitted three times. Overall,
the results of this region show that participants settled for a literal interpretation
in both literal conditions and on a metaphoric interpretation in the metaphoric
conditions: There were significant differences between both metaphoric conditions
and their literal counterparts. All model intercepts were significant. The results
are shown in Table 4.6 and can be visualized in Figure 4.8 .
ADV Region The model for the “adv” region included random intercepts and
random slopes for both factors by items and random slopes for both factors by
subjects. As with the previous regions, the model was fitted three times. As can
be seen in Figure 4.9, the results are very similar to those found in the previous
region, with significant differences between metaphoric and literal conditions and
no differences between early and late verb conditions. All model intercepts were
significant. The results are shown in Table 4.7 .
DIS region The model for the “dis” region included random intercepts and
random slopes for both factors by items and random slopes for both factors by
subjects. The results for this region were similar to those found in the previous
two regions, with more pronounced effects (see Figure 4.10 ). This suggests that
participants looked at the appropriate referent when hearing the disambiguating
word. The models are shown in Table 4.8 .
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Figure 4.7: Summary of results for the verb region, Experiment 5.
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Figure 4.9: Summary of results for the adv, Experiment 5
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Early-Metaphoric vs. Early-Literal −0.304
(−0.380, −0.228)
t = −7.808∗∗∗
Early-Metaphoric vs. Late-Metaphoric −0.155
(−0.204, −0.107)
t = −6.288∗∗∗
Late-Metaphoric vs. Late-Literal −0.154
(−0.230, −0.078)
t = −3.950∗∗∗
Early-Literal vs. Late-Literal −0.005
(−0.054, 0.043)
t = −0.212
Trial Order 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.0002, 0.001) (0.0002, 0.001) (0.0002, 0.001)




Intercept 0.084 −0.071 −0.220
(0.039, 0.130) (−0.117, −0.025) (−0.265, −0.174)
t = 3.619∗∗∗ t = −3.039∗∗ t = −9.427∗∗∗
condition at intercept early-met late-met early-lit
Observations 84,960 84,960 84,960
Log Likelihood −66,109.130 −66,109.130 −66,109.130
Akaike Inf. Crit. 132,236.300 132,236.300 132,236.300
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 132,320.400 132,320.400 132,320.400
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
values shown per cell are regression coefficients, confidence
intervals and t-values ( in that order)
4. Metaphoric (A)symmetry: the Case of Verb-Object Metaphors 127





Early-Metaphoric vs. Early-Literal −0.122
(−0.204, −0.041)
t = −2.959∗∗
Early-Metaphoric vs. Late-Metaphoric 0.018
(−0.050, 0.085)
t = 0.509
Late-Metaphoric vs. Late-Literal −0.311
(−0.392, −0.230)
t = −7.511∗∗∗
Early-Literal vs. Late-Literal −0.171
(−0.239, −0.103)
t = −4.947∗∗∗
Trial Order −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001
(−0.0005, 0.0002) (−0.0005, 0.0002) (−0.0005, 0.0002)




Intercept 0.075 0.093 −0.047
(0.015, 0.135) (0.033, 0.153) (−0.107, 0.013)
t = 2.456∗ t = 3.030∗∗ t = −1.547
condition at intercept early-met late-met early-lit
Observations 85,200 85,200 85,200
Log Likelihood −63,613.150 −63,613.150 −63,613.150
Akaike Inf. Crit. 127,248.300 127,248.300 127,248.300
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 127,351.200 127,351.200 127,351.200
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
values shown per cell are regression coefficients, confidence
intervals and t-values ( in that order)
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Early-Metaphoric vs. Early-Literal −0.303
(−0.360, −0.246)
t = −10.388∗∗∗
Early-Metaphoric vs. Late-Metaphoric 0.026
(−0.013, 0.064)
t = 1.310
Late-Metaphoric vs. Late-Literal −0.289
(−0.346, −0.231)
t = −9.886∗∗∗
Early-Literal vs. Late-Literal 0.040
(0.002, 0.078)
t = 2.057∗
Trial Order −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(−0.001, −0.0005) (−0.001, −0.0005) (−0.001, −0.0005)




Intercept 0.174 0.200 −0.129
(0.130, 0.219) (0.156, 0.244) (−0.173, −0.085)
t = 7.752∗∗∗ t = 8.890∗∗∗ t = −5.727∗∗∗
condition at intercept early-met late-met early-lit
Observations 70,590 70,590 70,590
Log Likelihood −54,084.480 −54,084.480 −54,084.480
Akaike Inf. Crit. 108,187.000 108,187.000 108,187.000
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 108,269.400 108,269.400 108,269.400
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
values shown per cell are regression coefficients, confidence
intervals and t-values ( in that order)
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Early-Metaphoric vs. Early-Literal −0.275
(−0.371, −0.180)
t = −5.668∗∗∗
Early-Metaphoric vs. Late-Metaphoric 0.067
(0.003, 0.130)
t = 2.062∗
Late-Metaphoric vs. Late-Literal −0.311
(−0.407, −0.216)
t = −6.407∗∗∗
Early-Literal vs. Late-Literal 0.031
(−0.033, 0.095)
t = 0.954
Trial Order −0.0004 −0.0004 −0.0004
(−0.001, −0.0001) (−0.001, −0.0001) (−0.001, −0.0001)




Intercept 0.132 0.199 −0.143
(0.075, 0.190) (0.142, 0.257) (−0.201, −0.086)
t = 4.498∗∗∗ t = 6.772∗∗∗ t = −4.872∗∗∗
condition at intercept early-met late-met early-lit
Observations 83,622 83,622 83,622
Log Likelihood −57,894.060 −57,894.060 −57,894.060
Akaike Inf. Crit. 115,808.100 115,808.100 115,808.100
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 115,901.500 115,901.500 115,901.500
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
values shown per cell are regression coefficients, confidence
intervals and t-values ( in that order)
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Early-Metaphoric vs. Early-Literal −0.530
(−0.611, −0.448)
t = −12.775∗∗∗
Early-Metaphoric vs. Late-Metaphoric 0.011
(−0.020, 0.042)
t = 0.702
Late-Metaphoric vs. Late-Literal −0.553
(−0.634, −0.472)
t = −13.342∗∗∗
Early-Literal vs. Late-Literal −0.011
(−0.042, 0.020)
t = −0.706
Trial Order 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.0005, 0.001) (0.0005, 0.001) (0.0005, 0.001)




Intercept 0.245 0.256 −0.285
(0.201, 0.289) (0.212, 0.300) (−0.333, −0.236)
t = 10.984∗∗∗ t = 11.479∗∗∗ t = −11.407∗∗∗
condition at intercept early-met late-met early-lit
Observations 134,728 134,728 134,728
Log Likelihood −91,040.380 −91,040.380 −90,017.050
Akaike Inf. Crit. 182,098.800 182,098.800 180,054.100
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 182,187.100 182,187.100 180,152.200
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
values shown per cell are regression coefficients, confidence
intervals and t-values ( in that order)
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Figure 4.10: Summary of results for the dis, Experiment 5
4.1.7 Discussion
Experiment 5 investigated the time course of comprehension of German verb-object
metaphors such as Sebastian füttert eine Prinzessin (“Sebastian feeds a princess”).
Prinzessin could either be interpreted as a noble woman, or as a spoiled cat. This
type of metaphor allows for the position of its elements to be reversed without
altering the overall interpretation beyond a change in sentence tense ( Sebastian
wird eine Prinzessin füttern). Moving the verb to the end of the clause means that
as people hear Prinzessin, the topic (the verb) is not yet available. By contrast,
for verb-second sentences, the topic verb has been encountered when participants
process the vehicle (Prinzessin).
A written discourse context preceding the target utterance established a bias
towards either a literal or a metaphoric interpretation of Prinzessin. In the target
utterance, the verb established a bias towards the metaphoric interpretation (füttert
prefers to take an animal as its object over an adult human being). This design
permitted a juxtaposition of expectations caused by the linguistic context with
the expectations associated with a verb’s thematic role constraints (compatible
vs. incompatible with the discourse context).
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With regard to assessing the influence of individual verbs that were compatible
(versus incompatible) with a preceding discourse context, Experiment 5 examined
the anticipation of post-verbal objects when sentences are preceded by a linguistic
context. Transitive verbs have been shown to generate expectations regarding their
likely arguments in the absence of a linguistic context (Altmann & Kamide, 1999)
and these expectations can direct visual attention to appropriate objects. However,
it has also been shown that information that is semantically compatible with context
yet incompatible with the unfolding linguistic input is activated during processing
(Metusalem et al., 2012). In Experiment 5, participants read a context that biased
towards expecting a specific referent (a princess or a cat) and then heard a sentence
in which a verb (füttert, “feeds”) constrained the upcoming referent via its thematic
role constraints to only one of these referents (the cat).
The results, which can be visualized in Figure 4.7, show that in the case in which
context expectations matched a verb’s thematic role constraints (Early-Metaphoric
condition, where both context and verb point towards the cat as likely referent),
participants were able to anticipate a likely post-verbal referent when hearing
the verb: They showed an overall viewing preference for the picture of the cat
judging by the significantly positive log-ratio. When these sources of information
(context and the verb’s selectional preferences) were not aligned and participants
heard the verb prior to the object (Early-Literal condition, where context points
to the princess and the verb points to the cat as likely referent), no evidence for
anticipation was found, given that the log-ratio in this condition was not significantly
different from zero. This pattern suggests that in this case participants deployed
a wait-and-see comprehension strategy instead.
The main finding of Experiment 5 concerns the asymmetry of processing verb-
object metaphors. The current results show differences in the gaze patterns as
a function of the position of the metaphoric elements and as a function of the
contextual bias. Of particular interest here are the results of the Vehicle region, seen
in Figure 4.6 . In the metaphoric conditions, the ratio of looks to the metaphoric
picture (a cat) over looks to the literal picture (a princess) was larger if they
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had previously heard the verbal topic (füttert) compared to when they had not
heard it yet. In fact, in the metaphoric early verb condition, there was an overall
preference for fixating the metaphoric picture in the entire region, judging by the
positive and significantly different from zero log-ratio in the metaphoric early verb
condition, which can be seen in 4.4.
This finding is more in line with the Category Inclusion view, which assigns
different roles to each element in a metaphor and predicts that the position of the
elements will affect processing. Specifically, this view predicts that hearing a topic
before the vehicle can produce a more rapid construction of metaphoric meaning
upon hearing the vehicle, given that the topic provides a necessary set of parameters
that allow for lexical modulation of the vehicle (See Chapter two for details).
The results are harder to account for by the Implicit Comparison view, according
to which processing a metaphor requires structural alignment of the metaphor’s
elements prior to a projection of inferences. This alignment process is role-neutral
and the same amount of information should be retrieved from the encoded meaning
of the vehicle whether it appears prior to or after the topic. To accommodate the
present results, it should be possible for the processing of the vehicle’s encoded
meaning to vary as a function of the position of the topic.
At this point, it is important to think about why participants would prefer to look
at the depicted cat instead of the depicted princess when hearing the word Prinzessin
(“princess”) for the duration of the Vehicle region in the early-verb metaphoric
condition. The strongest and most often found effect in the VWP literature is the
referential effect: when hearing a noun, participants spontaneously and consistently
look at the image that best represents the word they have just heard/are currently
hearing (e.g. Cooper, 1974). So why would participants look at a cat when hearing
princess if there was a literal princess available in the visual display?
For starters, it has been shown that referential effects are modulated by
contextual fit: When embedded in an appropriate (sentential or discourse) context,
participants can rapidly adjust the type of visual referent that best suits the un-
folding language-mediated representation: Chambers et al. (2004) gave participants
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instructions requiring them to incorporate world knowledge information about the
heard referents (hearing pour the egg on the flour in the bowl requires participants
to know that the egg must be in liquid form). When hearing such sentences while
seeing a visual grid in which there where two types of liquid eggs (one in a bowl and
one in its shell), participants did not prefer one over the other when hearing the
word egg. However, when one of these images was that of a solid egg, participants
rapidly settled on the image of the liquid egg when hearing the word egg. This
finding shows that the type of task at hand informs participants’ viewing behavior
and shapes their interpretation of the word egg, which results in a restriction of
the possibility space of visual reference.
But a liquid egg is still a type of egg. A princess is not a cat. To explain the
gaze pattern in the vehicle region of Experiment 5, it is necessary to think about the
linking hypothesis of the VWP when used to study language processing. Altmann
and Kamide (2007) (who provide the opening quote of this chapter) elaborated on
this point in order to establish a more general way of accounting for a broad type
of language-vision interactions. In two Experiments, Altmann and Kamide (2007)
provided evidence showing that participants looked more at an empty wine glass
after hearing has drunk compared to a full glass of beer. Conversely, they looked
more at the full beer glass when hearing will drink compared to the empty wine glass.
This finding extends the authors’ previous findings by showing that verb morphology
(specifically, tense) modulates anticipatory eye movements. Importantly, the authors
argue that this finding also shows that the relationship between eye-movements
and language processing cannot be described as simply one of establishing (or
anticipating) reference: The empty wine glass could have not possibly been an
upcoming referent of the verb drunk, since it violates the selectional restrictions of
the verb (drinking requires a liquid, not an empty glass). What the anticipatory
eye movements in this case suggest is some form of reasoning about what the end
state of an event of having had drunk would look like – namely an empty glass.
Altmann and Kamide (2007) concluded by stating that the guiding force in
language-vision interactions is one of conceptual overlap and not of establishing
4. Metaphoric (A)symmetry: the Case of Verb-Object Metaphors 135
reference: The conceptual features retrieved from a visual representation are
matched to the semantic features retrieved from the linguistic input. The greater
the overlap, the greater the likelihood that participants will fixate that specific
visual representation.
This linking hypothesis is compatible with an interpretation of the results of the
vehicle region that states that the word “princess” undergoes spontaneous lexical
modulation given the parameters provided by context and the verbal topic, as stated
by the Category Inclusion view: The conceptual overlap that participants calculate
when allocating their visual resources is not one between the picture “cat” and the
word princess but between the picture “cat” and PRINCESS*, an ad hoc category
created to describe things that are spoiled. In the metaphoric late-verb conditions,
the parameters for modulation are not narrow enough to trigger the modulation of
“princess” because the verbal topic has not been heard yet. Participants therefore
look preferentially at the literal picture when hearing the vehicle in this condition
because the word “princess” has not been modulated yet: Participants established
the biggest conceptual overlap between the word “princess” and the picture of a
princess. Altmann and Kamide (2007)’s linking hypothesis can therefore account
for the present results when assuming a Category Inclusion view.
The Implicit Comparison View would struggle to accommodate the results of the
vehicle region in the metaphoric conditions under the linking hypothesis of Altmann
and Kamide (2007): If the concept of princess is retrieved and aligned with the
verbal topic, the initial conceptual overlap of princess and the visual representation
of a literal princess should be the same regardless of position in the sentence. As
Experiment 5 shows, this does not appear to be the case.
A crucial part of this interpretation is the fact that, in the vehicle region, the
ratio of looks to metaphoric over literal picture was not modulated by verb position
in the literal conditions. This suggests that given a strong linguistic context biasing
participants in one direction (Sebastian has a friend who is a noble woman and
is hungry) a verb’s thematic role constraints can be bypassed to some degree,
resulting in the word “princess” eliciting the same referential effect (or in the terms
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of Altmann and Kamide (2007), the same degree of conceptual overlap between
vehicle and literal picture) regardless of whether the word is heard before or after
the verb feeds: In both cases, the conceptual overlap between linguistic and visual
stimuli is similarly large. This attributes a pivotal role to the linguistic context: It
can both bypass a verb’s thematic role constraints (in the literal conditions) and
work together with them to enable the interpretation of “princess” as a metaphor
(in the metaphoric conditions).
What happens then, in the absence of a linguistic context? Metaphors in general
and the metaphors used in this study in particular, are extremely context-dependent:
Take our example sentence Sebastian feeds a princess: Without contextual infor-
mation about Sebastian having a spoiled cat, it should be very difficult to infer
that princess is a metaphor for “spoiled”. We would therefore expect participants
to construct a literal interpretation of princess regardless of verb position. On the
other hand, without a linguistic context, participants might rely more strongly
on the thematic role constraints of the verbs: After hearing füttert they might
anticipate a cat as the most likely referent first and experience confusion when
hearing the word princess. This could result in less looks to the image of the
literal princess when hearing the word “princess” in the early-verb compared to
the late-verb condition. If this is the case, this would suggest that the results
of Experiment 5 might be a consequence of the verbs’ thematic role constraints
and not of the metaphor comprehension process.
This reasoning sets the stage for a follow-up study to test how the utterances of
Experiment 5 are understood in the absence of a linguistic context. This follow-up
is presented below as Experiment 6.
4.2 Experiment 6
Experiment 5 suggests that there are processing differences when understanding
a verb-object metaphor as a function of the relative syntactic position of the
metaphor’s elements. On the other hand, when the same verb-object pair is
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interpreted literally, their relative syntactic position does not seem to affect the
way in which the appropriate visual referent is selected when hearing the object of
the sentence. This difference between literal and metaphoric conditions suggests
that the construction of metaphoric meaning is asymmetric, contingent upon the
order of presentation of the metaphor’s elements, whereas no such asymmetry is
visible when participants constructed a literal interpretation.
Crucially, this difference is brought on by the interpretative constraints intro-
duced by the written linguistic context, which guided participants unequivocally
towards a literal or a metaphoric interpretation of the heard utterances. What would
participants’ viewing behavior look like in the absence of the linguistic context?
Would participants default to a literal interpretation of the heard utterance (resulting
in a viewing pattern similar to that found in the literal conditions of Experiment 5)
or will their viewing pattern be contingent upon sentence structure (resulting in a
viewing pattern similar to that found in the metaphoric conditions of Experiment 5)?
Experiment 5 also showed that a linguistic context and a verb’s selectional
restrictions work together to generate expectations about upcoming verb objects:
When the two were aligned (that is, when both linguistic context and the verb’s
selectional restrictions were compatible with anticipating the same visual referent,
as in the metaphoric early-verb condition), anticipation of an upcoming object took
place: In the metaphoric early-verb condition, participants preferentially looked at
the picture of the cat when hearing the verb. When the two sources of information
conflicted (as in the literal early-verb condition, where context suggested the picture
of the princess as referent but the verb’s selectional restrictions suggested the cat),
participants did not anticipate a specific upcoming object: In the literal early-verb
condition, participants did not show a preference for looking at neither literal nor
metaphoric picture. But what would happen if the contextual anticipation cue was
no longer available? It’s likely that participants would then anticipate the referent
most compatible with the verb’s selectional restrictions upon hearing the verb, in
line with previous findings (Altmann & Kamide, 1999; Hintz et al., 2017). However,
if in the absence of context participants did not anticipate any object whatsoever
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for the specific verbs used in Experiment 5, it would mean that the results from
Experiment 5 would have to be re-evaluated, since the interpretation of these results
depends on the assumption that the verb is providing a set of parameters that
allowed participants to anticipate the upcoming object. Experiment 6 addresses
this possibility by examining the way in which participants’ viewing patterns is
modulated by sentence structure independently of context. To do this, I created
a new version of the previous experiment that is identical to experiment 5 but
crucially excluded the presentation of the linguistic context.
4.2.1 Participants
Thirty-two native speakers of German (aged 18 to 31) with normal or corrected-
to-normal vision gave their informed consent and received 11 Euros each for their
participation. None of them participated in any of the previous experiments.
All participants were right handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
This study was covered by the ethics vote of the psycholinguistics lab of the
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.
4.2.2 Materials and design
Materials were identical to those used in Experiment 5 with the exception of the
written linguistic context. The design consisted therefore of only one factor (verb
constraint) with two levels (early and late) for the vehicle, verb, “und”, and “adv”
regions. The model for the “dis” region, however, included an additional factor in
the analysis (“Disambiguation” with the levels “metaphoric” and “literal”). This is
because, in this region, the utterance disambiguated the interpretation of the verb-
object pair (füttert eine Prinzessin) by explicitly referring to either “the cat” (die
Katze, metaphoric conditions) or “the noble woman” (die Adlige, literal conditions).
4.2.3 Predictions
Experiment 5 showed that context is fundamental for understanding verb-object
metaphors: The same utterance, preceded by either a literally-biasing or a metaphorically-
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biasing context resulted in completely different interpretations judging by the eye-
gaze patterns and the picture selection task. Since context is crucial for constructing
a metaphoric interpretation (as discussed in chapter two), the absence of context
should lead participants to default to a literal interpretation of the utterance. If
this is the case, I would expect participants in Experiment 6 to draw a literal
interpretation of the utterance and subsequently display a viewing pattern similar
to that found in the literal conditions in Experiment 5.
Specifically, I would expect participants to consider the literal representation
of the metaphoric vehicle (the princess) as an appropriate referent when hearing
the word Prinzessin in a similar way regardless of sentence structure. Such a
finding would strengthen the interpretation of the results of Experiment 5, given
that it would suggest that the asymmetries in processing found in that study
are a product of the construction of context-biased metaphoric meaning and not
just of sentence structure.
If, on the other hand, participants’ viewing pattern varies as a function of sentence
structure in a similar fashion as seen in the metaphoric conditions of Experiment 5, it
would suggest that this asymmetric viewing pattern is not necessarily a consequence
of the way a metaphoric interpretation is constructed through context. This finding
would weaken the interpretation of the results of Experiment 5, since it would
suggest that they do not reflect metaphoric processing exclusively.
Concretely, if differences in the viewing behavior in Experiment 5 between early
and late verb conditions are a consequence of contextually-derived metaphoric
interpretation, we should expect to find no overall difference in log-gaze probability
ratios of looks to metaphoric picture over looks to the literal picture between early
and late verb conditions in the current, context-free, experiment.
When participants hear the verb prior to the object (Sebastian feeds the princess),
they have nothing else to rely on in terms of anticipating what the verb’s object is
going to be besides the verb’s selectional preferences. When hearing the verb after
the object, it is natural that their visual attention would shift towards the literal
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depiction of said object (“the princess”), given that this is the linguistic input that
they have already encountered (in the sentence: Sebastian will the princess feed).
Because of this, the main prediction in this regard is that if participants rely on
a verb’s selectional preferences to anticipate objects, there should be a significant
difference between early and late verb conditions in the verb region, with a larger
log-gaze probability in the early compared to the late condition. Furthermore, the
log-gaze ratio of the early-verb condition should be positive and significantly different
from zero, which would represent an overall preference for the verb’s (“feeds”) typical
object (“the cat”) compared to the competitor image (“the princess”).
At this point, it is important to consider one key difference between Experiment
5 and Experiment 6. Given that in Experiment 6 there is no context biasing towards
either literal or metaphoric interpretation, the literal picture can no longer be
considered a true competitor. Instead it is a further distractor: When hearing
the verb prior to the object (early-verb condition), participants have no reason
to consider the princess as a viable referent. This is why, for the verb region,
two additional analyses were carried out using the log-gaze probabilities of looks
to metaphoric picture over looks to distractor image 1 and distractor image 2 as
dependent measures. By doing this, it should be possible to find that participants
preferred looking at the target picture (cat) when hearing the verb (feeds) compared
to all other images on the display.
For the purpose of completeness, I also analyzed the following 3 regions (“und”,
“adv” and “dis”) just as it was done for Experiment 5. The results of the analyses
for these last three regions are reported in Appendix D. No differences between
verb conditions were predicted for any of these regions. However, in the DIS region,
there should be an effect of the disambiguating word: Participants should look
at the image that matches the word they are hearing.
4.2.4 Procedure
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 5, with the exception of there
not being a written context prior to the target utterance. Every trial therefore
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began with the two-second preview of the visual grid.
4.2.5 Analysis
Experiment 6 was analyzed in a similar way as Experiment 5: Models including
verb constraint as a fixed effect as well as trial order as a control were fitted to
the log-gaze probability ratios of looks to metaphoric picture over looks to literal
picture in the vehicle and verb regions. All models used a treatment contrast coding
scheme. They were each fitted twice, changing the intercept of the model from
the early to the late verb constraint condition respectively.
Additionally, two further models were fitted to the verb region with different
dependent variables: One model used log-gaze probabilities of looks to metaphoric
picture divided by looks to the distractor image 1 and the other model used log-gaze
probabilities of looks to metaphoric picture divided by looks to the distractor image 2.
4.2.6 Results
Non-gaze Data
Picture Selection Overall, participants preferentially selected the literal picture
as the referent at the end of each trial. They chose this image over 90% of the times in
the literal conditions and around 45% of the times in the metaphoric conditions. This
suggests that without a context, it was difficult to determine whether the utterance
was meant metaphorically or not, even after hearing the disambiguating word.
Additionally, participants were faster at selecting an image in the literal com-
pared to the metaphoric conditions. These results can be visualized in Figures
4.11 and 4.12.
Vehicle region
There was no significant difference between early and late verb conditions. This
result suggests that the difference found in Experiment 5 was caused by the way
in which participants reached a contextually-driven metaphoric interpretation and
not by structural properties of the sentences when deprived of a context.
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Figure 4.12: Proportion of picture selected in Experiment 6. 0 and 1 represent selection
of the literal and metaphoric picture respectively.
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Because this interpretation is based on a null-effect, it was necessary to show
that Experiment 6 was sufficiently powered to detect an effect if there had been one.
For this purpose, a power curve was computed through simulations using the output
of the model ran for Experiment 5 for this same time-window. That model had
shown an effect of verb position in the metaphoric conditions, with a larger log-gaze
ratio in the early compared to the late conditions (see Table 4.4). For the power
curve simulations, I assumed a true effect size half of the one found in Experiment
5, following Green and MacLeod (2016), in order to have a conservative estimate
of the number of participants needed to detect a small effect size. The simulation
showed that an experiment with 22 participants would have over 80% power to
detect an effect half as big as the one found in Experiment 5. This suggests that
Experiment 6 was more than sufficiently powered to find a small difference between
verb conditions and yet failed to find one. This strengthens the claim that the
difference between verb conditions found in Experiment 5 was indeed a consequence
of the interpretation biases provided by the linguistic context, suggesting that it
was the way the metaphors were processed in context and not the differences in the
sentence structure per se that brought about the effect found in Experiment 5.
Furthermore, participants displayed a preference for fixating the literal compared
to the metaphoric picture throughout the region. This is evidenced by the negative
intercept of both versions of the model, which were significantly different from
zero. Figure 4.13 illustrates the results for the vehicle region of Experiment 6, and
Table 4.9 shows the output of the statistical model.
Verb Region
The first model fitted in this region (log-gaze ratio of looks to metaphoric over
looks to literal picture as dependent measure) showed that there was a significant
difference between early and late-verb conditions, with a larger log-gaze ratio in the
early compared to the late condition. This means that participants looked more at
the metaphoric picture compared to the literal picture when they heard the verb
before compared to after the object. The second and third model, which compared
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looks to the metaphoric picture to looks to the distractor images, showed a different
result: Here, there was no difference in log-ratios between the verb conditions.
The first model also showed a positive intercept that was not significantly
different from 0. This means that there was no overall preference for looking to
the metaphoric picture compared to the literal picture in the early-verb condition
in this region. This can be visualized in Figure 4.14, and Table 4.10 shows the
output of the model. It is also visible, however, that a preference for the metaphoric
picture arises as time in this region progresses. In fact, when refitting this model
on the second half of this region only, the intercept of the model is positive and
significantly different from zero. Table 4.11 shows the output of this refitted model.
This suggests that participants are able to anticipate the metaphoric picture when
hearing the verb prior to the object, but the effect only arises later in time.
The second and third models both showed positive intercepts that were sig-
nificantly different from zero. This means that throughout this entire region,
participants looked more to the metaphoric picture compared to either one of the
distractor images when hearing the verb prior to the object. This is shown in Figures
4.15 and 4.16. The output of the models can be seen in Tables 4.12 and 4.13.
Taken together, these results suggest that in the absence of a linguistic context
participants mostly relied on their knowledge of a verb’s selectional preferences
in order to anticipate what they believed to be the most likely upcoming referent.
However, the results from the first model (Table 4.10) suggest that this might
occur with somewhat of a delay.
4.2.7 Discussion
Experiment 6 was primarily intended as a baseline to assess the results of Experiment
5: The two Experiments were identical with the exception of the linguistic context,
which was absent in Experiment 6. The results of the vehicle region of Experiment
6 showed no difference between early and late verb constraint conditions. This
suggests that the effect of verb constraint found in Experiment 5 was indeed caused
by the biasing linguistic context and not by the structure of the sentence.
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Figure 4.14: Summary of results for the verb region, Experiment 6.





















viewing pattern when hearing verb contrasted to distractor 1






















viewing pattern when hearing verb contrasted to distractor 2
Figure 4.16: Summary of results for the verb region contrasted to distractor 2,
Experiment 6.
4. Metaphoric (A)symmetry: the Case of Verb-Object Metaphors 147





Early-Metaphoric vs. Early-Literal 0.019
(−0.096, 0.135)
t = 0.331
Trial Order 0.002 0.002
(0.002, 0.003) (0.002, 0.003)
t = 9.371∗∗∗ t = 9.371∗∗∗
Intercept −0.160 −0.140
(−0.227, −0.093) (−0.213, −0.068)
t = −4.677∗∗∗ t = −3.808∗∗∗
condition at intercept early-met late-met
Observations 55,300 55,300
Log Likelihood −44,472.370 −44,472.370
Akaike Inf. Crit. 88,960.750 88,960.750
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 89,032.110 89,032.110
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
values shown per cell are regression coefficients, confi-
dence intervals and t-values ( in that order)
Besides serving as a control for Experiment 5, there are some other interesting
conclusions that can be drawn from Experiment 6. The results of the non-gaze
data, for example, show that in the absence of a context, verb-object metaphors
are hardly understood: Participants preferentially selected the literal picture at
the end of the trial and took longer to select the metaphoric picture compared
to the literal picture, despite having already heard the disambiguating word at
the time of selection. This suggests that the selectional preferences of the verb
(füttern prefers to select an animal as an object over an adult human) were on
average not strong enough to force a metaphoric interpretation of the verb’s object.
Instead, participants seemed to have loosened the verb’s selectional restrictions and
understood the object literally (i.e., feeding a literal princess).
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Early-Metaphoric vs. Early-Literal −0.271
(−0.383, −0.158)
t = −4.720∗∗∗
Trial Order 0.002 0.002
(0.001, 0.002) (0.001, 0.002)
t = 8.306∗∗∗ t = 8.306∗∗∗
Intercept 0.031 −0.239
(−0.045, 0.107) (−0.303, −0.176)
t = 0.805 t = −7.411∗∗∗
condition at intercept early-met late-met
Observations 55,774 55,774
Log Likelihood −42,005.740 −42,005.740
Akaike Inf. Crit. 84,027.480 84,027.480
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 84,098.910 84,098.910
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
values shown per cell are regression coefficients, confi-
dence intervals and t-values ( in that order)
This interpretation is supported by the eye-tracking results. During the vehicle
region, participants preferentially directed their gaze to the literal picture over the
metaphoric picture in both conditions, judging by the negative log-gaze ratios in
both versions of model 4.9, which were significantly different from zero. They did
this despite the fact that the eye-tracking record showed a sensitivity to the verb’s
selectional preferences when hearing the verb: When the verb was heard before the
object, participants looked at the picture most associated with the verb’s thematic
role constraints (the metaphoric picture) more than they looked at any of the two
distractors (throughout the entire region, Tables 4.12, 4.13) and more than they
looked at the literal picture (only in the second half of the verb region, Table 4.11).
Overall, these results are consistent with what has been dubbed the verb
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Table 4.11: Regression analysis of log-gaze probability ratio in the second half of the




Early-Metaphoric vs. Early-Literal −0.241
(−0.367, −0.116)
t = −3.759∗∗∗
Trial Order 0.002 0.002
(0.002, 0.003) (0.002, 0.003)
t = 7.043∗∗∗ t = 7.043∗∗∗
Intercept 0.083 −0.159
(0.003, 0.162) (−0.239, −0.079)
t = 2.030∗ t = −3.903∗∗∗
condition at intercept early-met late-met
Observations 28,240 28,240
Log Likelihood −21,182.630 −21,182.630
Akaike Inf. Crit. 42,381.260 42,381.260
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 42,447.250 42,447.250
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
values shown per cell are regression coefficients, confi-
dence intervals and t-values ( in that order)
mutability effect (Gentner & France, 1988; King & Gentner, 2019): When undergoing
semantic strain, a verb’s semantic features are more likely to be altered than the
semantic features of the verb’s subject. What this means is that when comprehending
an unusual noun-verb combination (such as the lizard worshiped) people are more
likely to adjust the verb’s meaning to match the features of the noun than the other
way around. Gentner and France (1988) investigated this with two Experiments
that showed that participants preferred to paraphrases sentences such as the lizard
worshiped the sun as The reptile stared unblinkingly at the sun, leaving the meaning
of the subject noun intact and adjusting the meaning of the verb (instead of, for
example, interpreting the noun lizard as a priest and keeping the meaning of the
verb worshiped intact). Experiment 6 of the current investigation extends these
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Table 4.12: Regression analysis of log-gaze probability ratio in the verb region of




Early-Metaphoric vs. Early-Literal 0.028
(−0.055, 0.110)
t = 0.657
Trial Order 0.001 0.001
(0.001, 0.002) (0.001, 0.002)
t = 6.965∗∗∗ t = 6.965∗∗∗
Intercept 0.064 0.092
(0.007, 0.121) (0.034, 0.150)
t = 2.191∗ t = 3.098∗∗
condition at intercept early-met late-met
Observations 55,774 55,774
Log Likelihood −29,931.400 −29,931.400
Akaike Inf. Crit. 59,878.790 59,878.790
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 59,950.220 59,950.220
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
values shown per cell are regression coefficients, confi-
dence intervals and t-values ( in that order)
findings to show that the verb mutability effect also seems to apply for verb-object
combinations such as füttert eine Prinzessin.
The fact that participants on average did not anticipate the metaphoric picture
over the literal picture during the first half of the verb region could have two
possible explanations.
First, it could be the case that participants developed a task-specific behavior
throughout the experiment: Since for all critical items the object of the verb was
never the one most likely to be associated with the verb, participants might have
adopted the strategy to ignore the information coming from the verb’s selectional
preferences. What speaks against this is the fact that trial order had a significant
effect throughout the region: As the experiment progressed, participants on average
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Table 4.13: Regression analysis of log-gaze probability ratio in the verb region of




Early-Metaphoric vs. Early-Literal 0.020
(−0.050, 0.090)
t = 0.548
Trial Order 0.001 0.001
(0.0003, 0.001) (0.0003, 0.001)
t = 3.596∗∗∗ t = 3.710∗∗∗
Intercept 0.093 0.117
(0.042, 0.143) (0.068, 0.166)
t = 3.585∗∗∗ t = 4.649∗∗∗
condition at intercept early-met late-met
Observations 55,774 55,774
Log Likelihood −28,440.170 −28,655.610
Akaike Inf. Crit. 56,896.340 57,325.210
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 56,967.770 57,387.710
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
values shown per cell are regression coefficients, confi-
dence intervals and t-values ( in that order)
tended to look more at the metaphoric picture over the literal one. Why would
they look more at the metaphoric picture throughout the experiment if they had
developed a strategy to ignore the verb’s selectional preferences?
A second explanation is simply that anticipation effects based solely on a verbs
selectional restrictions are somewhat delayed in comparison to anticipation effects
based on a combination of selectional preferences and contextual biases: In the
verb region of Experiment 5, there was an overall preference for anticipating the
metaphoric picture over the literal one for the entire duration of the region (see
Table 4.5), an effect that visibly appears somewhere around 500 milliseconds after
verb onset. In Experiment 6, this effect visibly appears at around 750 milliseconds.
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4.3 Interim Conclusion
Taken together, the results of Experiments 5 and 6 suggest that the processing
of verb-object metaphors is asymmetric: When the verb appeared before the
vehicle, participants preferentially directed their gaze towards the image depicting
a metaphoric interpretation when hearing the vehicle. When they heard the vehicle
prior to the verb, on the other hand, participants preferred inspecting the image
that depicted a literal interpretation of the vehicle. In the absence of a linguistic
context (Experiment 6) no such difference in processing was found. This points
to a difference in the way in which the metaphoric meaning was constructed as
a function of the position of the elements, in line with the Category Inclusion
View (Glucksberg, 2001; Glucksberg et al., 1997) and at odds with the Implicit
Comparison view (Wolff & Gentner, 2000; Wolff & Gentner, 2011).
As previously discussed, this interpretation of the results is compatible with the
conceptual overlap linking hypothesis (Altmann & Kamide, 2007): When hearing
the word Prinzessin, participants evaluated the degree of conceptual overlap with
the available visual context: In the metaphoric early-verb condition, they deemed
the overlap to be greatest with the metaphoric picture and in the metaphoric late-
verb condition they identified the literal picture as having the greatest overlap. This
suggests that the semantic features of the word Prinzessin varied as a function of
its position in the sentence: When appearing before the verb, it likely retained most
of the semantic features associated with a literal interpretation of the word (hence
the overlap with the literal picture). When appearing after the verb, the semantic
features associated with the word changed and participants likely constructed
the ad hoc category PRINZESSIN*, which has a greater conceptual overlap with
the metaphoric picture (the cat).
Importantly, there were no differences in picture selection accuracy or speed
in Experiment 5. In Experiment 5, participants also settled on the metaphoric
picture as the most likely referent in both metaphoric conditions from the region
“und” onward (judging by the gaze record). This suggests that despite the early
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asymmetries in processing, participants still derived a metaphoric interpretation
in each case with similar processing ease and accuracy.
In terms of what the results of these experiments say about the way in which an
object is anticipated given the verb, there are two conclusions to be drawn. Firstly,
it seems that even though a verb’s selectional restrictions influence participants’
eye-gaze, they are not strong enough to override the mental representations derived
from a previous linguistic context. In Experiment 5, participants showed sensitivity
to the verb’s selectional restrictions in the early verb-metaphoric condition, where
they quickly anticipated the referent that was compatible with both the context
and the verb. However, when context was pitted against the verb’s selectional
preferences, participants did not anticipate any referent and instead seem to wait
for further linguistic input before settling on an interpretation.
Secondly, participants are more likely to loosen a verb’s selectional preferences
than to loosen the semantic features of the verb’s object when these collide.
Participants preferred to derive literal interpretations (and did so more quickly)
of sentences such as Sebastian feeds a princess, indicating that they adjusted the
verb’s but not the noun’s semantic properties. This is analogous to findings showing
that verb’s will be more likely loosened compared to their sentential subject, which
is known as the the verb mutability effect (Gentner & France, 1988).
I now turn to the final empirical test of the two theories discussed throughout this
dissertation. As discussed in chapter two, mediating effects of aptness, familiarity
and conventionality are theoretically relevant for both Category Inclusion and
Implicit Comparison views. In the next chapter, I provide a re-examination
of Experiments 2 and 5 in order to explore the relationship between metaphor
processing and metaphoric aptness, familiarity and conventionality in the light of
the theoretical predictions discussed in chapter two.
5
Assessing the Impact of Aptness,
Conventionality and Familiarity on
Metaphor Comprehension
This chapter presents the dissertation’s last empirical test of the discussed theories
of metaphor comprehension. Here, I address the following question:
- What is the relative contribution of aptness, conventionality and familiarity to
the processing of metaphors in Experiments 2 and 5?
This question is important to ask given the theoretical repercussions it might
have: It is namely the case that these mediating factors are ascribed different
functions in the two main theories discussed in this dissertation.
Bowdle and Gentner (2005) formulated the “career of metaphor hypothesis”
as an addendum to Gentner’s Structure Mapping Theory. It suggests that novel
metaphors are processed via analogical reasoning, but, the more often a metaphor
is heard, i.e. the higher the metaphor’s degree of conventionality, the more likely it
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is that it will be processed as a category statement: When a metaphoric vehicle is
applied to different metaphoric topics to yield the same figurative interpretation
(by activating the same relational structure patterns), the vehicle will begin to be
conventionally associated with this abstracted, metaphoric meaning and thus become
polysemous. Once this has occurred, the expression as a whole will be processed
via class inclusion: The vehicle will have acquired a secondary, abstract-categorical
meaning as a by-product of repeated structural alignment.
Crucially, the career of metaphor hypothesis sees conventionality impacting the
stage of structural alignment: More conventional metaphors will display a vertical
alignment, i.e. one in which the vehicle is understood as a higher-order category
abstraction, with the topic being a member of said category. Less conventional
metaphors, on the other hand, establish horizontal alignments in which both
terms are on the same level of abstraction. This means that degree of vehicle
conventionality impacts the stage of structural alignment, which according to
Structure Mapping Theory, occurs prior to the projection of inferences from
vehicle to topic.
Bowdle and Gentner (2005) also provide empirical support for their view. First,
they discuss the literature showing how conventional metaphors are understood
faster than novel metaphors (Blank, 1988; Gentner & Wolff, 1997). They interpret
the reading time advantage for conventional metaphors as evidence for a switch in
processing mode. However, the main evidence supporting their view comes from 3
experiments in which they evaluate the effect of conventionality on form preference
by comparing the processing of similes and metaphors with identical conceptual
information (e.g. A soldier is a pawn vs. A soldier is like a pawn). They rely on the
following auxiliary hypothesis: Similes should always be processed as comparisons by
default (since they include the explicit comparison trigger like), whereas metaphors
could preferentially be processed as categorical statements (since they display the
surface form of a literal category statement such as an apple is a fruit).
In the first two Experiments, the authors showed that conventional metaphors
are preferred and read faster in the metaphor form whereas novel ones are preferred
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and read faster in the simile form. In a third experiment, they conducted a form of
“in vitro” conventionalization: By showing participants the same metaphoric vehicle
used together with different topics they managed to shift participants’ surface form
preference from simile to metaphor when the vehicle was seen again, effectively
accelerating the conventionalization process in the lab.
Category inclusion theorists have disputed the career of metaphor hypothesis and
the evidence supporting it. The argument is best summed up in what Glucksberg
(2008) informally deemed the “quality-of-metaphor hypothesis”: If a metaphoric
vehicle can easily be perceived as capturing important salient features of the topic,
it will be modulated into an ad hoc category and the metaphor as a whole will
swiftly be understood as a category statement. If, on the other hand, it is not
possible to understand the way in which the vehicle captures such salient relevant
properties, vehicle and topic will likely be scanned for structural similarities, forcing
the metaphor to be processed via indirect comparison. With this in mind, it
would not be a metaphor’s conventionality value that plays the key mediating
role, but a metaphor’s aptness: The degree to which the vehicle captures salient
relevant properties of the topic.
The strongest case for the “quality-of-metaphor hypothesis” was made by Jones
and Estes (2006). They argue against the results of Bowdle and Gentner (2005)
by pointing out that in that study the authors had not controlled for the effect of
aptness. Aptness and conventionality have usually been found to be highly correlated:
Studies showing an effect of aptness on metaphor comprehension did not control
for conventionality (e.g. D. Chiappe, Kennedy, & Smykowski, 2003; Gagné, 2002;
Jones & Estes, 2005; Kusumi, 1987) and studies showing effects of conventionality
did not control for aptness (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005; Gentner & Wolff, 1997).
Jones and Estes (2006) created a new set of materials in which conventionality
and aptness were carefully teased apart, with an equal number of high-apt/low-
conventionality, low-apt/low-conventionality, low-apt/high-conventionality, and
high-apt/high-conventionality items. they re-conducted Experiment 2 of Bowdle
and Gentner (2005) and found that only aptness predicted form preference and
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reading times of this set of metaphors and not conventionality. They conclude
that aptness is the true mediator of processing form, providing support for the
“quality-of-metaphor” hypothesis.
Thibodeau and Durgin (2011) argued against the conclusions drawn by Jones
and Estes (2006) on the basis of the definition of conventionality. They argue that
Jones and Estes’ definition is inaccurate and claim that conventionality should be
measured as a sentence-level property and not as a word-level property. This means
that a metaphor’s conventionality score should not be computed by examining the
metaphoric vehicle alone, but by observing the frequency of topic-vehicle pairings, a
construct also referred to as metaphor familiarity (Blasko & Connine, 1993; Bowdle
& Gentner, 2005). They believe that familiarity and not aptness is responsible for
modulating the processing mode of metaphoric expressions.
Besides this definitional point, Thibodeau and Durgin (2011) make two main
claims. The first one concerns the explanatory value of using participants’ ratings to
obtain point estimates of aptness and familiarity and the second one the sensitivity
of aptness to context. It is important for the current purposes to have a closer
look at these two claims.
Regarding their first claim, they argue that participants might be inadvertently
rating familiarity when asked to rate aptness or vice versa. More importantly,
they argue that both of these measurements might actually be measuring a third
construct known as processing fluency, or how easy it is to process a sentence.
Previous work in the domain of social psychology has shown that participants tend
to misattribute a broader sense of processing fluency to various different abstract
categories of a sentence they are asked to rate (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Jacoby
et al., 1988; Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989). Thibodeau and Durgin (2011) use this as
an argument against the validity of the claims regarding aptness made by Jones and
Estes (2006), by stating that Jones and Estes (2006) weren’t really measuring aptness
but processing fluency, so their results cannot provide actual support for the quality-
of-metaphor hypothesis. This claim is hard to address because it is not backed
by an independent test of the degree to which processing fluency affects ratings of
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aptness. More importantly, if it is the case that processing fluency affects aptness
ratings, there is no reason to believe it shouldn’t affect ratings for conventionality
and/or familiarity in a similar fashion, meaning that the effect of processing fluency
could probably habe been constant across all three dimensions in previous studies.
The second claim, concerns the context-sensitivity of aptness. Thibodeau and
Durgin (2011) state that the definition of aptness as “the degree to which the
figurative meaning of the vehicle describes a relevant feature of the topic” (Jones
& Estes, 2006, p. 19) means that aptness should not be sensitive to contextual
manipulations, given that it is a property of the relationship between vehicle and
topic. To test this, they conducted an experiment to see whether aptness ratings
were sensitive to different priming conditions that involved context: If aptness
ratings were shown to be influenced by a contextual manipulation, it would prove
that aptness ratings were not measuring the intended dimension, but were instead
only indexing overall processing fluency (which is believed to be context-dependent).
In their experiment, participants first read metaphoric primes in which the vehicle
either shared the same intended meaning as the target (similar-sense prime: An
Encyclopedia is a lantern, where lantern stands for metaphorically lighting the
darkness of ignorance), or had a different intended meaning (alternative-sense prime:
A flag is a lantern, where lantern stands for a signaling device). Participants
then rated the target metaphor (Target: Education is a lantern, meaning that
education shines a light on the darkness of ignorance) as being more apt following
the same-sense compared to when it followed the alternative-sense metaphor. The
authors claim that because the ratings were sensitive to the presence of salient
incompatible properties (whether the prime sentence used the vehicle with the same
metaphoric meaning or a different one) they were actually measuring processing
fluency and not aptness, which should depend only on the topic/vehicle interaction.
To understand why this conclusion is not entirely licensed, it is worth revisiting
the discussion of section 2.2.2 on the role of context for establishing the relevant
dimensions for attribution. There, I argued that the interaction between topic
and vehicle has to necessarily consider the influence of contextually-derived biases
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for metaphor interpretation. Examples (9a) and (9b) of chapter two, reproduced
below as examples (1) and (2) illustrate this point:
1) My lawyer always eats more than he should and now he is very overweight.
My lawyer is an elephant.
2) My lawyer can remember anything you tell him because of his incredibly good
memory. My lawyer is an elephant.
Here, sentences with identical topics trigger a different metaphoric interpretation
because of the relevant context. The aptness values of (1) and (2) will therefore be
different from one another, given that the contextual biasing of the interpretation
(which critically contributes to creating the relevant dimensions for attribution)
might be felicitous to different degrees in each case. This point can also be made by
looking at the verb-object metaphors studied in chapter four: Without the context,
participants were not even able to understand them as metaphors (as evidenced
by the results of Experiment 5). That being the case, context can be said to play
a fundamental role in determining a metaphor’s aptness.
The results of Thibodeau and Durgin (2011) are therefore not surprising. Priming
different senses of a metaphoric vehicle will modulate aptness ratings of subsequent
metaphors using the same metaphoric vehicle: Participants are evaluating the
contextually situated representation of the metaphoric topic in each case and then
evaluating its fit with the vehicle: If the context is one about the intellectual
triumph over ignorance (similar-sense prime: An Encyclopedia is a lantern, where
lantern stand for metaphorically lighting the darkness of ignorance), it will be easier
to process the metaphor Education is a lantern (to the extent that participants
consider the sentences to be contextually related). If, on the other hand, the context
is a technical discussion on signaling devices (alternative-sense prime: A flag is
5. Assessing the Impact of Aptness, Conventionality and Familiarity on Metaphor
Comprehension 160
a lantern), participants will most likely be uncertain about the meaning of the
target and rate the metaphor as being overall less apt.
Ultimately, Thibodeau and Durgin (2011) argue for the need of better estimates
for aptness and conventionality in order to determine the way in which they influence
metaphor processing. Though I disagree with the arguments they have against the
construct validity of aptness, I do agree that it is important to improve on the
way in which measures of aptness, conventionality and familiarity (from here on
referred to as “the three mediating factors”) are measured in order to get closer
to answering the question of which one is better suited to explain differences in
processing. Concretely, I believe that there are two fronts on which improvement
is necessary: Measurement validity and construct specification.
5.1 Measurement Validity
In the psychometric literature, measurement validity is defined as the extent to which
the way a variable is measured (ratings scales for measuring aptness, for example)
is an accurate quantification of the cognitive construct that said variable represents
(Price et al., 2015, section 4.2). In the literature on metaphor comprehension, there
is consistency in the way in which the aptness, familiarity and conventionality of a
metaphor are measured, as can be seen in Table 5.1 below, which presents a brief
overview of some of the most popular studies measuring these dimensions. Though
this table is not meant to be exhaustive nor comprehensive, it does show that aptness,
familiarity and conventionality are (a) almost always measured using a 7-point likert
scale in which the data is treated as continuous and not ordinal, and (b) they are
often dichotomized (crucially, in the studies important for theory development) in
order to create two separate groups of items (e.g., low-apt vs. high apt).
Point (a) is a problem for measurement validity because by treating the data as
continuous the measure is distorted and it less-accurately represents the intended
construct: If a participant is asked to rate how apt a metaphor is on a scale from
1 (very bad) to 7 (very good), the conceptual distance between 3 and 4 will not





































Bowdle & Gentner (2005) aptness likert, 1-10 yes yes nominal English 16
Bowdle & Gentner (2005) conventionality likert, 1-10 yes yes nominal English 16
Blasko and Connine (1993) aptness likert, 1-7 yes yes nominal English 44
Blasko and Connine (1993) familiarity likert, 1-7 yes yes nominal English 44
Cardillo et al. (2012) familiarity likert, 1-7 yes no nominal English 80
Cardillo et al. (2012) familiarity likert, 1-7 yes no verbal English 80
Chiappe and Kennedy (1999) aptness likert, 1-7 yes no nominal English 46
Chiappe and Kennedy (2001) familiarity likert, 1-7 yes no nominal English 16
Chiappe et al. (2003) aptness likert, 1-10 yes no nominal English 36
Chiappe et al. (2003) conventionality likert, 1-7 yes no nominal English 66
Gentner and Wolff (1997) conventionality likert, 1-7 yes yes nominal English 12
Jones and Estes (2006) aptness likert, 1-7 yes yes nominal English 62
Jones and Estes (2006) conventionality likert, 1-7 yes yes nominal English 33
Thibodeau and Durgin (2011) familiarity likert, 1-7 yes yes nominal English 72
Thibodeau et al. (2018) aptness likert, 1-7 yes no mixed English 1200
Thibodeau et al. (2018) familiarity likert, 1-7 yes no mixed English 1200
Table 5.1: Overview of previous studies investigating aptness, familiarity and conven-
tionality
be the same as the distance between 1 and 2. This is a fundamental property
of ordinal scales. Continuous scales, by contrast, don’t have this property as the
distance between individual values is assumed to remain constant. This is why,
when describing the central tendency of a set of ordinal data, it is more appropriate
to use the median (Stevens, 1946), which is the middle score when scores are ranked
in order of magnitude, and is less sensitive to extreme values compared to the mean.
For continuous data, on the other hand, the mean is the best measure of central
tendency, since the intervals of the scale are considered to have the same conceptual
distance. In a recent study, Liddell and Kruschke (2018) make a strong case against
treating ordinal data as interval data (i.e. using the mean as the central tendency
of ordinal data or fitting a linear regression model on ordinal data) by showing
that it leads to a loss of statistical power as well as to an inflated false-positive
rate. They specifically address the common practice of averaging out the scores
of likert scales in order to treat these averages as a new continuous variable (as
is usually done in the metaphor literature, see Table 5.1), by simulating data and
performing two different analyses: One taking the averaged data as continuous and
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one taking the un-averaged data as ordinal (section 7, p. 333). They found that,
when there was a true underlying null-effect, the model using the averaged data as
a continuous variable greatly overestimated the effect size and showed a significant
difference. They also found that, when there was an underlying true effect size, this
was detected by the model treating the data as ordinal but not detected by the
model using continuous data. In sum, treating averaged ordinal data as continuous
inflated both the false positive and the false negative rate.
Point (b) (i.e. the dichotomization of continuous data) also affects measure-
ment validity because it leads to a significant loss of the information carried by
the measured variable, which can dramatically distort the relationship between
measurement and construct. Imagine if, for example, we wanted to measure how
aptness affects reading times. So we conduct an experiment with 20 items, for
which we have individually measured their aptness levels. We then group the items
into low-apt and high-apt groups by performing a median-split. This hypothetical
scenario is depicted in Figure 5.1 below. After we run our experiment, we find that
the low-apt group had significantly shorter reading times than the high-apt group
(the graph to the left in Figure 5.1). However, for the individual items within each
group (the yellow dots in the graph to the right), the trend is actually going in the
opposite direction: The higher-apt metaphors are associated with shorter reading
times within the low-apt group (i.e. the group of metaphors rated between 0 and
10 for aptness) and also within the high-apt group (i.e. the group of metaphors
rated between 10 and 20 for aptness). As the figure shows, if we had analyzed this
hypothetical data with aptness as a continuous predictor instead of as a categorical
predictor, we would have found that the regression line (depicted in red in the graph
to the right) actually went in the opposite direction. By dichotomizing the variables
we lost crucial information that made us draw the wrong conclusions from the data.
Though this scenario might not be likely to occur, it does illustrate the dangers of
dichotomizing continuous variables (or pseudo-continuous, as is the case of averaged
ordinal data). This practice, though common in psychology, has been heavily
discussed in fields such as clinical medicine and applied statistics. Here, several
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Figure 5.1: Hypothetical results of an Experiment on the effect of aptness on reading
times.
studies have shown that dichotomizing variables leads to information loss and to a
dramatic reduction of statistical power, similar to losing around one third of the data
(Altman & Royston, 2006; Cohen, 1983; MacCallum et al., 2002). MacCallum et al.
(2002) conducted a series of simulations comparing an analysis using a continuous
variables as the predictor in the model vs. using a dichotomized version of the
same variable as the predictor. They found that, for the case of a model with
a single independent variable, using a dichotomized predictor inflated the false
negative rate compared to the model that treated the predictor as continuous.
When there were two independent variables in the model, dichotomization lead to
an inflated false positive rate. Another simulation study by Austin and Brunner
(2004) found that, with increased sample size, the risk of a false positive actually
increased with dichotomization of the predictor. Very similar conclusions have
been drawn using large real data sets as the test cases (Royston et al., 2006),
additionally emphasizing the fact that there is no good reason for selecting the
median as an ideal cut-off point. the problem of dichotomization is so severe and
so pervasive in many fields of studies that some journals have begun to ban the
practice altogether (Dawson & Weiss, 2012).
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given this background, it seems likely that points (a) and (b) are affect the validity
of the measurements of the three mediating factors in metaphor comprehension. the
studies presented in the chapter attempt to improve on this by collecting continuous
instead of ordinal data and by not dichotomizing it in the analysis.
5.2 Construct Specification
At what point during comprehension do the different theories predict effects of the
three mediating factors to appear? Are these effects unique to reading times, or
can they be translated to other measurements? Are the effects of the mediating
factors predicted for nominal metaphors only, or should they appear in other types
of metaphors as well? These questions have not been properly addressed in the
literature on metaphor comprehension. As a result, the constructs of aptness,
conventionality and familiarity can be said to be theoretically underspecified in
regard to these questions.
The career of metaphor appears to be the most explicit in terms of the point in
time in which effects should arise, considering that they state the following: “In
general, then, conventional metaphors will tend to be interpreted as categorizations
rather than as comparisons because the former mode of alignment (i.e. vertical
alignment as opposed to horizontal alignment) will be completed more rapidly
than the latter” (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005, pg. 199). Considering how the
Structure Mapping Engine operates in Structure-Mapping Theory, this means
that conventionality should affect the earliest stages of processing, given that this
is the point in time in which structural alignment takes place (Wolff & Gentner,
2011). Category Inclusion views, on the other hand, are underspecified in this
regard. They claim that aptness should be the key mediating factor, but the point
in time in which aptness should play a role remains unclear.
In terms of whether the three mediating factors should affect non-nominal
metaphors, the theoretical constructs are also underspecified. The Category
Inclusion view states that the mechanisms for processing nominal metaphors also
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apply to verbal metaphors, such as The car flew across the intersection (Glucksberg,
2001, pg. 66-67). It follows from this statement that aptness should also modulate
the processing of verbal metaphors, but this is not explicitly stated nor has it been
empirically tested. Structure Mapping Theory, on the other hand, does not explicitly
state that non-nominal metaphors are processed via analogical reasoning. However,
Gentner et al. (2001) discuss the ways in which analogical reasoning can account
for the phenomena discussed in Conceptual Metaphor Theory, a theory which does
explicitly attempt to account for all types of metaphors with a single explanation.
So it it is reasonable to assume that Structure Mapping Theory, in as much as it can
capture a wide spectrum of metaphor types, would predict effects of conventionality
on non-nominal metaphors. This prediction has also not been previously tested.
Finally, I am not aware of any work considering how the effects on reading times
and reaction times found for the three mediating factors in the past (e.g. Blasko &
Connine, 1993; Bowdle & Gentner, 2005; Jones & Estes, 2006) should translate to
other dependent variables. It is therefore necessary to address these issues in order
to better specify the constructs of aptness, conventionality and familiarity.
5.3 Mediating Factors in Processing Non-Nominal
Metaphors
The experiments presented in this chapter are an attempt to answer the question of
which one of the three mediating factors contributes most to metaphor processing.
Because the different theories discussed so far make different prediction in this regard,
answering this question should provide further insight as to which theory provides the
overall best explanation for the phenomenon. To answer this question, I collected new
ratings of aptness, conventionality and familiarity for the verbal metaphors used in
Experiment 2 and for the verb-object metaphors used in Experiment 5. These ratings
were then used to re-fit the models analysis the data from Experiments 2 and 5.
To improve measurement validity compared to previous studies, ratings were
collected by using a continuous slider scale ranging from 1-100 instead of an ordinal
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likert scale. Doing this changes the type of data collected from ordinal to continuous,
which makes it possible to take the mean as the measure of central tendency without
fearing a loss in statistical power. Additionally, the higher resolution provided
by continuous slider scales has been shown to both have a higher validity than
coarse-grained likert scales (Warriner et al., 2017) and to produce more reliable
results when measuring abstract constructs (Cook et al., 2001; Imbault et al., 2018).
The studies in this chapter also had a larger average sample size than in the ma-
jority of previous studies on the mediating factors during metaphor comprehension.
By increasing the number of participants, it should be possible to obtain more precise
estimates for the aptness, conventionality and familiarity values of each metaphor.
Furthermore, given that the measurements for the three factors have often
been found to correlate (Jones & Estes, 2006), I collected ratings from separate
group of participants in order to reduce the correlation between the values as
much as possible. The ratings were also included in the statistical models as
continuous variables, thus avoiding the problems associated with dichotomization
discussed in the previous section.
In terms of construct specification, the differences in modality of Experiments
10 (eye-tracking during reading) and 14 (Visual World Paradigm) will allow
us to compare how effects vary across dependent measures (reading times, in
Experiment 10 and log-gaze ratios, in Experiment 14), and across different types
of non-nominal metaphors (verbal metaphors in Experiment 10 and verb-object
metaphors in Experiment 14). This will help further specify the constructs of
aptness, familiarity and conventionality by examining how they behave across
measures and metaphor types. Furthermore, the high sensitivity of the eye-tracking
method lets us investigate the time-course of any potential effects of the mediating
variables on comprehension. The constructs can therefore be specified with regards
to the point in time during processing that their effects should appear.
Overall, the way in which the Experiments in this chapter were constructed
should allow us to get better measurements of the three mediating factors and how
they impact metaphor processing compared to previous studies. This should in
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turn allow us to tease apart the effect of the three factors and relate this to the
predictions made by the two theories under discussion. I first present the ratings and
re-analysis of the verbal metaphors investigated in Experiment 2, followed by the
ratings and re-analysis the the verb-object metaphors investigated in Experiment 5.
5.4 The Effect of Mediating Factors on Process-
ing Written Verbal Metaphors
Before conducting Experiments 1-4 the metaphors used as critical items were
normed for aptness (as described in chapter three). To do this, a group of 20
participants read 40 verbal metaphors together with 40 nonsensical sentences on
a scale from 1-7. Based on the results, 4 metaphors were excluded from the main
analysis and the remaining 36 were used as the critical items in Experiment 1.
An example of a verbal metaphor, including the different analysis regions used in
Experiment 2, is presented as sentence (3) below:
(3) Dass seine / Meinung noun / umgittert verb / wurde nach dem Regimewech-
sel, war / schwierig adj / für den Redakteur
“That his / opinion noun / fenced-in verb / was after the change in regime,
was /difficult adj/ for the journalist”
“The fact that his opinion was fenced-in after the change in regime was difficult
for the journalist.”
I used these original ratings to explore their potential effect on reading times
of the metaphors in Experiment 2. I chose Experiment 2 given that it was the
highest-powered study on verbal metaphors presented in this dissertation. This
tentative exploratory study lead me to collect new, higher-quality ratings on
aptness as well as on conventionality and familiarity in order to better assess their
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impact on metaphor comprehension. The collection of these ratings is described
in Experiments 7-9. Their individual contribution to the processing of verbal
metaphors is explored in Experiment 10.
Since the goal of Experiments 7-9 (as well as 11-13) was the collection of ratings,
none of these studies had explicit predictions, and the data collected in these
Experiments was only analyzed descriptively.
5.4.1 Experiment 7: aptness of verbal metaphors
The first rating study conducted intended to get a new measure of metaphoric
aptness for the verbal metaphors used in Experiment 2. This study, as well as all
the following rating studies, was programmed and run using an instance of the
IBEX farm (Drummond, 2013) coupled with the Penncontroller extension (Zehr &
Schwarz, 2018). These tools allow for the creation of web-based experiments that
can be run online, without the need of bringing participants to the lab.
Participants
50 monolingual German native speakers (ages 18-31) were recruited using the
“clickworker” recruiting platform. All participants gave their informed consent
prior to taking part in the study and received 2 Euros for their participation.
This study was covered by the ethics vote of the psycholinguistics lab of the
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.
Materials and design
The materials used were the same 36 critical items used in Experiment 2. In addition,
participants saw 4 ungrammatical, completely non-sensical sentences. These
sentences were incorporated as attention controls: Only the data of participants
who rated at least 3/4 of these sentences as incomprehensible (i.e. with a value
lower than 20 on the provided scale) were analyzed. The presentation of critical
and filler items was randomized.
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Figure 5.2: Example of a trial in Experiment 7
In the study, participants were asked to rate how understandable they thought
every metaphor was given the provided context on a continuous, sliding scale from
1 (meaning totally incomprehensible) to 100 (meaning totally comprehensible). The
metaphor was always underlined. Participants were not given an explicit definition
of a metaphor. This was done in order to avoid biasing their answers as much as
possible. An example critical trial can be seen in Figure 5.2.
Procedure
On each trial, participants first read the entire metaphorical sentence. They then
pressed the SPACE bar in order to see the continuous scale. They changed the
position of the slider button on the scale using their mouse, after which they clicked
on the button “send”. The entire Experiment lasted around 10 minutes.
Analysis and results
Prior to any analysis, the data from 10 participants was excluded based on their
ratings of the filler items. This reduced the total number of participants to 40.
the data of these 40 participants was used to calculate the mean aptness value
of each one of the 36 critical items.
On average, participants rated the items to be somewhat comprehensible, with
ratings being shortly below half-way between the ends of the scale (mean value:46.85,
median value: 44.81). The lowest rating was 33.20 and the highest was 68.72. The
mean aptness values for every item can be seen in Table 5.4.
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5.4.2 Experiment 8: familiarity of verbal metaphors
The second rating study conducted intended to measure participants’ subjective
impression of the frequency of each metaphoric expression.
Participants
50 monolingual German native speakers (ages 18-31) were recruited using the
“clickworker” recruiting platform. None of them participated in Experiment 7. All
participants gave their informed consent prior to taking part in the study and
received 2 Euros for their participation. This study was approved by the ethics
vote of the psycholinguistics lab of the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.
Materials, design and procedure
The materials, design, predictions and procedure were identical to those of Experi-
ment 7. The only difference was the type of instructions that participants received
regarding the task: Instead of being asked to rate how comprehensible the sentences
were, the task was to indicate roughly how often they believed to have heard each
metaphor on a sliding scale from 1 (never before) to 100 (very often).
Analysis and results
Prior to any analysis, the data from 14 participants was excluded based on their
ratings of the filler items. This reduced the total number of participants to 36.
Their data was used to calculate the mean familiarity value of each one of the 36
critical items. Only descriptive statistics were obtained from Experiment 7.
The ratings were overall lower than those found in Experiment 7, suggesting
that participants did not, on average, believe to have been exposed to the critical
verbal metaphors too often before. The mean familiarity rating was 28.5 and the
median 26.17. The minimum score was 10.6 and the maximum was 53.7. The mean
familiarity values for every item can be seen in Table 5.4.
5. Assessing the Impact of Aptness, Conventionality and Familiarity on Metaphor
Comprehension 171
5.4.3 Experiment 9: conventionality of verbal metaphors
Experiment 9 intended to isolate participants’ subjective frequency of exposure
to the metaphoric meaning of the verbs used in Experiment 2. To do this, the
study consisted of two parts: In the first one, a group of participants gave their
interpretation of the meaning of each verb as it appeared in is metaphoric meaning
embedded in the corresponding critical sentence. I then analyzed the answers that
participants provided and determined the most common one for each item. In the
second part of Experiment 9 a different group of participants rated the frequency in
which the verbs, deprived of context, were believed to be used with the metaphoric
meaning obtained from the results of the first part of the experiment for every item.
Participants
Two separate groups of participants were used for each part of the study. The first
group consisted of 50 monolingual German native speakers (ages 18-31), who were
recruited using the “clickworker” recruiting platform. None of them participated in
Experiments 7 or 8. The second group was made up of 590 monolingual German
native speakers (ages 18-31).
The stark difference in number of participants between part 2 of Experiment 9
and all other ratings studies in this chapter was a consequence of the materials used
for this set of experiments (i.e. the 36 verbal metaphors presented in chapter three).
All of the 36 verbal metaphors were conceptually related: They all had similar verbs
of physical containment expressing abstract difficulty. As a consequence of this,
the participants in part 1 of Experiment 9 all gave very similar interpretations of
the metaphors, resulting in almost half of the items having the same interpretation
(see the Results section below). I therefore decided, after conducting part 1, to run
part 2 of Experiment 9 as a single-item study: Participants saw only a single one
of the 36 critical items, together with their most common interpretation obtained
in part 1. As a consequence, the number of participants had to be increased from
50 in order to get multiple ratings for every critical item. The total number of
participants of part 2 (590) was determined by monetary constraints.
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All participants gave their informed consent prior to taking part in the study and
received 3 Euros (participants in part 1) or 10 cents (participants in part 2) for their
participation. This study was covered by the ethics vote of the psycholinguistics
lab of the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.
Materials and design
In part one, participants were asked to interpret the metaphoric sentences, with the
only constraint being brevity: They were asked to interpret the metaphors in as few
words as possible. Every participants saw the 36 experimental sentences and 4 filler
sentences intended as catch trials. These sentences were completely nonsensical.
Participants were instructed to mark nonsensical sentences as such by writing “I
do not understand this sentence” (or similar). Participants who did not identify at
least 3/4 of nonsensical sentences as such were excluded from further analysis.
Given that all 36 items were conceptually related (all of the sentences conceptualized
difficulty using a verb of spatial containment, see chapter 3 for details), the
metaphoric interpretation of the items overlapped: For more than half of the items,
the most common response in part one of the study was identical (see Table 5.2 below
for the most common response for each item). Therefore, in order to avoid repetition
effects, part two was conducted as a single item study: Participants saw just one
critical item together with one nonsensical filler item. Participants who rated the
single nonsensical filler with a score higher than 20 were discarded from the analysis.
In part two, Participants saw the de-contextualized target verb together with
the most common metaphoric interpretation for that verb obtained in part one
of the experiment. They were instructed to rate how often they believed to have
heard or read this specific verb with the given metaphoric interpretation on a
scale from 1 (never) to 100 (very often).
Procedure
In part one, participants read the sentence and saw a dialogue box underneath,
where they could write their interpretation of the metaphor. After they had entered
5. Assessing the Impact of Aptness, Conventionality and Familiarity on Metaphor
Comprehension 173
the interpretation, they could click on the “continue” button under the dialogue box.
The entire experiment lasted around 15 minutes. In part two, participants saw the
target verb written in bold with the intended metaphoric interpretation underneath.
They were asked to rate how often they had encountered this verb with this meaning.
Analysis and results
Prior to analyzing the results of part 1, the data from 4 participants was removed
given their answers to the filler trials. After this, the answers of all participants
were manually counted to determine the most common response. When participants
answered with the same verb but in different tenses, or using the same verb but
in a different syntactic construction, this was counted as being the same answer
(e.g. begrenzen begrenzt and nach oben begrenzt were counted as belonging to the
same class). The same was done for synonymous answers (e.g. reduziert und
verkleinert were counted as belonging to the same class). For part 2, the data from
249 participants was removed from the analysis given their rating of the filler item.
This reduced the total number of participants to 341.
The results of part 1 showed that participants chose the word eingeschränkt
as the most appropriate interpretation of the metaphoric meaning for 16 out of
the 36 items. This was followed by verringert, which was chosen 6 times, and
begrenzt, which was chosen 4 times. The most common response for every item,
which was used for part 2 of the experiment, can be seen in Table 5.2. In Table 5.2,
“Critical_Word” refers to the target item that participants were asked to define,
“Interpretation” is the most common response taht participants gave for each item.
The results of part 2 showed that on average, participants did not consider the
metaphoric meaning of the verbs to be very conventional. The mean score was 37.771
and the median score was 31.1. The maximum rating was 61.89 and the minimum
was 9.87. The final conventionality mean score for every item can be seen in Table 5.4.







































Table 5.2: Most common answer for every item in part 1 of Experiment 9.
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5.4.4 Experiment 10: effects of aptness, familiarity and
conventionality on processing verbal metaphors
Participants, materials, design, and procedure
Experiment 10 was a reanalysis of the data collected in Experiment 2. Specifically,
of total sentence reading times and of the reading times in the VERB region, which
were originally discussed in chapter three and are summarized in Table 3.7.
Predictions
The predictions for Experiment 10 were derived from the theoretical discussion on the
role of aptness, conventionality and familiarity during metaphor processing: Whereas
Category Inclusion views hold that aptness is the main factor that modulates
processing mode (e.g. Glucksberg, 2008), Implicit Comparison views reserve this
role for either conventionality (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005) or familiarity (Thibodeau
& Durgin, 2011). This means that if the Category Inclusion view holds, we should
find that aptness is a better fit to the reading times data in the VERB region
of Experiment 2. If, on the other hand, the Implicit Comparison View holds,
conventionality or familiarity should be a better fit to the data.
In terms of the point in time in which these effects should appear, we would
expect to find them in total sentence reading times, as has been evidenced in the
previous literature. Additionally, it should be possible to find effects on reading
times of the metaphoric vehicle (the VERB region, see sentence (3) above), since
at this point participants have read the entire metaphor. If the mediating factors
have a rapid effect, we should be able to find that the mediating factors modulate
first-pass reading times and/or regression path duration. If, on the other hand,
these effects are somewhat delayed, we should find them in total reading times only.
Analysis
Since the goal of Experiment 10 was to disentangle the effects of aptness, conven-
tionality and familiarity of reading times of verbal metaphors, it was important to
try to minimize the correlation between these three variables for the set of materials.
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I attempted to do this by (1) collecting ratings for each measure from different sets
of participants, (2) increasing the number of data points compared to the original
norming task, and (3) including a continuous slider scale to obtain more fine-grained
results. However, this approach can only do so much to reduce correlation values,
given that the materials were not designed with this purpose in mind. It can
therefore be the case that some of the critical items happen to have similar values in
the three categories. This was what was observed, as can be seen in Table 5.3 below.
Table 5.3: Correlation values of the ratings collected in Experiments 7-9
Correlation of ratings Aptness Familiarity Conventionality
Aptness 1 0.8062579 0.5456825
Familiarity 0.8062579 1 0.6366677
Conventionality 0.5456825 0.6366677 1
The correlation values shown in Table 5.3 make it likely that fitting a model
including all three of the variables at the same time will result in multicollinearity.
Multicollinearity can lead to an inflated variance, distorting the individual contribu-
tion of each independent variable, which in turn makes it hard to interpret the results
(see York, 2012; or McElreath, 2020, pg. 141-144). Because of this, four separate
models were fitted to the data in order to explore the individual contribution of
each variable. The first model - which served as a base level - did not include any
of the three variables. It had the following structure, provided in R syntax below:
model 1: Transformed reading times ~ Prime Type + Trial Order + (1
+ Prime Type |item) + (1 + Prime Type|subject)
Note that this model differs somewhat from the final model shown in Table 3.7.
The present model removed the factor “Containment” given that this factor did not
have a significant effect on the reading times and did not significantly improve the
model fit. Including the factor “Containment” in the fixed and random effects to all
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the models in Experiment 10 does not change the results nor their interpretation in
any way. The random effects structure was kept identical across all models.
Models 2-4, which included aptness, conventionality and familiarity, respectively
were identical to the base model shown above with the exception of adding each
one of the variables of interest individually. This means that models 2-4 only
tested a main effect of the mediating factors and not their interaction with Prime
Type or with Trial Order.
Models 2-4 were individually compared to model 1 through a log-likelihood test.
To assess the fit of each model and therefore the unique contribution of each of the
mediating factors (besides testing for significance), I took into consideration the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)
of each model. Both of these measures index the degree to which the fixed and
random variables can account for the dependent measure: The lower the AIC and
BIC, the better the fit of the model to the data. Additionally, I also compared each
model’s marginal R2 value, which assesses the percentage of variance explained
by a model’s fixed effects only. By comparing the values of each model in these
categories, we can have a better idea of which model was overall best, in addition
to the criterion of significance testing. All of these analyses were exploratory in
nature. For completeness purposes, a final regression model was fitted to the data
including all three mediating factors simultaneously.
This model-fitting procedure was conducted on the first-pass reading times,
regression-path duration and total reading times of the VERB region, as well as
on total sentence reading times. Only the VERB region was selected since it was
the only one were it would be theoretically possible to expect an effect of all three
mediating factors, since aptness and familiarity ratings were collected on the entire
metaphoric sentences, but conventionality ratings were collected only for the verb.
Total sentence reading times were considered to test for the possibility that effects
would only be visible after the entire sentence had been understood.
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Results
The results of the analyses show that the model including aptness as a factor was
the overall best fit to the data. This was found for both total sentence reading
times and total reading times of the VERB region, but not for first-pass reading
times or for regression path duration, where there were no significant effects of
any of the three mediators.
For sentence reading times and total reading times of the VERB region, the
effect of aptness was significant, while there was no significant effect of familiarity
or conventionality. This was also the case if Containment was included in the
model. Adding the mediating factors did not affect any of the original results
reported in chapter three.
The effect of aptness shows that metaphors that were rated as more apt were
read faster than those rated as less apt. The model that included aptness had
the highest marginal R2 value out of the three models as well as the lowest values
for AIC and BIC. The model including all mediating factors simultaneously also
shows this same pattern for both total sentence reading times and total reading
times in the VERB region: Only aptness had a significant facilitation effect on
reading times. This model is shown in Table 5.9.
Because of the problem of multicollinearity, it was necessary to assess the validity
of the results of the model including all variables simultaneously, depicted in Table
5.9. One way of doing this is by measuring a model’s Variance inflation Factor
(VIF) (Mansfield & Helms, 1982), which measures the relationships between the
variance of a model with multiple terms and that of the same model with just
one term. As a general rule of thumb, it is commonly stated that if the VIF is
below 5, multicollinearity should not pose a problem for the interpretation of the
regression coefficients (Neter et al., 1996). The VIF values for aptness, familiarity
and conventionality for the model shown in Table 5.9 were all below 5, suggesting
that the regression coefficients are reliable.
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No significant effects were found on first-pass reading times or on regression-path
duration of the VERB region.
These results can be visualized in Figures 5.3 and 5.4, and the output of all models
is shown in Tables 5.5, 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8.
item familiarity aptness conventionality
1 52.45 59.12 32.45
2 41.76 54.77 29.69
3 29.94 44.73 31.33
4 39.45 43.58 35.33
5 36.79 44.90 48.88
6 13.70 39.40 34.55
7 19.33 33.20 34.55
8 9.42 33.38 14.90
9 16.82 43.30 9.88
10 17.85 43.00 36.17
11 11.42 40.58 20.15
12 12.09 46.77 20.15
13 17.91 40.25 26.27
14 22.09 54.50 26.27
15 46.85 56.85 61.42
16 21.82 48.95 30.65
17 42.33 61.58 46.50
18 44.58 64.08 46.50
19 15.45 36.98 49.36
20 23.06 49.15 36.54
21 20.30 44.05 22.82
22 27.64 48.33 13.67
23 13.94 40.62 13.45
24 16.97 42.85 37.88
25 29.09 42.88 15.08
26 27.79 46.73 40.00
27 24.64 45.62 22.33
28 38.79 56.15 44.90
29 36.06 46.55 61.89
30 25.52 42.00 18.12
31 51.91 53.60 39.64
32 54.67 68.72 60.33
33 41.00 53.50 52.50
34 39.61 43.65 31.75
35 11.61 37.20 15.62
36 12.82 35.08 14.64
Table 5.4: Ratings collected in Experiments 7-9
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Averaged reading times for every item in the VERB regionC
Figure 5.3: Mediating factors for total reading times of the verb region of Experiment
10
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Averaged reading times for every item for the whole sentenceC
Figure 5.4: Mediating factors for reading times of the whole sentence of Experiment 10
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Prime Type −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(−0.002, 0.0005) (−0.002, 0.0005) (−0.002, 0.001)










Trial Order −0.00004 −0.00004 −0.00004
(−0.0001, −0.00002) (−0.0001, −0.00002) (−0.0001, −0.00002)
t = −4.538∗∗∗ t = −4.549∗∗∗ t = −4.555∗∗∗
Intercept 1.612 1.613 1.613
(1.606, 1.619) (1.610, 1.617) (1.609, 1.616)
t = 489.847∗∗∗ t = 943.229∗∗∗ t = 918.214∗∗∗
Marginal R-squared 0.00985 0.00962 0.01026
Observations 1,566 1,566 1,566
Log Likelihood 4,679.936 4,679.902 4,680.093
Akaike Inf. Crit. −9,341.873 −9,341.804 −9,342.186
Bayesian Inf. Crit. −9,293.666 −9,293.597 −9,293.980
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
values shown per cell are regression coefficients, confi-
dence intervals and t-values ( in that order)
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Prime Type −0.002 −0.002 −0.002
(−0.004, −0.001) (−0.004, −0.001) (−0.004, −0.001)










Trial Order −0.00004 −0.00004 −0.00004
(−0.0001, −0.00002) (−0.0001, −0.00002) (−0.0001, −0.00002)
t = −4.522∗∗∗ t = −4.522∗∗∗ t = −4.521∗∗∗
Intercept 1.616 1.616 1.616
(1.609, 1.623) (1.613, 1.619) (1.613, 1.620)
t = 454.164∗∗∗ t = 917.532∗∗∗ t = 889.588∗∗∗
Marginal R-squared 0.01689 0.01689 0.01709
Observations 1,566 1,566 1,566
Log Likelihood 4,629.192 4,629.191 4,629.242
Akaike Inf. Crit. −9,240.385 −9,240.383 −9,240.483
Bayesian Inf. Crit. −9,192.178 −9,192.176 −9,192.277
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
values shown per cell are regression coefficients, confi-
dence intervals and t-values ( in that order)
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Prime Type −0.003 −0.003 −0.003
(−0.004, −0.002) (−0.004, −0.002) (−0.004, −0.002)










Trial Order −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001
(−0.0001, −0.0001) (−0.0001, −0.0001) (−0.0001, −0.0001)
t = −9.537∗∗∗ t = −9.500∗∗∗ t = −9.483∗∗∗
Intercept 1.633 1.629 1.629
(1.628, 1.639) (1.625, 1.632) (1.626, 1.632)
t = 567.421∗∗∗ t = 993.223∗∗∗ t = 979.076∗∗∗
Marginal R2 0.05191 0.04845 0.05022
Observations 1,566 1,566 1,566
Log Likelihood 4,608.710 4,606.728 4,607.223
Akaike Inf. Crit. −9,199.419 −9,195.455 −9,196.446
Bayesian Inf. Crit. −9,151.213 −9,147.249 −9,148.240
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
values shown per cell are regression coefficients, confi-
dence intervals and t-values ( in that order)
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Prime Type −0.099 −0.099 −0.099
(−0.121, −0.077) (−0.121, −0.077) (−0.121, −0.077)










Trial Order −0.003 −0.003 −0.003
(−0.003, −0.003) (−0.003, −0.003) (−0.003, −0.003)
t = −16.751∗∗∗ t = −16.707∗∗∗ t = −16.696∗∗∗
Intercept 8.677 8.534 8.538
(8.519, 8.835) (8.446, 8.623) (8.447, 8.629)
t = 107.418∗∗∗ t = 188.658∗∗∗ t = 183.833∗∗∗
Marginal R-squared 0.09879 0.09345 0.09459
Observations 1,566 1,566 1,566
Log Likelihood 87.646 85.630 85.701
Akaike Inf. Crit. −153.292 −149.261 −149.402
Bayesian Inf. Crit. −94.373 −90.341 −90.483
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
values shown per cell are regression coefficients, confi-
dence intervals and t-values ( in that order)
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Table 5.9: Mediating factors for both VERB region and sentence.
Dependent variable:
VERB Total RTs Sentence RTs
(1) (2)
Prime Type −0.003 −0.099
(−0.004, −0.002) (−0.121, −0.076)
t = −4.514∗∗∗ t = −8.745∗∗∗
Aptness −0.0002 −0.007
(−0.0004, −0.00005) (−0.012, −0.002)
t = −2.498∗∗ t = −2.672∗∗∗
Familiarity 0.0001 0.003
(−0.00002, 0.0002) (−0.001, 0.006)
t = 1.640 t = 1.644
Conventionality −0.00003 −0.0004
(−0.0001, 0.00005) (−0.003, 0.002)
t = −0.813 t = −0.347
Trial Order −0.0001 −0.003
(−0.0001, −0.0001) (−0.003, −0.003)
t = −9.495∗∗∗ t = −16.755∗∗∗
Intercept 1.636 8.762
(1.630, 1.643) (8.579, 8.946)
t = 489.505∗∗∗ t = 93.597∗∗∗
Observations 1,566 1,566
Log Likelihood 4,610.018 88.982
Akaike Inf. Crit. −9,198.036 −151.964
Bayesian Inf. Crit. −9,139.116 −82.332
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
values shown per cell are regression coefficients, confi-
dence intervals and t-values ( in that order)
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5.4.5 Discussion
The results of Experiments 7-10 suggest that aptness modulates reading times of
verbal metaphors better than conventionality and familiarity: After controlling
for the effect of Prime Type and Trial Order, the aptness ratings collected in
Experiment 7 showed that more apt metaphors were read significantly faster than
less apt metaphors. This was the case for total sentence reading times, in line
with the findings of Jones and Estes (2006), and for total reading times of the
VERB region. The models including aptness also had an overall better fit than the
models including conventionality and familiarity, who did not show any significant
improvement on model fit compared to the base model. This suggests that aptness
might be the best mediating factor during processing of verbal metaphors, and that
this effect might only appear in secondary stages of metaphor comprehension.
At first glance, another interpretation seems possible: It could be the case that
the differences in effects have to do with the differences in mean scores for aptness
(mean value: 46.85), familiarity (mean value: 28.5) and conventionality (mean
value: 37.771): Maybe aptness was found to modulate reading times because the
items had an overall higher rating for aptness than for familiarity or conventionality.
If another set of items had been used that had higher scores for familiarity and
conventionality, it could have been possible to find a different pattern of effects. In
other words, it could be that effects of a factor are only found when that factor
has higher ratings vs. when the factors has lower ratings. However, one strong
argument against this interpretation is the fact that both familiarity (min value:
10.6, max value: 53.7) and conventionality (min value: 9.8, max value:61.8) had a
wider range than aptness did (min value: 33.20, max value: 68.72), and the ranges
overlapped, particularly in the higher values. So if more conventional and more
familiar metaphor would have shown an effect of conventionality and/or familiarity,
the current set of materials would have been able to detect this.
One potential problem with the current results is the fact that there were
considerable differences in the ratings collected for conventionality, on the one
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hand, and aptness and familiarity, on the other. Whereas the final ratings for
conventionality came from an average of 9.5 individual ratings for every critical
item, the ratings for aptness and familiarity came from an average of over 1200
individual ratings for every item, since for aptness and familiarity, every participant
saw the full set of 36 items. This means that it is possible that the estimates for
conventionality for every item are less accurate than the estimates for aptness and
familiarity. To be sure that these estimates for conventionality are reliable, it would
be necessary to collect ratings from a larger number of participants.
5.5 The Effect of Mediating Factors on Process-
ing Spoken Verb-Object Metaphors
The following Experiments focus on the second type of non-nominal metaphors
investigated in this dissertation: Verb-Object metaphors. The procedure here was
identical to that of Experiments 7-10: I first collected ratings on the three dimensions
of relevance (aptness, familiarity and conventionality) and then proceeded to fit
the new values to the existing data collected in Experiment 5. Importantly, only
a subset of the data was use for the current purposes: the metaphoric conditions
of Experiment 5. This is due to the fact that the ratings collected collected on
the three dimensions referred to the metaphorical interpretation of the sentences
exclusively. Table 5.10 below presents an example of a context and Table 5.11 an
example of a critical utterance for Experiment 5.




Sebastian liebt eine wunderschöne Katze. Er hat sie in einem
Tierheim adoptiert und seitdem sind sie unzertrennlich. Die
Katze ist verwöhnt und launisch, und kann sehr wählerisch sein.
Deswegen würde Sebastian alles für sie tun, wenn sie Hunger hat.
Er wird sich immer um sie kümmern wollen.





“Sebastian loves a beautiful cat. He adopted her in a shelter and
they have since been inseparable. The cat is spoiled and moody
and can be very fussy. That’s why Sebastian would do anything
for her when she’s hungry. He will always want to take care of
her.”




Sebastian fütterttopic eine Prinzessinvehicle, und wird
unablässig der Katze beistehen.




Sebastian wird eine Prinzessinvehicle fütterntopic, und
wird unablässig der Katze beistehen.
English Translation “Sebastian will a princess feed and will relentlessly the
cat support”
As described in chapter four, the verb-object metaphors of Experiment 5 were
normed for aptness in order to make sure that the metaphors could be sufficiently
understood. Based on this, two metaphors were discarded, leaving the total of
critical items at 36. Additionally, ratings for familiarity were collected from the
same group of participants, who were asked to state how often they had heard these
metaphors before (if at all) on an ordinal scale from 1-7. Both of these ratings were
used to compute a mean aptness and familiarity score for every item.
An initial exploratory analysis showed that aptness and familiarity might
modulate processing: Metaphors that were rated more highly showed a higher
log-gaze probability than the metaphors with lower aptness scores. This tentative
finding was visible in the VEHICLE, VERB and UND regions.
However, these original ratings suffered from the same problems as the original
ratings collected for Experiment 1: They used an ordinal measurement scale and
were collected from only 20 participants. A further problem with this original
norming study is the fact that aptness and conventionality were collected from the
same sample of participants. As Jones and Estes (2006) argue, this can lead to the
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ratings being highly correlated: Participants tend to rate the metaphors that they
consider to be more apt as more familiar and vice versa. This was in fact the case
with these ratings, which had a correlation value of 0.826 for familiarity and aptness.
Given the theoretical importance of teasing the effects of aptness, familiarity
and conventionality apart, it was paramount to obtain better quality data that
could help do so. The collection of new ratings is described in Experiments 11-13.
Their individual contribution to the processing of verbal metaphors is explored
in Experiment 14. The ratings in Experiments 11-13 were all collected using the
target items in the early-verb metaphoric condition only.
5.5.1 Experiment 11: aptness of verb-object metaphors
Experiment 11 is analogous to Experiment 7: it was meant to assess the per-
ceived quality of the verb-object metaphoric expressions when embedded in their
appropriate context. The Experiment was programmed using the IBEX software
(Drummond, 2013) and run entirely online.
Participants
As with the previous Experiments in this chapter, 50 monolingual native speakers of
German (ages 18-31) who did not participate in any other study in this chapter were
recruited using the “clickworker” platform. All participants gave their informed
consent prior to taking part in the study and received 2 Euros for their participation.
This study was covered by the ethics vote of the psycholinguistics lab of the
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.
Materials and design
The 36 critical items used in Experiment 5 served as the materials for Experiments 11-
14. As with the previous studies in this chapter, participants saw 4 ungrammatical,
completely non-sensical sentences which were used as attention controls: Only the
data of participants who rated at least 3/4 of these sentences as incomprehensible
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Figure 5.5: Example of a trial in Experiment 11
(i.e. with a value lower than 20 on the provided scale) were analyzed. The
presentation of critical and filler items was randomized.
In the study, participants were asked to rate how understandable they thought
every metaphor was given the provided context on a continuous, sliding scale from
1 (meaning totally incomprehensible) to 100 (meaning totally comprehensible). The
metaphor was always underlined. Participants were not given an explicit definition
of a metaphor. This was done in order to avoid biasing their answers as much as
possible. An example critical trial can be seen in Figure 5.5.
Procedure
On each trial, participants first read the 4-sentence context biasing the critical
utterance towards a metaphoric interpretation. They then pressed the SPACE
bar in order to read the metaphoric sentence. They pressed the SPACE bar again
to reveal the slider scale. They changed the position of the slider button on the
scale using their mouse, after which they clicked on the button “send”. The entire
Experiment lasted around 15 minutes.
Analysis and results
Prior to any analysis, the data from 13 participants was excluded based on their
ratings of the filler items. This reduced the total number of participants to 37.
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The data of these 37 participants was used to calculate the mean aptness value
of each one of the 36 critical items. Only descriptive statistics were performed
on the results of Experiment 11.
On average, participants rated the items to be somewhat comprehensible, with
ratings being almost exactly half-way between the ends of the scale (mean value:
50.87, median value: 52.35). The lowest rating was 28.16 and the highest was 69.73.
The mean aptness values for every item can be seen in Table 5.14.
5.5.2 Experiment 12: familiarity of verb-object metaphors
With this study, I collected data on perceived familiarity with verb-object metaphors.
Participants
50 monolingual native speakers of German (ages 18-31) who did not participate in
any other study in this chapter were recruited via “clickworker”. All participants
gave their informed consent prior to taking part in the study and received 2
Euros for their participation. This study was approved by the ethics vote of the
psycholinguistics lab of the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.
Materials, design, predictions and procedure
The materials, design, predictions and procedure were identical to those of Ex-
periment 11 with the exception of the task: Participants were asked to rate the
perceived frequency of the underlined verb-object metaphors on a scale from 1
(never before) to 100 (very often).
Analysis and results
Prior to the analysis, the data from 6 participants was excluded based on their
ratings of the filler items. This reduced the total number of participants to 44.
The data of these 44 participants was used to calculate the mean aptness value
of each one of the 36 critical items. Only descriptive statistics were performed
on the results of Experiment 12.
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The results show that participants believed to be somewhat familiar with the
set of metaphors. The mean rating was 45.67 and the median rating was 47.73.
The spread was somewhat larger than in the previous experiment: The minimum
rating was 17.86 and the maximum was 72.84. The mean familiarity values for
every item can be seen in Table 5.14.
5.5.3 Experiment 13:
conventionality of verb-object metaphors
As with Experiment 9, the goal of Experiment 13 was to obtain a measure of the
metaphoric vehicle’s de-contextualized metaphoric conventionality.
This Experiment was also divided into two parts: In the first one, a group
of participants gave their interpretation of the meaning of each metaphor as it
appeared embedded in the critical sentence (in the present tense) and with its
corresponding 4-sentence context.
The most common answers per item were then determined and these were used
as the basis of part two of the experiment, in which a different group of participants
rated the frequency in which the target nouns, deprived of context, were believed
to be used in the specific metaphoric meaning obtained in part 1.
Participants
Two separate groups of participants were used for each part of the study. The first
group consisted of 50 monolingual German native speakers (ages 18-31), who were
recruited using the “clickworker” recruiting platform. None of them participated
in any of the other Experiments in this chapter. The second group also consisted
of 50 monolingual German native speakers (ages 18-31).
All participants gave their informed consent prior to taking part in the study and
received 3 Euros (participants in part 1) or 2 Euros (participants in part 2) for their
participation. This study was approved by the ethics vote of the psycholinguistics
lab of the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin.
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Materials and design
In part one, participants were asked to interpret the metaphoric sentences in
their provided context in as few words as possible. Every participants saw the 36
experimental sentences and 4 filler sentences intended as catch trials. These sentences
were completely nonsensical. Participants were instructed to mark nonsensical
sentences as such by writing “I do not understand this sentence” (or similar).
Participants who did not identify at least 3/4 of nonsensical sentences as such
were excluded from further analysis.
As opposed to Experiment 9, participants in part 2 of Experiment 13 also
saw all 36 metaphoric items, given that these were not conceptually related in
any particular way. They read the de-contextualized target noun (e.g. Prinzessin)
together with the most common metaphoric interpretation for that noun obtained
in part one of the experiment. They were instructed to rate how often they believed
to have heard or read this specific noun with the given metaphoric interpretation
on a scale from 1 (never) to 100 (very often).
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 9.
Analysis and results
No participant was removed from the analysis of part 1 given their responses to the
filler trials. The answers of all participants were manually counted to determine
the most common response. As in Experiment 9, participants’ answers were
grouped together with answers that were conceptually identical but superficially
different (e.g. langsame Spieler langsames Team and die Leute waren langsam
were counted as variations of the same response, namely langsam). Synonymous
words were also grouped together (e.g. gefühlslos und emotionslos were counted as
being the same response). For part 2, the data from 8 participants was removed
from the analysis given their ratings of the filler items. This reduced the total
number of participants to 42.
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The results of part 1 showed that participants tended to provide more lengthy
responses than those found in part 1 of Experiment 9, often providing more than one
identifying property for the metaphor. Because of this, two stated characteristics
were used as the final interpretation whenever more than half of the participants
provided more than one identifying property. The final most common responses,
which were chosen as the materials for part 2, are shown in Table 5.12: Here,
“Critical_word” refers to the metaphoric vehicle that participants had to define.
“Interpretation” refers to the average most common interpretation that participants
gave to the metaphoric vehicles.
The results of part 2 showed that on average, participants considered the
metaphoric meaning of the nouns to be somewhat conventional. The mean score
was 54.9 and the median score was 55.06. The maximum rating was 96.26 and
the minimum was 22.48.
5.5.4 Experiment 14: effects of aptness, familiarity and
conventionality on processing verb-object metaphors
Participants, materials, design, and procedure
Experiment 14 was a reanalysis of the data collected in Experiment 5. Specifically,
of the log-gaze ratios computed for the VEHICLE, VERB and UND time-windows
(see chapter 4 for details on the original analyses performed on these regions). One
important difference in the way the data was analyzed in Experiment 14 was the
fact that a subset of the original data was taken containing only the metaphoric
conditions. This was done because the ratings collected in Experiments 11-13 were
based on the metaphoric conditions only.
Predictions
The predictions for Experiment 14, as with Experiment 10, were derived from the
theoretical discussion on the role of aptness, conventionality and familiarity during
metaphor processing: If the Category Inclusion view holds, it should be possible to
find that aptness is a better fit to the data than familiarity and/or conventionality.
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item Interpretation Critical_word
1 rücksichtsloser und wütender Mensch Bulldozer
2 wütender und gefährlicher Mensch Drachen
3 emotionsloser Mensch Roboter
4 Gruppe von Menschen, die langsam und träge sind Altersheim
5 gütige, uneigennützige Person Engel
6 hinterlistige, gierige Person Hyäne
7 sehr alte und erfahrene Person Dinosaurier
8 negative emotionale veränderung in einer Beziehung Riss
9 aggressive und starke person Gorilla
10 aggressive und gierige Person Hai
11 sehr langsame person Schildkröte
12 cholerische, unberechenbare person Vulkan
13 charakterlich wandlungsfähiger Mensch Chamäleon
14 starker, mutiger Mensch Löwen
15 Ort, mit chaotischen Zuständen Zirkus
16 jemand, der sich nicht zeigt und schwer aufzufinden ist Gespenst
17 hartes, unverdauliches Essen Stein
18 anmutige, elegante person Schmetterling
19 eingängiger Song, der schnell an bekanntheit gewinnt Virus
20 stark übergewichtiger mensch Walross
21 zierliche, leicht verwundbare person Schneeflocke
22 Schmächtiger und schwächlicher Mensch Zahnstocher
23 Dummer Mensch der Glück hat Esel
24 große, breitgebaute Person Schrank
25 sehr alte Person mit veralteten Ansichten Fossil
26 abweisende, gefühllose Person Eisstatue
27 chaotischer, undurchsichtiger Ort Dschungel
28 lindernde aber temporäre Lösung Pflaster
29 athletische, sehr schnelle Person Leoparden
30 hinterlistige, falsche Person Schlange
31 großer, wütender mensch, der seine Meinung durrchsetzt Panzer
32 verwöhnte und launische Person Prinzessin
33 redselige Person Papagei
34 agressive und gefährliche Person Piranha
35 habgierige Mensch Geier
36 eine schwierig zu erobernde Person, die nur als Statussymbol gilt. Trophäe
Table 5.12: Most common answer for every item in part 1 of Experiment 13
If, on the other hand, the Indirect comparison view holds, familiarity and/or
conventionality should provide a better fit to the data than aptness.
A further prediction relates to the time in which effects should be visible. In
Experiment 10, it was found that the effect of aptness was highly localized to
the total reading times of the verb region, with no effect being found in first-pass
or regression-path duration. In the Visual World Paradigm, participants do not
have the option to revisit the linguistic input as they do when reading. Instead,
they must continue to process the unfolding utterance and relate it to the visual
context. If it is the case that effects of mediating factors should appear in later
stages of metaphor comprehension, we would expect them to appear in the “und”
region, as opposed to the “verb” or “vehicle” regions. If, on the other hand, these
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factors can appear earlier during sentence comprehension, we should see them
in the vehicle and/or verb regions.
Analysis
As with Experiment 10, one of the goals of the newly collected ratings was to
minimize the correlation values between variables. This was only partially successful:
The correlation between aptness and familiarity was reduced from 0.8 to 0.66,
but 0.66 is still a relatively high correlation value. All correlation values are
presented in Table 5.13 below.
Because of the high correlation values, the analysis proceeded as in Experiment
10: Four separate models were fitted to the data in each of the three time windows
(vehicle, verb, and “und”) in order to explore the individual contribution of each
variable. The baseline model did not include any of the three variables but had an
identical random effects structure. This is provided in R syntax below:
log-gaze ratio of looks to metaphoric picture over literal picture ~ verb
position + trial order + (1 +verb position| subject) + (1 +verb position|
Item)
Note that these models differ slightly from the final models used for these regions
in chapter four. The present models were fitted only on the metaphoric conditions,
seeing that the ratings were themselves only collected on the metaphoric levels of the
factors “context bias” (they are, after all, measuring dimensions of metaphoricity,
making them uninterpretable for the literal conditions). The factors “verb position”
is still included in order to control for its effect during processing.
The models including aptness, conventionality and familiarity, were identical to
the models presented above with the exception of adding each one of the variables of
interest individually in each region. The models were compared to the corresponding
base model through a log-likelihood test. the AIC, BIC and marginal R2 of each
model were then informally compared to one another to determine which of the three
models had the best overall fit to the data. Finally, a full model including all three
mediating factors simultaneously was fitted for every one of the three time windows.
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Table 5.13: Correlation values of ratings collected in Experiments 11-13
Correlation of ratings Aptness Familiarity Conventionality
Aptness 1 0.6585614 0.5245973
Familiarity 0.6585614 1 0.7643484
Conventionality 0.5245973 0.7643484 1
Results
The results show that none of the three mediating factors significantly improved
the model fit on the verb or on the vehicle region. For the vehicle region, the
model including aptness showed a better fit to the data compared to the competing
models, but not a better fit than the base model without any of the mediating
variables. Similarly, in the verb region, the model including familiarity showed
the best fit out of the three models with mediating variables, but it failed to be
a better fit than the base model.
In the “und” region, only the model including aptness showed a significant
improvement compared to the base model, with higher values of aptness associated
to higher log-gaze probability ratios. This model also showed a lower BIC and
AIC scores than the competing models, as well as a higher value of marginal R2.
This suggests that the more apt a metaphor, the more participants directed their
gaze towards the metaphoric picture and less towards the literal picture. This
finding also lends some support to the idea that item-specific properties, such
as aptness, might have a delayed influence on processing, similarly to what was
observed in Experiment 10.
All results of Experiment 14 can be visualized in Figures 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8. In the
figures, the dotted blue line represents the point of no preference for viewing either
literal or metaphoric picture. Positive values on the x-axis (i.e. above the blue line)
represent a preference for the metaphoric picture and negative values (below the
blue line) a preference for the literal picture. The red line shows the regression line.
The output of all models is shown in Tables 5.15, 5.16, and 5.17. Table 5.18 shows
the results of the models that included all variables simultaneously. As was the case
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in Experiment 10, the VIF values for this model were assessed in order to rule out a
distortion of the coefficients because of multicollinearity. All VIF values in the model
shown in Table 5.18 were below 5. These models thus suggest that only aptness
has an effect on processing and that this effect is only visible in the “und” region.
One problem with the interpretation of these results comes from the fact that I
examined only a subset of the original data. Whereas in Experiment 10 (which had
64 participants in total) the full set of 36 metaphors was analyzed, Experiment 14
consisted only of 18 items and 32 participants (since only the metaphoric conditions
were considered for the analysis). It might therefore be the case that Experiment 14
was not sufficiently powered to detect effects of the mediating factors in the vehicle
or verb regions, or to detect potential effects of conventionality and or familiarity
in the “und” region. The current results should therefore be considered to be
exploratory and need to be confirmed by a follow-up replication study.
5.5.5 Discussion
Experiments 11-13 collected ratings on the familiarity, aptness and conventionality
of verb-object metaphors. In Experiment 14, these ratings were used to assess the
individual contribution of each of these factors to the construction of metaphoric
meaning. The findings showed that aptness was the only factor that showed an
improved model fit compared to a base model. This effect was found only in the
“und” region, which came immediately after the second element of the metaphor
(the vehicle in the early-verb condition and the topic in the late-verb condition).
The results suggest that, in the “und” region, participants preferred to inspect the
metaphoric picture more than the literal picture if the metaphor was particularly
apt. The less apt a metaphor, the more they preferred to look at the literal picture
compared to the metaphoric picture. This is consistent with the idea that more
apt metaphors should be more easily understood.
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Figure 5.6: Mediating factors for log-gaze probability ratios in the vehicle region of
Experiment 14
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Figure 5.7: Mediating factors for log-gaze probability ratios in the verb region of
Experiment 14
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Figure 5.8: Mediating factors for log-gaze probability ratios in the ’und’ region of
Experiment 14
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Item familiarity aptness conventionality
1 26.14 50.32 25.74
2 72.80 59.08 61.23
3 55.50 47.95 76.02
4 26.80 41.22 42.55
5 67.20 59.22 85.17
6 31.91 55.03 43.83
7 55.89 53.92 40.43
8 44.16 59.81 59.11
9 54.52 42.27 54.62
10 60.93 60.05 44.49
11 47.16 61.46 76.70
12 25.98 33.05 35.04
13 34.57 45.00 55.30
14 59.98 66.11 71.96
15 61.82 64.51 62.43
16 59.66 59.59 55.45
17 35.18 28.38 58.60
18 40.39 52.11 33.96
19 18.48 28.16 21.28
20 58.89 49.84 76.68
21 30.41 52.59 31.19
22 49.18 52.14 49.15
23 46.25 36.08 41.09
24 71.55 54.68 88.87
25 58.77 53.81 50.81
26 18.68 43.57 32.64
27 45.95 50.46 63.15
28 22.61 48.41 57.02
29 17.86 56.00 37.98
30 72.84 63.43 96.04
31 18.27 28.65 33.47
32 71.70 66.27 83.36
33 53.07 52.57 56.62
34 19.34 41.35 28.81
35 48.30 44.54 84.04
36 61.32 69.73 73.83
Table 5.14: Ratings collected in Experiments 11-13
These results are less conclusive than those of Experiment 10, given the
substantially reduced number of data points available for the analysis. Additionally,
the two conditions of Experiment 14 changed the order of presentation of the
metaphoric elements, meaning that when hearing the vehicle in one condition and
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Verb Constraint 0.155 0.155 0.155
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038)










Trial Order 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
t = 4.927∗∗∗ t = 4.935∗∗∗ t = 4.941∗∗∗
Intercept −0.102 −0.059 −0.053
(0.088) (0.054) (0.058)
t = −1.158 t = −1.103 t = −0.926
Marginal R2 0.02013 0.01982 0.0194
Observations 41,280 41,280 41,280
Log Likelihood −32,878.880−32,878.960 −32,879.120
Akaike Inf. Crit. 65,779.760 65,779.920 65,780.240
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 65,874.670 65,874.830 65,875.150
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
values shown per cell are regression coefficients, confi-
dence intervals and t-values ( in that order)
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Verb Constraint 0.008 0.008 0.008
(−0.041, 0.056) (−0.041, 0.056) (−0.041, 0.056)










Trial Order 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001, 0.002) (0.001, 0.002) (0.001, 0.002)
t = 5.151∗∗∗ t = 5.151∗∗∗ t = 5.152∗∗∗
Intercept 0.037 0.033 0.046
(−0.165, 0.240) (−0.084, 0.150) (−0.082, 0.173)
t = 0.363 t = 0.551 t = 0.704
Marginal R2 0.00096 0.00107 0.00093
Observations 41,760 41,760 41,760
Log Likelihood −32,538.690 −32,538.650 −32,538.690
Akaike Inf. Crit. 65,093.380 65,093.300 65,093.390
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 65,162.490 65,162.420 65,162.500
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
values shown per cell are regression coefficients, confi-
dence intervals and t-values ( in that order)
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Verb Constraint −0.016 −0.016 −0.016
(−0.118, 0.086) (−0.118, 0.086) (−0.118, 0.086)










Trial Order 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001, 0.002) (0.001, 0.002) (0.001, 0.002)
t = 4.308∗∗∗ t = 4.326∗∗∗ t = 4.337∗∗∗
Intercept −0.032 0.097 0.098
(−0.212, 0.149) (−0.024, 0.219) (−0.030, 0.225)
t = −0.342 t = 1.572 t = 1.497
Marginal R-squared 0.00621 0.0024 0.00211
Observations 34,515 34,515 34,515
Log Likelihood −25,222.920 −25,224.330 −25,224.380
Akaike Inf. Crit. 50,467.830 50,466.670 50,470.770
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 50,560.770 50,542.710 50,563.710
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
values shown per cell are regression coefficients, confi-
dence intervals and t-values ( in that order)
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Verb Constraint 0.151 0.015 0.020
(0.077, 0.226) (−0.082, 0.112) (−0.077, 0.117)
t = 3.966∗∗∗ t = 0.305 t = 0.404
Aptness 0.0004 −0.0002 0.002
(−0.004, 0.005) (−0.005, 0.005) (0.001, 0.003)
t = 0.187 t = −0.092 t = 6.158∗∗∗
Familiarity 0.0004 0.001 0.0001
(−0.003, 0.004) (−0.003, 0.005) (−0.0004, 0.001)
t = 0.203 t = 0.394 t = 0.412
Conventionality 0.0003 −0.0004 0.0002
(−0.003, 0.003) (−0.004, 0.003) (−0.0003, 0.001)
t = 0.205 t = −0.256 t = 0.815
Trial Order 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001, 0.002) (0.001, 0.002) (0.001, 0.002)
t = 4.233∗∗∗ t = 5.148∗∗∗ t = 3.895∗∗∗
Intercept −0.069 0.048 0.022
(−0.249, 0.111) (−0.161, 0.257) (−0.008, 0.051)
t = −0.752 t = 0.451 t = 1.456
Observations 41,280 41,760 34,515
Log Likelihood −33,879.150 −32,538.610 −26,894.950
Akaike Inf. Crit. 67,780.300 65,097.220 53,807.900
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 67,875.210 65,183.620 53,883.940
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
values shown per cell are regression coefficients, confi-
dence intervals and t-values ( in that order)
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the verb in the other they had not heard the entire metaphor yet. This might explain
why results were only visible in the “und” region, which consistently appeared after
the metaphor had been fully understood in both conditions.
However, there was a more balanced number of observations for the ratings
of aptness, familiarity and conventionality, since the number of participants that
rated each dimension was 37, 42, and 44 respectively. In Experiments 11-13,
every participant saw the full set of items. This makes it easier to compare the
three dimensions to one another.
5.6 Interim Conclusion
In this chapter, I investigated the effect of aptness, conventionality and familiarity
on the processing of verbal metaphors and verb-object metaphors. These mediating
factors play different roles in the theories that have been evaluated throughout
this thesis: Whereas Implicit Comparison views attribute an important mediating
role to conventionality and/or familiarity, Category Inclusion models view aptness
as the true mediating factor.
Overall, the results present tentative support for the Category Inclusion view:
For both verbal metaphors and verb-object metaphors, aptness was the only factor
that significantly improved model fits. The effect were also found to be in a direction
compatible with the theories: For verbal metaphors, more apt metaphors showed
shorter reading times than less apt metaphors. For verb-object metaphors, more
apt metaphors showed higher log-gaze ratios than less apt metaphors, which can
be interpreted as higher apt metaphors displaying a more pronounced preference
for visually inspecting the metaphoric picture vs. the literal picture compared
to less apt metaphors.
Importantly, these effects were found to occur at somewhat later stages of
metaphor processing for the investigated dependent measures: Experiment 10 found
effects in total-reading times and sentence reading times (but not on first-pass or
regression path duration), while Experiment 14 found effects in the “und” time
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window only. This suggests that Category Inclusion models need to be further
specified to account for these late effects by postulating that aptness influences
a later processing stage only.
It could, for example, be stated that aptness affects the ease in which the ad
hoc category is ultimately constructed, but only after the relevant parameters
for modulation have been determined from the metaphoric topic together with
the utterance’s context.
It is important to note, however, that these conclusions are only tentative. This
is particularly the case for the interpretation of the results of Experiment 14, which
might not have been sufficiently powered to answer the questions at hand, given
that the analysis was only performed on half of the observations of the full data
set. This is only speculative, and further analyses would be necessary to determine
the minimum effect size of interest and the number of participants necessary
to conduct an appropriately powered study investigating only the metaphoric
conditions. This way, it should be possible to determine whether or not there are
any effects of conventionality, aptness and familiarity and whether these effects
appear any earlier than the “und” region.
One possible criticism to these results is that only effects for aptness were found
because the ratings collected for aptness were a better estimate for the true value
of aptness compared to the ratings collected for familiarity and conventionality.
Since it might be difficult for participants to assess their perceived frequency
of exposure, these ratings might have introduced more noise to the data than
the aptness ratings did.
However, if this is the case, this problem might permeate the entire research
area of mediating factors of metaphor comprehension, since the procedure followed
here was identical to the one used in the two previous studies addressing the issue
of theoretical repercussions of mediating effects (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005; Jones
& Estes, 2006). Compared to these studies, the present experiments represent a
methodological improvement by (1) testing more participants on average, (2) testing
different types of metaphors and (3) measuring and keeping the mediating factors as
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continuous variables. It is therefore likely that the estimates for the mediating factors
presented here represent an overall step in the right direction, even if the possibility
remains that they might not be optimal. Future research could address this issue
by testing the within-items reliability rate (for example, by collecting ratings for
the same items using different participant sample) and the between-items reliability
rate (by collecting ratings from the same participants but on different days).
The next chapter examines the results of chapters three through five in light of
the goals stipulated in chapter one and the theories discussed in chapter two.
6
Conclusion
6.1 Relating the Findings to Theories of Metaphor
Processing
The goal of this dissertation was to investigate the way in which the theoretical
debate on metaphor processing could be pushed forward by examining previously
understudied linguistic phenomena. Crucially, this was done by incorporating
the insights and methodology from the field of situated and incremental language
processing. This field has shown, for example, that deploying eye-tracking during
the inspection of a visual context can resolve broader theoretical issues in cognitive
science (Tanenhaus et al., 1995), investigate subtle non-referential links between
visual context and sentence processing (Guerra & Knoeferle, 2014, 2017), provide
fine-grained evidence regarding the way in which participants derive pragmatic
meaning (Huang & Snedeker, 2009), uncover how associated semantic and phono-
logical features play a role during lexical processing (Huettig & Altmann, 2005;
Huettig & Hartsuiker, 2008; Tanenhaus et al., 2000), and show that comprehenders
use the incrementally-developing sentence interpretation to anticipate upcoming
discourse referents (Altmann, 1999; Altmann & Kamide, 2007; Kamide et al., 2003),
among other things (see for example Huettig et al., 2011; Knoeferle & Guerra,
2016; Knoeferle, 2016, for systematic reviews).
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Specifically, I was interested in the way in which two leading theories of metaphor
comprehension - The Implicit Comparison View (Gentner & Bowdle, 2008) and
the Category Inclusion View (Glucksberg, 2003; Sperber & Wilson, 2008) - make
differentiating predictions on three open issues regarding metaphor comprehension:
the issue of symmetry, the role of literal features of the metaphoric vehicle and
the effect of potential mediating factors (see Holyoak & Stamenković, 2018, for
the most systematic review of these issues to date). The different positions were
discussed in detail in chapter two and were broadly summarized in Table 1.1,
which is reproduced here as Table 6.1.
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The role of the literal features of the metaphoric vehicle was addressed in
chapter three. Here, the eye-tracking during reading method was used to investigate
how the processing of German verbal metaphors was modulated by preceding
exposure to a visual representation of a feature of the literal meaning of the
metaphoric verb: Participants saw either video of a ball being trapped by a box
(contained condition) or a video of a ball bouncing freely (not-contained condition).
They then read metaphoric sentences in which the vehicle was a verb of physical
containment, such as It was difficult fo the journalist to see his opinion be fenced-
in after the change in regime.
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As Table 6.1 above illustrates, the role of literal features of a metaphorically
used word is disputed: Whereas the Category Inclusion view sees literal features as
mostly irrelevant for metaphor processing (McGlone & Manfredi, 2001), the Implicit
Comparison View claims that these should be automatically activated during early
stages of processing (Gentner et al., 2001). This difference was directly reflected
in the predictions of Experiments 1 and 2: If the Category Inclusion view holds,
then seeing the “contained” video before reading the metaphorically used verb
should hinder comprehension relative to seeing the “not-contained” video first. If,
on the other hand, the Implicit Comparison view is correct, we should find that the
“contained” video facilitates comprehension relative to the “not-contained” video.
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 where somewhat inconclusive in this regard:
They showed neither a facilitation nor an interference effect of the “contained” video
on the reading times of the metaphoric verb or of any other sentence region. An
initial effect of the matching video found on the response time patterns to questions
that followed the metaphoric sentence was shown to be unrelated to metaphor
processing in Experiment 3. However, the results of Experiment 4 showed that, in
the absence of a sentential context, the same match video used in Experiments 1
and 2 was capable of modulating processing times of the de-contextualized critical
verbs: Participants in this experiment showed shorter response times in a lexical
decision task when the verbs were preceded by the “contained” compared to when
they were preceded by the “not-contained” video.
This pattern of findings suggests, with some caution, that the null-effects
found in Experiments 1 and 2 can be interpreted meaningfully: It is possible
that the literal features of the metaphorically used verbs that were primed by
the “contained” video were simply ignored during processing. This could have
been brought about by the fact that these features did not contribute to the
construction of metaphoric meaning. When viewed this way, the results could be
seen as offering tentative support for the Category Inclusion View: Literal features
need not be activated during comprehension of verbal metaphors, even if these
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features would normally facilitate processing of the same verbs when the verbs
are processed without a sentential context.
This could be understood as a consequence of the activated set of parameters
that the metaphoric topic is believed to provide during metaphor comprehension:
Since the verbal vehicle (fenced-in) was always read after the topic (The journalist’s
opinion), it might have been possible for participants to have narrowed down the
set of expected upcoming discourse by considering the topic’s semantic feature of [-
concrete] (i.e. by taking into account the fact that an opinion is an abstract entity).
Upon encountering the verb, participants did not integrate the video with the verb
because they had previously established that the video was irrelevant for comprehen-
sion, given that the semantic features activated by the video (physical containment)
were incompatible with the parameters provided by the topic ([- concrete]).
It is possible that the scope of these results is limited to verbal metaphors only,
as it has been claimed that verbal and nominal metaphors might undergo distinct
processes given their different syntactic attachment structures (Cardillo et al., 2010;
Schmidt et al., 2010). However, as discussed in chapter three, there is evidence
showing that verbal and nominal metaphors do not differ in the type of neural
substrate that they recruit during processing (Cardillo et al., 2012). Additionally,
Category Inclusion accounts have been extended in the past to account for verbal
metaphors using the same mechanisms believed to be at play during processing of
nominal metaphors (Kintsch, 2000; Torreano et al., 2005). Given these empirical
and theoretical arguments, which are additionally supported by Ockham’s razor,
the burden of proof rests on Implicit Comparison theoreticians to show that verbal
metaphors are not processed similarly to nominal metaphors.
The second test of the theories, presented in chapter four, dealt with the issue
of symmetry: Does altering the relative position of the elements of a metaphor
affect the way in which they are processed? The positions of the theories in this
regard are also shown in Table 6.1: Implicit Comparison Views see metaphors as
being symmetric, meaning that both elements play have the same function, at least
during initial stages of processing (Gentner & Wolff, 1997; Wolff & Gentner, 2011).
6. Conclusion 215
Category inclusion views, on the other hand, claim that the roles of the elements are
different from the earliest stages onward, meaning that changes in the position of
the elements should result in changes in the way in which the metaphor is processed
(D. Chiappe, Kennedy, & Smykowski, 2003; Glucksberg, 2001, pg. 55-58).
Chapter four addressed this question by examining German verb-object metaphors
with a Visual World Paradigm. As opposed to nominal metaphors, verb-object
metaphors allow for a natural reversal of the position of the metaphor’s elements
without rendering the expression infelicitous. The choice of materials was therefore
tailored to explore this particular theoretical issue. In the two Experiments of
chapter four, participants listened to verb-object metaphors (e.g. Sebastian feeds
a princess (verb-early conditions)/will a princess feed(verb-late conditions) and
will relentlessly stand by the cat(metaphoric conditions) /by the noble woman
(literal conditions)) after having read a linguistic context facilitating a literal or a
metaphoric interpretation (Experiment 5) or no context whatsoever (Experiment 6).
The sentences participants heard in both Experiments were either in the present
or future tense (verb-early vs. verb-late conditions), effectively altering the order
of presentation of the metaphoric vehicle (princess) and the verbal topic (feeds).
During listening, participants saw 4 images on display: One compatible with a
literal interpretation of the metaphoric vehicle (a princess), one compatible with a
metaphoric interpretation of the vehicle (a cat), and two distractors.
The results of chapter four support the idea that verb-object metaphors are
processed asymmetrically. In Experiment 5, after reading a metaphorically-biasing
context, participants directed their gaze preferentially towards the metaphoric
picture (the cat) relative to the literal picture (a princess) when hearing the
metaphoric vehicle (princess) after having heard the verbal topic (feeds); but they
instead preferred to inspect the literal picture relative to the metaphoric picture
when hearing the vehicle before the verbal topic. Crucially, this difference was not
found when participants read a literally-biasing context (literal context conditions,
Experiment 5), nor when they read no context at all (Experiment 6). This strongly
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suggests that the difference between viewing behavior can be attributed to differences
in the way in which a metaphoric interpretation was constructed.
The pattern of results found in chapter four was predicted and can best be
accommodated by Category Inclusion views: when understanding a metaphor,
participants will more swiftly grasp the vehicle’s metaphoric meaning if they have
previously heard the verbal topic compared to when they haven’t heard it yet.
This can be explicated using Altmann and Kamide (2007)’s linking hypothesis
regarding the interpretation of the gaze record in the Visual World Paradigm:
When hearing the metaphoric vehicle after the verbal topic (verb-early metaphoric
condition), participants determined that the metaphoric picture has the greatest
amount of conceptual overlap with the heard word. This suggests that participants
might have modulated the meaning of the metaphoric vehicle from princess to
PRINCESS*, an ad hoc category that includes all humans and animals thought
to be spoiled, needy, etc. They were able to do so because they had previously
processed the parameters needed for the construction of this ad hoc category when
they heard the verbal topic (feeds restricts its upcoming object to being an animal
or a baby, not an adult human).
When hearing the metaphoric vehicle before the topic (verb-late metaphoric
condition), participants were not able to rapidly construct the ad hoc category and
instead were likely to derive a literal interpretation of princess. Because of this,
they determined that the picture of the literal princess had the greatest conceptual
overlap with the heard metaphoric vehicle and thus preferentially looked at that
picture over the the picture of the cat.
Implicit Comparison views, by contrast, would struggle to accommodate these
results: During structural alignment, believed to be a key first stage in processing,
it would be necessary to retrieve the full structure of the metaphoric vehicle in
order to compare it to the structure of the verbal topic. This should have translated
into equal amounts of conceptual overlap between the literal picture (the princess)
and the heard vehicle (princess) regardless of the vehicle’s relative position to the
verbal topic. The account would have to be modified to incorporate these findings.
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It is hard to make the case that the results from chapter four should not
generalize to nominal metaphors. The main claim present in Schmidt et al. (2010)
against the comparability of nominal and verbal metaphors, for example, is centered
around the processing of the metaphoric vehicle. The authors argue that when
a verb is the vehicle, the verb’s concrete and sensory features are lost and the
verb is abstracted. In a nominal metaphor, on the other hand, they claim that
these features are not lost and a process of comparison takes place between topic
and vehicle. In verb-object metaphors we do not have a verb as the vehicle, but
a noun. Following Schmidt et al. (2010) then, we could in principle assume that
the construction of metaphoric meaning occurs similarly for verb-object metaphors
as it does for “X is a Y” nominal metaphors. Again, the burden of proof rests on
accounts claiming that nominal and verb-object metaphors are processed differently.
Finally, chapter five investigated a third unresolved issue in this debate: The role
of potential mediating factors during processing. Specifically, the role of aptness,
conventionality and familiarity. Table 6.1 shows the predictions of each set of views in
this regard: Indirect comparison views claim that a metaphor can only change from
being processed through analogy toward being processed through category inclusion
as a function of the vehicle’s frequency of association with its metaphoric meaning
(Bowdle & Gentner, 2005), which is known as conventionality, or, alternatively,
as a function of the frequency of exposure to a metaphoric expression as a whole
(Thibodeau & Durgin, 2011), which is known as familiarity. Category inclusion
views, on the other hand, believe that any change in processing mode should be a
consequence of the way in which the salient features of the vehicle interact with
contextually relevant properties of the topic, independently of the frequency of
exposure, which is defined as aptness (Glucksberg, 2008; Jones & Estes, 2006).
The investigation in this chapter was exploratory in nature: I collected ratings
on all three dimensions (familiarity, aptness and conventionality) for the items used
in Experiments 2 and 5. I then re-fitted the statistical models used to analyze
the data in those experiments including the newly collected ratings as covariates.
The new models, which independently fitted each one of the different ratings, were
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compared both to a base model and to each other. The results suggest that for both
verbal metaphors and verb-object metaphors aptness provided the best fit to the
data and was the only factor to show a significant effect on total reading times of
the metaphoric vehicle (Experiment 10) and on log-gaze ratios in the time window
immediately following the second element of the metaphor (Experiment 14).
Importantly, aptness modulated processing in a way consistent with Category
Inclusion views: For the verbal metaphors, more apt metaphors were read faster
than less apt ones, localized to the total reading times of the verb itself. For
the verb-object metaphors, participants inspected the target metaphoric picture
more so for high-apt metaphors than for low-apt metaphors in the time window
immediately following the presentation of both metaphoric elements. Both of these
findings suggest that aptness - and not conventionality or familiarity - effectively
modulated processing so that more apt metaphors were understood faster and
more swiftly than less apt metaphors. However, it is important to note that these
results are only exploratory and should in future be supported by a confirmatory
analysis of newly collected data.
To summarize, the evidence coming from all three empirical chapters appears
to be more in line with category inclusion views than with indirect comparison
views: Chapter three presents the strongest evidence in this regard, directly showing
support for this view’s explicit prediction. Chapter two failed to support the strong
prediction made by Category inclusion views regarding the role of literal features
(see Table 6.1), but it could be seen as supporting a weaker version, in which literal
features do not interfere with processing but are instead ignored. Chapter five
presents the weakest evidence in this regard, since it consisted of an exploratory
analysis, but its results are nevertheless consistent only with Category Inclusion
views and not with Implicit Comparison views.
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6.2 Specifying and Generalizing the Category In-
clusion View
Besides providing support for Category Inclusion views, the current dissertation
also lays out a road map for further specifications of theoretical accounts of
metaphor processing. The main way in which theories of metaphors can be specified
based on the outcome of this dissertation concerns the time course of metaphor
processing and the point at which effects of aptness on metaphor comprehension
should be observable.
In this regard, Experiments 10 and 14 are highly informative: In both cases,
an effect of aptness was found in later measures of metaphoric comprehension
only: Aptness modulated total reading times of the verb region in Experiment
10 as well as log-gaze ratios in the time region immediately following the second
element of the metaphoric expression in Experiment 14. This apparent consistency
in timing across paradigms and metaphor types suggests the working hypothesis
that a metaphor’s aptness comes into play during later processing stages. From a
Category Inclusion perspective, this could mean restricting the effect of aptness to
the later stages of lexical modulation, that is, only after the relevant parameters
for modulation have been set.
The results of Experiment 5 suggest a further way in which Category Inclusion
views comes can be refined: When hearing the vehicle in the late-verb metaphoric
condition, participants preferred to examine the literal picture suggesting that they
might be deriving a literal interpretation of the word princess up to this point.
However, once they had heard the verbal topic, participants quickly settled on a
metaphoric interpretation, as evidenced by the way in which they preferentially
inspected the metaphoric picture in every time window that followed the verbal
topic (similarly to the way it was done in the early-verb metaphoric condition) as
well as by the accuracy in selecting the metaphoric picture at the end of the trial,
which did not differ from the early-verb metaphoric condition. This means that
category inclusion theories cannot limit themselves to describing the way in which
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processing occurs when the vehicle follows the topic. They must also account for
the way in which processing unfolds when the position of the elements is reversed.
Finally, as shown in chapter three, pre-activating literal features of a metaphor
does not have to result in interference with the metaphor comprehension process
itself, contrary to what has been predicted by category inclusion models. This means
that there is room for theoretical improvement in order to incorporate these results.
A refined version of the Category Inclusion model could work as follows: When
language comprehenders first encounter the metaphoric topic, they constrain their
expectations regarding upcoming information together with the contextually-derived
mental representations that they have developed up to this point.
When they then encounter the metaphoric vehicle, they evaluate the way in
which this incoming linguistic information could be integrated with their built-up
representations and determine that, given the parameters previously established,
they should modulate the meaning of the vehicle in order to construct an ad hoc
category. When doing so, language comprehenders can ignore semantic information
that is part of the encoded meaning of the metaphoric vehicle but incompatible with
the metaphoric interpretation (perhaps up to a particular threshold of salience). Only
at this point do they consider the metaphor’s aptness, i.e. the degree to which the
most salient features of the vehicle can capture relevant properties of the contextually
situated metaphoric topic: Metaphors with a higher degree of aptness will go through
this stage more quickly than metaphors with a lower degree of aptness.
When language comprehenders first encounter the metaphoric vehicle, they will
initially fail to find a way to integrate the word with the previous context. This will
result in first deriving a literal interpretation of the vehicle. Once the metaphoric
topic is encountered, however, this initial interpretation is revised. This happens
because the topic, together with the relevant context, provide narrow-enough
parameters at this point in time to revise the initial interpretation of the vehicle
and construct the appropriate ad hoc category. This last stage is again sensitive to
aptness: The more apt a metaphor is, the faster the final construction of meaning.
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This preliminary hypothesis, which could be called the Generalized Category
Inclusion View, could be applicable to other types of metaphors, such as nominal
or adjectival metaphors. Testing these predictions should be the goal of future
investigations in this matter.
6.3 The Role of Context During Metaphor Pro-
cessing
Historically, metaphor research has been focused on testing theories on de-contextualized
nominal metaphors. One notable early exception is the work by Gildea and
Glucksberg (1983), which followed up on previous research on the automaticity of
metaphor processing (Glucksberg et al., 1982). In Glucksberg et al. (1982), the
authors had participants give true/false judgments on de-contextualized nominal
metaphors (some jobs are jails), and literally false (some jobs are birds) statements.
They found that participants had a harder time stating that metaphors are false
compared to the literally false statements, which they dubbed the metaphor
interference effect. The authors reasoned that, even though literally false, sentences
such as some jobs are jails were automatically understood as meaningful metaphors,
so that it took participants additional effort to recognize that these were indeed
literally false. They noticed, however, that when metaphors seemed to be particularly
“bad”, no metaphor interference effect was elicited. Would a facilitating context
be able to induce such an effect? What would such a context look like? These
were the questions asked by Gildea and Glucksberg (1983).
In three experiments, Gildea and Glucksberg (1983) showed participants low-apt
metaphors (a marriage is an icebox) preceded either by a literal context (winters
are cold), a metaphoric context (people are cold), a literal context that primed
the general semantic domain (summers are warm) or no context at all. They
found that without a context, these low-apt metaphors did not elicit a metaphor
interference effect. However, in all three of the context conditions, the metaphors
elicited an interference effect similar to the one observed for de-contextualized
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high-apt metaphors in Glucksberg et al. (1982). The authors conclude that even
an incompatible linguistic context (summers are warm) can facilitate metaphor
comprehension by simply highlighting the relevant parameters needed for the
meaning of the metaphoric vehicle to be modulated.
Similarly, the experiments in chapter four of the present dissertation highlight
the dramatic way in which context provides the parameters necessary for the
construction of metaphoric meaning. In Experiment 6, participants preferentially
understood de-contextualized verb-object utterances in a literal way: When hearing
the object of the verb (Prinzessin), they preferentially inspected the picture of the
literal princess over the metaphoric picture regardless of the object’s position in
the sentence, and they more often selected the literal image as the appropriate
referent at the end of the trial. By contrast, in the presence of a linguistic context
(Experiment 5), the object can be easily understood as a metaphoric vehicle, to the
point where participants preferentially inspected the metaphoric picture over the
literal picture for the duration of the entire time window (Experiment 5, vehicle
region, verb-early metaphoric condition).
This stark difference in gaze patterns between Experiments 5 and 6 can be
understood as following the same general principles put forth by Gildea and
Glucksberg (1983): When a metaphorical vehicle is not given enough constraining
parameters for its meaning to be modulated, language users will probably fail
to do so and instead fall back on a conventional literal interpretation. When
provided with an appropriate context, the set of parameters needed for modulation
is sharpened by making the dimension more salient, effectively turning a low-apt
metaphor into a high-apt metaphor.
It’s important to note that there is no need to postulate a metaphor-specific
mechanism regarding the way in which context facilitates comprehension: Instead,
The way in which a linguistic context facilitates metaphoric meaning comprehen-
sion can be seen to be similar to the way in which context modulates language
comprehension in other types of tasks. Linguistic contexts have been shown to
rapidly override default syntactic preferences (Altmann et al., 1998), generate
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expectations about specific upcoming nouns (e.g. Van Berkum et al., 2005),
modulate sense selection during word recognition (Sereno et al., 2003), as well
as ease processing and recognition of other instances of figurative language such as
irony (Rodriguez Ronderos, Noveck, et al., 2020), among many other things.
The results of Experiments 1 and 2, on the other hand, show the limitations of
the way in which context (in this case visual) interacts with metaphor processing.
Though both rivaling theories would predict that priming literal features should
have an effect on metaphor processing (facilitation effect, in the case of Implicit
Comparison views, and interference effect, in the case of category inclusion views),
the results of Experiments 1 and 2 showed a null-effect of the visual context on
processing the metaphoric sentence. This is somewhat puzzling, considering how
the same videos facilitated responses to the verbs present in the sentences in
a lexical decision task (Experiment 4) and how effects of the visual context on
subsequent sentence reading have been found on multiple occasions in the past
(e.g. Guerra & Knoeferle, 2014; Guerra & Knoeferle, 2017; Guerra & Knoeferle,
2018). Experiment 2, in particular, was sufficiently powered to detect any such
subtle effects of the visual context.
Two possible explanations for these null-effects come to mind. The first one
is the one given earlier in this chapter and in the interim conclusion of chapter
three: Participants could have ignored the information derived from the visual
prime in Experiments 1 and 2 because it was unnecessary for the construction of
metaphoric meaning. In Experiment 4, this information elicited a priming effect
because no metaphoric meaning was constructed.
The second possible explanation relates to the differences in the set-up of
Experiments 1, 2 and 4. In Experiment 4 (where effects of the visual context were
found on the processing of the isolated verb), participants saw only two critical
items: One in the match and one in the mismatch condition. In Experiments 1
and 2, participants saw the full set of 36 items, with half of them preceded by the
matching and the other half by the mismatching video prime. It is possible then,
than participants in Experiments 1 and 2 became desensitized to the information
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provided by the visual primes because of repeated exposure (the visual primes
were the same for all critical items), thus masking a possible, underlying true
effect (be it of interference or facilitation).
This second interpretation, though compatible with the pattern of results, seems
less likely if we consider that the Experiments in Guerra and Knoeferle (2014) and
Guerra and Knoeferle (2018), for example, also used the same visual primes for all
items and were nevertheless able to detect both facilitation and interference effects.
However, deciding between these two interpretations of the results is ultimately
an empirical question that requires further follow-up studies.
6.4 Beyond Metaphors: Interaction of the Lin-
guistic Context and a Verb’s Semantic Fea-
tures
Another important finding of this dissertation pertains to the way in which
information derived from a linguistic context interacts with the information as-
sumed to be part of the semantics of a verb, independently of the presence of
a metaphoric expression.
Previous studies have shown that in the absence of a context, participants use
the information obtained from a verb’s selectional restrictions to anticipate an
upcoming referent (e.g. Altmann & Kamide, 1999; Hintz et al., 2017). Furthermore,
when a verb (ride) on its own does not provide enough restrictions to select between
two possible visual referents (a motorcycle and a carousel), participants incorporate
information about the verb’s stated agent (a man or a girl) in order to anticipate the
likely object upon hearing the verb (Kamide et al., 2003). But what happens when
the contextual information and the verb’s selectional restrictions point towards
different possible upcoming verbal objects?
This was investigated in Experiment 5, where participants read a context biasing
towards a literal interpretation of an upcoming spoken utterance (in the literal
context bias conditions). The spoken utterance contained a verb (füttern, “feeds”)
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whose selectional restrictions (füttern can only take an animal or a baby as its object)
were more compatible with the metaphoric picture (a cat) than with the literal
picture (a princess), even though the literal picture was the most compatible with
the contextually-derived representation (The linguistic context is about Sebastian
having a noble woman as a friend). When participants heard the verb, they did
not anticipate any upcoming object in particular, judging by the way in which the
log-gaze ratio of looks to the metaphoric divided by looks to the literal pictured
hovered around zero for the entirety of the region. Participants were uncertain
about which object to anticipate: The one most related to the context (the princess)
or the one most related to the verb (the cat).
In the metaphoric early-verb conditions of Experiment 5, participants did not
display this hesitation when hearing the verb: In this case, they were able to
anticipate the object that was both compatible with context and compatible with
the verb’s selectional restrictions (i.e. the cat). This unequivocal anticipation of
the upcoming object is what eventually lead participants to process the metaphoric
vehicle with more ease: Hearing the verb before the vehicle in the metaphoric con-
ditions resulted in participants preferentially directing their gaze to the metaphoric
picture when hearing the metaphoric vehicle.
It is interesting to compare these results with those of Experiment 6: Here, in the
absence of a linguistic context, participants could only rely on the verb’s selectional
restrictions to anticipate the upcoming object. However, this anticipation effect was
only visible in the second half of the verb region, as well as in the comparison between
looks to the metaphoric picture and looks to either one of the distractor pictures.
As a whole, these results can be interpreted as meaning that a verb’s selectional
preferences on their own can facilitate anticipation, but only after some time has
passed, i.e. when processing of the verb is already on its way. When the verb’s
selectional restrictions are coupled with a supporting linguistic context (as was the
case of Experiment 5, in the early-verb metaphoric condition), anticipation of the
object happened sooner and had an overall larger effect.
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This suggests that post-verbal object anticipation effects in the Visual World
Paradigm are the result of a complex parallel integration of all of the information
leading up to the verb: The richer the mental representation up to the onset
of the verb, the easier it will be to anticipate a referent. When only a verb’s
selectional restrictions are available, anticipation occurs but in a somewhat delayed
fashion (Verb region, Experiment 6) compared to when a linguistic context supports
the verb’s selectional restrictions (Verb region, early-verb metaphoric condition,
Experiment 5). When different sources of information collide (such as context and
a verb’s selectional preferences) anticipation might not be possible at all (Verb
region, early-verb literal condition, Experiment 5).
This interpretation is broadly compatible with the view stated by Metusalem
et al. (2012), who tested the influence of salient event representations on the
anticipation of semantically incompatible words. In an EEG study, they had
participants read a discourse (e.g. about a blizzard and kids playing in the snow)
followed by a sentence (the kids built a. . . ) that ended in a word compatible with
the verb’s selectional restrictions (snowman) or an incompatible one (towel or
jacket). They measured event-related brain potentials time-locked to the onset
of the last word. They observed that, when the semantically inappropriate word
was overall compatible with the event structure provided in the previous written
discourse (jacket), it elicited an N400 effect larger than the one elicited by the
expected word (snowman) but smaller compared to a word that was incompatible
with both the written discourse and the verb’s selectional restrictions (towel). The
authors interpreted this finding as suggesting that the written discourse triggered
the construction of an event representation that was capable of accommodating
the processing of a word despite the word being semantically inappropriate. This
interpretation can be extended to the findings of chapter four of this dissertation:
The event representation built up to the point of hearing the verb füttert in the
early-verb literal condition leads to increased activation of the event-related object
(the princess) in parallel to the activation of the object compatible with the verb’s
lexical semantics (the cat). This simultaneous activation leads participants to
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distribute their visual attention to both objects similarly throughout the region
and prevents them from anticipating one object over the other. This results in
them having to wait until more linguistic information is available before they can
settle on a single object as the preferred referent.
This “wait-and-see” strategy (displayed by participants during the verb region in
the early-verb literal condition of Experiment 5) can be accounted for by appealing
to the architecture of predictive pre-activation during language processing posited by
Kuperberg and Jaeger (2016). Kuperberg and Jaeger (2016) suggest that language
comprehenders trade off the benefits and costs of predicting upcoming language by
rationally allocating their available metabolic and cognitive resources. The authors
formalize rationality in terms of a utility function that weighs the advantages and
disadvantages of anticipating information during comprehension. One way in which
comprehenders do this, according to Kuperberg and Jaeger (2016), is by estimating
the reliability of prior knowledge and using this estimate to calibrate the degree to
which they should update their beliefs. In other words, comprehenders assess the
level of prediction error before anticipating upcoming input. In the specific case
of Experiment 5 of this dissertation, this could mean that participants determined
that the input (during the verb region in the early-verb literal condition) had low
reliability for anticipation purposes: The verb’s semantic information was at odds
with the previously read linguistic context. Participants thus maximized their utility
by not anticipating any representation and instead waiting until more information
became available in order to update their beliefs.
6.5 Quo Vadis, Metaphor Research?
With the end of this dissertation in sight, it’s important to reflect on the impact
that this work might have on future research on metaphor processing.
First and foremost, the present work has shown the need to go beyond the horizon
of English nominal metaphors so that the field can begin to solve longstanding the-
oretical debates. Only by doing this can we start to get a grasp on the phenomenon
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as a whole. This work is already underway: Bambini et al. (2019), for example,
provided preliminary evidence on the processing of Italian literary metaphors, and
Coulson et al. (2015) investigated the processing of English adjectival metaphors.
In the future, the field would benefit from intensifying efforts in this direction.
Secondly, the Experiments presented in this work appear to support Category
Inclusion views more than Implicit Comparison views. Given the interest of the
field in resolving this debate, it would be necessary to determine how generalizable
these results are by attempting to replicate them and to determine the precise
conditions under which they are valid. This is particularly the case for the results
of chapter three, in which the interpretation is based on a null result, and chapter
five, in which the main analyses were exploratory in nature.
Besides trying to replicate the results, future research should also focus on devel-
oping computational psychological models of metaphor comprehension. Formalizing
verbal theories, as has been argued by Gervais (2020), Guest and Martin (2020),
and van Rooij and Baggio (2020), among others, allows researchers to be certain
of the full set of assumptions and commitments that any stated theory has. This
can in turn lead to future ways of testing between theories and refining our beliefs
concerning the cognitive mechanisms involved in metaphor comprehension.
Finally, different kinds of tests of the theories are necessary in order to definitively
be able to choose one theory over the other. One possible avenue of exploration, for
example, could be to take a contrastive look at the processing of metaphors and other
types of phenomena believed to occur via indirect comparison (such as analogies),
and phenomena believed to occur via the construction of ad hoc categories (such as
hyperboles). This could lead to uncovering similarities and differences between these
processes that would allow for a refinement of a Generalized Category Inclusion
View. Following this path will bring us to a deeper understanding of the way in
which metaphors are understood and how the construction of metaphoric meaning
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A.2 Critical Items for Experiment 4
Table A.2: critical items of Experiment 4





















B.1 Critical Contexts for Experiment 5







1 “Sarah und ihre Arbeitskollegen betreten das Büro. Ein
unkontrollierter Angestellter ist sehr laut, und droht ohne Grund
einen Azubi zu feuern. Sarah wird sich dem Angestellten in den Weg
stellen, weil er den Azubi sonst zugrunde richten wird. Für ihr
Handeln wird sie danach bejubelt werden.”
“met.”
1 “Sarah und ihre Arbeitskollegen betreten die Straße. Ein
unkontrolliertes Raupenfahrzeug ist laut und droht ohne Grund eine
Schule zu rammen. Sarah wird sich dem Raupenfahrzeug in den Weg
stellen, weil es die Schule sonst zugrunde richten wird. Für ihr
Handeln wird sie danach bejubelt werden.”
“literal”
1 “Sarah und ihre Arbeitskollegen betreten das Büro. Ein
unkontrollierter Angestellter ist sehr laut, und droht ohne Grund
einen Azubi zu feuern. Sarah wird sich dem Angestellten in den Weg
stellen, weil er den Azubi sonst zugrunde richten wird. Für ihr
Handeln wird sie danach bejubelt werden.”
“met.”
1 “Sarah und ihre Arbeitskollegen betreten die Straße. Ein
unkontrolliertes Raupenfahrzeug ist laut und droht ohne Grund eine
Schule zu rammen. Sarah wird sich dem Raupenfahrzeug in den Weg
stellen, weil es die Schule sonst zugrunde richten wird. Für ihr
Handeln wird sie danach bejubelt werden.”
“literal”
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2 “Michael geht mit seinen Freunden in die Berge. Dort sieht er eine
schlafende, mythische Feuerechse, die den Ruf hat, böse zu sein und
Kinder zu fressen. Er versucht leise zu sein, aber sein Handy klingelt
und seine Freunde schreien. Das wird sich als Fehler erweisen.”
“literal”
2 “Michael geht mit seinen Freunden in die Bibliothek. Dort sieht er
eine schlafende Bibliothekarin, die den Ruf hat, sehr böse zu sein
und Kinder zu hassen. Er versucht leise zu sein, aber sein Handy
klingelt und seine Freunde lachen. Das wird sich als Fehler erweisen.”
“met.”
2 “Michael geht mit seinen Freunden in die Berge. Dort sieht er eine
schlafende, mythische Feuerechse, die den Ruf hat, böse zu sein und
Kinder zu fressen. Er versucht leise zu sein, aber sein Handy klingelt
und seine Freunde schreien. Das wird sich als Fehler erweisen.”
“literal”
2 “Michael geht mit seinen Freunden in die Bibliothek. Dort sieht er
eine schlafende Bibliothekarin, die den Ruf hat, sehr böse zu sein
und Kinder zu hassen. Er versucht leise zu sein, aber sein Handy
klingelt und seine Freunde lachen. Das wird sich als Fehler erweisen.”
“met.”
3 “Thomas besucht seine Familie und begegnet dabei seiner gefühllosen,
kalten Oma. Sie hat Schwierigkeiten, Liebe zu verstehen. Er wird
mit ihr reden und Gefühle zeigen. Er hofft, sie zu erwärmen, aber es
wird nicht funktionieren.”
“met.”
3 “Thomas besucht ein technisches Museum und begegnet einer
intelligenten Maschine. Sie hat Schwierigkeiten, Liebe zu verstehen.
Er wird mit ihr reden und Gefühle zeigen. Er hofft, sie zu erwärmen,
aber es wird nicht funktionieren.”
“literal”
3 “Thomas besucht seine Familie und begegnet dabei seiner gefühllosen,
kalten Oma. Sie hat Schwierigkeiten, Liebe zu verstehen. Er wird
mit ihr reden und Gefühle zeigen. Er hofft, sie zu erwärmen, aber es
wird nicht funktionieren.”
“met.”
3 “Thomas besucht ein technisches Museum und begegnet einer
intelligenten Maschine. Sie hat Schwierigkeiten, Liebe zu verstehen.
Er wird mit ihr reden und Gefühle zeigen. Er hofft, sie zu erwärmen,
aber es wird nicht funktionieren.”
“literal”
4 “Karin wird demnächst eine Pflegeeinrichtung leiten. Obwohl sie sehr
optimistisch ist, weiß sie, dass die Senioren deprimiert sind und die
Bezahlung sehr schlecht ist. Sie sind auch noch ziemlich trostlos und
alt. Sie freut sich aber trotzdem auf die Arbeit.”
“literal”
4 “Karin wird demnächst eine Fußballmannschaft leiten. Obwohl sie
sehr optimistisch ist, weiß sie, dass die Fußballspieler unmotiviert
sind und deren Leistung schlecht ist. Sie sind auch noch sehr träge
und langsam. Sie freut sich aber trotzdem auf die Arbeit.”
“met.”







4 “Karin wird demnächst eine Pflegeeinrichtung leiten. Obwohl sie sehr
optimistisch ist, weiß sie, dass die Senioren deprimiert sind und die
Bezahlung sehr schlecht ist. Sie sind auch noch ziemlich trostlos und
alt. Sie freut sich aber trotzdem auf die Arbeit.”
“literal”
4 “Karin wird demnächst eine Fußballmannschaft leiten. Obwohl sie
sehr optimistisch ist, weiß sie, dass die Fußballspieler unmotiviert
sind und deren Leistung schlecht ist. Sie sind auch noch sehr träge
und langsam. Sie freut sich aber trotzdem auf die Arbeit.”
“met.”
5 “Andreas arbeitet in der Steuerbehörde und besucht beruflich ein
Flüchtlingslager. Er kommt pünktlich an, und spricht über Finanzen
mit einer Nonne, welche die Rechte der Flüchtlinge Namibias
verteidigt. Er will der frommen Frau helfen, weil sie den ganzen Tag
arbeitet und die Freude dabei nicht verliert. Er wird sich intensiv
damit auseinandersetzen.”
“met.”
5 “Andreas arbeitet in der Steuerbehörde und besucht privat ein
Kunstmuseum. Er ist betrunken, und spricht aus Versehen über
Finanzen mit einem Gemälde, welches die Verkündung der Geburt
Jesu darstellt. Er will dem Götterboten helfen, weil er die frohe
Botschaft verkündet und die Ruhe dabei nicht verliert. Er wird sich
intensiv damit auseinandersetzen.”
“literal”
5 “Andreas arbeitet in der Steuerbehörde und besucht beruflich ein
Flüchtlingslager. Er kommt pünktlich an, und spricht über Finanzen
mit einer Nonne, welche die Rechte der Flüchtlinge Namibias
verteidigt. Er will der frommen Frau helfen, weil sie den ganzen Tag
arbeitet und die Freude dabei nicht verliert. Er wird sich intensiv
damit auseinandersetzen.”
“met.”
5 “Andreas arbeitet in der Steuerbehörde und besucht privat ein
Kunstmuseum. Er ist betrunken, und spricht aus Versehen über
Finanzen mit einem Gemälde, welches die Verkündung der Geburt
Jesu darstellt. Er will dem Götterboten helfen, weil er die frohe
Botschaft verkündet und die Ruhe dabei nicht verliert. Er wird sich
intensiv damit auseinandersetzen.”
“literal”
6 “Stefan ist Journalist und fährt nach Afrika, um das Thema
Tierquälerei zu recherchieren. Als er da ist, findet er in der Wüste
ein ungewöhnliches Raubtier, das stark misshandelt und sogar
angeschossen wurde. Stefan kommt ihm näher und wird das traurige
Stöhnen des Tieres auf Tonband aufnehmen. Diese Begegnung wird
ihm lange im Gedächtnis bleiben.”
“literal”







6 “Stefan ist Journalist und fährt nach Frankfurt, um das Thema
Steuerbetrug zu recherchieren. Als er da ist, findet er in der Bank
einen amoralischen Makler, der den Staat betrügt und sogar
Geldwäscherei betreibt. Stefan kommt ihm näher und wird das
Angeben des Kapitalisten auf Tonband aufnehmen. Diese Begegnung
wird ihm lange im Gedächtnis bleiben.”
“met.”
6 “Stefan ist Journalist und fährt nach Afrika, um das Thema
Tierquälerei zu recherchieren. Als er da ist, findet er in der Wüste
ein ungewöhnliches Raubtier, das stark misshandelt und sogar
angeschossen wurde. Stefan kommt ihm näher und wird das traurige
Stöhnen des Tieres auf Tonband aufnehmen. Diese Begegnung wird
ihm lange im Gedächtnis bleiben.”
“literal”
6 “Stefan ist Journalist und fährt nach Frankfurt, um das Thema
Steuerbetrug zu recherchieren. Als er da ist, findet er in der Bank
einen amoralischen Makler, der den Staat betrügt und sogar
Geldwäscherei betreibt. Stefan kommt ihm näher und wird das
Angeben des Kapitalisten auf Tonband aufnehmen. Diese Begegnung
wird ihm lange im Gedächtnis bleiben.”
“met.”
7 “Susanne geht zum ersten Mal in den Reichstag. Es gibt einen
Empfang mit dem einzigen noch lebenden Politiker aus der
vorletzten Republik. Sie wird in den großen Raum hineingehen und
dem sehr alten Mann die Hand reichen. Danach wird sie lange von
diesem Moment schwärmen.”
“met.”
7 “Susanne geht zum ersten Mal ins Naturkunde Museum. Es gibt
einen Raum mit dem einzigen noch erhaltenen Riesenskelett aus der
kleinen Eiszeit. Sie wird in den großen Raum hineingehen und dem
alten Skelett Respekt zollen. Danach wird sie lange von diesem
Moment schwärmen.”
“literal”
7 “Susanne geht zum ersten Mal in den Reichstag. Es gibt einen
Empfang mit dem einzigen noch lebenden Politiker aus der
vorletzten Republik. Sie wird in den großen Raum hineingehen und
dem sehr alten Mann die Hand reichen. Danach wird sie lange von
diesem Moment schwärmen.”
“met.”
7 “Susanne geht zum ersten Mal ins Naturkunde Museum. Es gibt
einen Raum mit dem einzigen noch erhaltenen Riesenskelett aus der
kleinen Eiszeit. Sie wird in den großen Raum hineingehen und dem
alten Skelett Respekt zollen. Danach wird sie lange von diesem
Moment schwärmen.”
“literal”
8 “Martin und seine Freundin haben zusammen eine Villa gekauft. Sie
waren überglücklich, bis sie einen heftigen Erdrutsch erlebten.
Martin durchsucht die Villa auf Schäden. Er wird danach traurige
Klarheit haben.”
“literal”







8 “Martin und seine Freundin haben sich vor kurzem verlobt. Sie
waren überglücklich, bis sie einen heftigen Streit hatten. Martin
durchdenkt die Auseinandersetzung genauer. Er wird danach
traurige Klarheit haben.”
“met.”
8 “Martin und seine Freundin haben zusammen eine Villa gekauft. Sie
waren überglücklich, bis sie einen heftigen Erdrutsch erlebten.
Martin durchsucht die Villa auf Schäden. Er wird danach traurige
Klarheit haben.”
“literal”
8 “Martin und seine Freundin haben sich vor kurzem verlobt. Sie
waren überglücklich, bis sie einen heftigen Streit hatten. Martin
durchdenkt die Auseinandersetzung genauer. Er wird danach
traurige Klarheit haben.”
“met.”
9 “Nicole ist Kriminalbeamtin und muss eines Tages in den Slum
fahren, weil es ein Gemetzel gibt. Leider kommt es zu einem heftigen
Streit zwischen Schlägern aus unterschiedlichen Familien, und ein
großer, aggressiver Raufbold wirkt dabei besonders gefährlich. Für
Nicole wird es schwierig sein, die Situation unter Kontrolle zu
bringen.”
“met.”
9 “Nicole ist Tierschützerin und muss eines Tages in den Urwald
fahren, weil es ein Gemetzel gibt. Leider kommt es zu einem heftigen
Streit zwischen Primaten aus unterschiedlichen Gruppen, und ein
großes, aggressives Männchen wirkt dabei besonders beängstigend.
Für Nicole wird es schwierig sein, die Situation unter Kontrolle zu
bringen.”
“literal”
9 “Nicole ist Kriminalbeamtin und muss eines Tages in den Slum
fahren, weil es ein Gemetzel gibt. Leider kommt es zu einem heftigen
Streit zwischen Schlägern aus unterschiedlichen Familien, und ein
großer, aggressiver Raufbold wirkt dabei besonders gefährlich. Für
Nicole wird es schwierig sein, die Situation unter Kontrolle zu
bringen.”
“met.”
9 “Nicole ist Tierschützerin und muss eines Tages in den Urwald
fahren, weil es ein Gemetzel gibt. Leider kommt es zu einem heftigen
Streit zwischen Primaten aus unterschiedlichen Gruppen, und ein
großes, aggressives Männchen wirkt dabei besonders beängstigend.
Für Nicole wird es schwierig sein, die Situation unter Kontrolle zu
bringen.”
“literal”
10 “Eva ist Anwältin und arbeitet bei einem kleinen Tierschutzverein.
Neulich kam es vor, dass ein aggressiver Raubfisch versuchte, einen
Tierpfleger in einem Gewässer zu beißen. Eva wird dem Raubfisch
beistehen, obwohl der Tierpfleger schwer verletzt ist. Dabei wird sie
ein schlechtes Gefühl haben.”
“literal”







10 “Eva ist Anwältin und arbeitet bei einem großen
Immobilienverwalter. Neulich kam es vor, dass ein aggressiver
Hausbesitzer versuchte, eine arme Familie aus einer Wohnung zu
vertreiben. Eva wird dem Hausbesitzer beistehen, obwohl die Familie
in Not ist. Dabei wird sie ein schlechtes Gefühl haben.”
“met.”
10 “Eva ist Anwältin und arbeitet bei einem kleinen Tierschutzverein.
Neulich kam es vor, dass ein aggressiver Raubfisch versuchte, einen
Tierpfleger in einem Gewässer zu beißen. Eva wird dem Raubfisch
beistehen, obwohl der Tierpfleger schwer verletzt ist. Dabei wird sie
ein schlechtes Gefühl haben.”
“literal”
10 “Eva ist Anwältin und arbeitet bei einem großen
Immobilienverwalter. Neulich kam es vor, dass ein aggressiver
Hausbesitzer versuchte, eine arme Familie aus einer Wohnung zu
vertreiben. Eva wird dem Hausbesitzer beistehen, obwohl die Familie
in Not ist. Dabei wird sie ein schlechtes Gefühl haben.”
“met.”
11 “Tobias ist im Urlaub auf einer kleinen Insel im Pazifik. Auf dem
Weg zum Flughafen bleibt er lange im Stau stehen, weil eine alte
Greisin weit vor ihm unglaublich langsam über die Straße läuft.
Wenn er sie sehen wird, wird er sie durch das Fenster anschreien. Er
hat Angst, ihretwegen den Flug zu verpassen.”
“met.”
11 “Tobias ist im Urlaub auf einer kleinen Insel im Pazifik. Auf dem
Weg zum Flughafen bleibt er lange im Stau stehen, weil ein großes
Reptil weit vor ihm unglaublich langsam über die Straße läuft. Wenn
er es sehen wird, wird er es durch das Fenster anschreien. Er hat
Angst, seinetwegen den Flug zu verpassen.”
“literal”
11 “Tobias ist im Urlaub auf einer kleinen Insel im Pazifik. Auf dem
Weg zum Flughafen bleibt er lange im Stau stehen, weil eine alte
Greisin weit vor ihm unglaublich langsam über die Straße läuft.
Wenn er sie sehen wird, wird er sie durch das Fenster anschreien. Er
hat Angst, ihretwegen den Flug zu verpassen.”
“met.”
11 “Tobias ist im Urlaub auf einer kleinen Insel im Pazifik. Auf dem
Weg zum Flughafen bleibt er lange im Stau stehen, weil ein großes
Reptil weit vor ihm unglaublich langsam über die Straße läuft. Wenn
er es sehen wird, wird er es durch das Fenster anschreien. Er hat
Angst, seinetwegen den Flug zu verpassen.”
“literal”
12 “Astrid geht zu einer Pazifikinsel mit ihrer Familie. Dort sieht sie
einen Berg, aus dem unaufhörlich und laut Gas und sehr viel Lava
ausgestoßen werden. Ihre Familie will den Berg bezwingen, Astrid
möchte aber nicht und wird des Spaßes halber dem Berg sagen, dass
sie nachher noch viel arbeiten muss. Sie wird froh sein, die Situation
vermieden zu haben.”
“literal”







12 “Astrid geht zu einer Konferenz mit ihren Freunden. Dort trifft sie
einen Kollegen, der leidenschaftlich und laut argumentiert und
schnell gereizt wird. Ihre Freunde wollen mit dem Kollegen essen
gehen, Astrid möchte aber nicht und wird zu dem Kollegen sagen,
dass sie nachher noch viel arbeiten muss. Sie wird froh sein, die
Situation vermieden zu haben.”
“met.”
12 “Astrid geht zu einer Pazifikinsel mit ihrer Familie. Dort sieht sie
einen Berg, aus dem unaufhörlich und laut Gas und sehr viel Lava
ausgestoßen werden. Ihre Familie will den Berg bezwingen, Astrid
möchte aber nicht und wird des Spaßes halber dem Berg sagen, dass
sie nachher noch viel arbeiten muss. Sie wird froh sein, die Situation
vermieden zu haben.”
“literal”
12 “Astrid geht zu einer Konferenz mit ihren Freunden. Dort trifft sie
einen Kollegen, der leidenschaftlich und laut argumentiert und
schnell gereizt wird. Ihre Freunde wollen mit dem Kollegen essen
gehen, Astrid möchte aber nicht und wird zu dem Kollegen sagen,
dass sie nachher noch viel arbeiten muss. Sie wird froh sein, die
Situation vermieden zu haben.”
“met.”
13 “Maria und ihr Freund gehen zusammen zum Psychologen. Sie hat
nämlich das Gefühl, sein wahres Ich nicht wirklich zu kennen, da er
sich immer an den anderen anpasst und seine Meinung ständig
ändert. Auch wenn er so mysteriös wirkt, kann sie nicht ohne ihren
Partner leben. Allein bei seiner Nähe lächelt sie entspannt.”
“met.”
13 “Maria und ihr Freund gehen zusammen zum Zoo. Sie hat nämlich
das Glück, eine Ausstellung gratis zu besuchen, da sie sich früher um
die Tiere gekümmert hat und die Reptilien gut kennt. Auch wenn es
so scheu ist, kann sie nicht ohne ihr farbenfrohes Lieblingstier leben.
Allein bei seiner Nähe lächelt sie entspannt.”
“literal”
13 “Maria und ihr Freund gehen zusammen zum Psychologen. Sie hat
nämlich das Gefühl, sein wahres Ich nicht wirklich zu kennen, da er
sich immer an den anderen anpasst und seine Meinung ständig
ändert. Auch wenn er so mysteriös wirkt, kann sie nicht ohne ihren
Partner leben. Allein bei seiner Nähe lächelt sie entspannt.”
“met.”
13 “Maria und ihr Freund gehen zusammen zum Zoo. Sie hat nämlich
das Glück, eine Ausstellung gratis zu besuchen, da sie sich früher um
die Tiere gekümmert hat und die Reptilien gut kennt. Auch wenn es
so scheu ist, kann sie nicht ohne ihr farbenfrohes Lieblingstier leben.
Allein bei seiner Nähe lächelt sie entspannt.”
“literal”







14 “Florian ist ein Zirkus-Künstler, der gerne mit dem ungewöhnlichsten
Gegner ringt. Sein anstehender Gegner ist ein bekanntes Raubtier.
Florian lässt sich deswegen einen ungewöhnlichen Trick einfallen,
welcher einen Knock-out für das Raubtier bedeuten wird. Er wird
das Publikum damit begeistern.”
“literal”
14 “Florian ist ein Faustkämpfer, der gerne den tapfersten Gegner hat.
Sein anstehender Gegner ist ein sehr berühmter, edelmütiger Boxer.
Florian lässt sich deswegen einen ungewöhnlichen Schlag einfallen,
welcher einen Knock-out für den Boxer bedeuten wird. Er wird das
Publikum damit begeistern.”
“met.”
14 “Florian ist ein Zirkus-Künstler, der gerne mit dem ungewöhnlichsten
Gegner ringt. Sein anstehender Gegner ist ein bekanntes Raubtier.
Florian lässt sich deswegen einen ungewöhnlichen Trick einfallen,
welcher einen Knock-out für das Raubtier bedeuten wird. Er wird
das Publikum damit begeistern.”
“literal”
14 “Florian ist ein Faustkämpfer, der gerne den tapfersten Gegner hat.
Sein anstehender Gegner ist ein sehr berühmter, edelmütiger Boxer.
Florian lässt sich deswegen einen ungewöhnlichen Schlag einfallen,
welcher einen Knock-out für den Boxer bedeuten wird. Er wird das
Publikum damit begeistern.”
“met.”
15 “Beate will Lehrerin werden und macht deswegen ein Praktikum bei
einem Erzieher. Sie wird ihm bei der Arbeit in der Schule helfen,
und wird schnell merken, dass dort alles sehr chaotisch ist. Die
Kinder sind laut, der Ablauf ist unstrukturiert und die Erwachsenen
komplett überfordert. Es werden harte Tage für sie sein.”
“met.”
15 “Beate will Entertainerin werden und macht deswegen ein Praktikum
bei einem Clown. Sie wird ihm bei der Arbeit in der Manege helfen,
und wird schnell merken, dass dort alles sehr kompliziert ist. Die
Tiere sind laut, die Jongleure sind nicht nett und das Publikum
komplett gelangweilt. Es werden harte Tage für sie sein.”
“literal”
15 “Beate will Lehrerin werden und macht deswegen ein Praktikum bei
einem Erzieher. Sie wird ihm bei der Arbeit in der Schule helfen,
und wird schnell merken, dass dort alles sehr chaotisch ist. Die
Kinder sind laut, der Ablauf ist unstrukturiert und die Erwachsenen
komplett überfordert. Es werden harte Tage für sie sein.”
“met.”
15 “Beate will Entertainerin werden und macht deswegen ein Praktikum
bei einem Clown. Sie wird ihm bei der Arbeit in der Manege helfen,
und wird schnell merken, dass dort alles sehr kompliziert ist. Die
Tiere sind laut, die Jongleure sind nicht nett und das Publikum
komplett gelangweilt. Es werden harte Tage für sie sein.”
“literal”







16 “Charlotte zieht in ein neues Haus ein, in dem ihr Onkel gestorben
ist und wo er angeblich seitdem spukt. Sie sucht nach dem Onkel,
der aber unsichtbar ist und sich nur in der Nacht blicken lässt. Sie
entscheidet sich, mit einem Rosenkranz durch den Keller zu gehen,
doch das Fehlen von Hinweisen frustriert sie. Sie wird schnell die
Geduld verlieren.”
“literal”
16 “Charlotte zieht in eine neue Gegend ein, in der ein Bär die Leute
erschreckt und die Tomaten der Nachbarn frisst. Sie sucht nach dem
Bären, der aber vorsichtig ist und sich äußerst selten blicken lässt.
Sie entscheidet sich, mit einem Gewehr durch den Wald zu gehen,
doch das Fehlen von Hinweisen frustriert sie. Sie wird schnell die
Geduld verlieren.”
“met.”
16 “Charlotte zieht in ein neues Haus ein, in dem ihr Onkel gestorben
ist und wo er angeblich seitdem spukt. Sie sucht nach dem Onkel,
der aber unsichtbar ist und sich nur in der Nacht blicken lässt. Sie
entscheidet sich, mit einem Rosenkranz durch den Keller zu gehen,
doch das Fehlen von Hinweisen frustriert sie. Sie wird schnell die
Geduld verlieren.”
“literal”
16 “Charlotte zieht in eine neue Gegend ein, in der ein Bär die Leute
erschreckt und die Tomaten der Nachbarn frisst. Sie sucht nach dem
Bären, der aber vorsichtig ist und sich äußerst selten blicken lässt.
Sie entscheidet sich, mit einem Gewehr durch den Wald zu gehen,
doch das Fehlen von Hinweisen frustriert sie. Sie wird schnell die
Geduld verlieren.”
“met.”
17 “Katharina ist Archäologin und besucht gerade ein Stammesfest
mitten in der Wüste. Sie hat einen sehr empfindlichen Magen und
alle Gerichte, die ihr beim Essen angeboten werden, sind fettig, hart
und überwürzt. Sie will nicht unhöflich sein, also bereitet sie sich vor,
eine ordentliche Portion Fleisch zu sich zu nehmen. Ihre
Entscheidung wird sie danach mehrmals bereuen.”
“met.”
17 “Katharina ist Archäologin und besucht gerade eine Ausgrabung
mitten in der Wüste. Sie hat einen defekten Kompass, und alle
Versuche, zum Zelt zurückzufinden, sind verzweifelt, panisch und
erfolglos. Sie will nicht vor Hunger sterben und verliert den Verstand,
also bereitet sie sich vor, einen großen Felsbrocken zu essen. Ihre
Entscheidung wird sie danach mehrmals bereuen.”
“literal”
17 “Katharina ist Archäologin und besucht gerade ein Stammesfest
mitten in der Wüste. Sie hat einen sehr empfindlichen Magen und
alle Gerichte, die ihr beim Essen angeboten werden, sind fettig, hart
und überwürzt. Sie will nicht unhöflich sein, also bereitet sie sich vor,
eine ordentliche Portion Fleisch zu sich zu nehmen. Ihre
Entscheidung wird sie danach mehrmals bereuen.”
“met.”







17 “Katharina ist Archäologin und besucht gerade eine Ausgrabung
mitten in der Wüste. Sie hat einen defekten Kompass, und alle
Versuche, zum Zelt zurückzufinden, sind verzweifelt, panisch und
erfolglos. Sie will nicht vor Hunger sterben und verliert den Verstand,
also bereitet sie sich vor, einen großen Felsbrocken zu essen. Ihre
Entscheidung wird sie danach mehrmals bereuen.”
“literal”
18 “Daniel geht mit seinen Kindern zum Tropenhaus. Die Gehege sind
voll mit wunderschönen fliegenden Insekten. Eines sitzt besonders
farbenfroh und flatternd auf einer Blume. Er wird deswegen lange
staunen.”
“literal”
18 “Daniel geht mit seinen Kindern ins Theater. Das Stück ist besetzt
mit wunderschönen hüpfenden Tänzerinnen. Eine davon tanzt
besonders elegant und leichtfüßig auf der Bühne. Er wird deswegen
lange staunen.”
“met.”
18 “Daniel geht mit seinen Kindern zum Tropenhaus. Die Gehege sind
voll mit wunderschönen fliegenden Insekten. Eines sitzt besonders
farbenfroh und flatternd auf einer Blume. Er wird deswegen lange
staunen.”
“literal”
18 “Daniel geht mit seinen Kindern ins Theater. Das Stück ist besetzt
mit wunderschönen hüpfenden Tänzerinnen. Eine davon tanzt
besonders elegant und leichtfüßig auf der Bühne. Er wird deswegen
lange staunen.”
“met.”
19 “Robert ist Pop-Musiker und arbeitet in einer großen Plattenfirma.
Obwohl die Produzenten viel Vertrauen in sein Können gesteckt
haben, war Robert bis jetzt wenig erfolgreich. Aber nach langen
Nächten im Studio gelingt es ihm, einen sehr eingängigen Song zu
schreiben, der in kürzer Zeit überall zu hören sein wird. Er wird
seinen verdienten Erfolg genießen.”
“met.”
19 “Robert ist Biologe und arbeitet in einer wissenschaftlichen
Einrichtung. Obwohl die Regierung viel Geld in sein Projekt gesteckt
hat, war Robert bis jetzt wenig erfolgreich. Aber nach langen
Nächten im Labor gelingt es ihm, einen kritischen Erreger zu
synthetisieren, der in kürzester Zeit viele Leben retten könnte. Er
wird seinen verdienten Erfolg genießen.”
“literal”
19 “Robert ist Pop-Musiker und arbeitet in einer großen Plattenfirma.
Obwohl die Produzenten viel Vertrauen in sein Können gesteckt
haben, war Robert bis jetzt wenig erfolgreich. Aber nach langen
Nächten im Studio gelingt es ihm, einen sehr eingängigen Song zu
schreiben, der in kürzer Zeit überall zu hören sein wird. Er wird
seinen verdienten Erfolg genießen.”
“met.”







19 “Robert ist Biologe und arbeitet in einer wissenschaftlichen
Einrichtung. Obwohl die Regierung viel Geld in sein Projekt gesteckt
hat, war Robert bis jetzt wenig erfolgreich. Aber nach langen
Nächten im Labor gelingt es ihm, einen kritischen Erreger zu
synthetisieren, der in kürzester Zeit viele Leben retten könnte. Er
wird seinen verdienten Erfolg genießen.”
“literal”
20 “Stephanie ist Tiermedizinerin und meldet sich bei einem
Pflegedienst an. Sie kümmert sich im Zoo um eine verletzte,
schüchterne atlantische Robbe und füttert sie regelmäßig. Sie ist sehr
überrascht zu sehen, dass die Robbe unglaublich schlecht gelaunt ist,
und nichts fressen will. Nichtdestotrotz versucht sie, eine gute Zeit
mit ihr zu verbringen.”
“literal”
20 “Stephanie ist Single und meldet sich bei einer Dating-Website an.
Sie flirtet im Internet mit einem netten, angeblich gutaussehenden
Mann und lädt ihn zum Essen ein. Sie ist sehr überrascht zu sehen,
dass der Mann unglaublich fettleibig ist, und kaum durch die
Wohnungstür passt. Nichtdestotrotz versucht sie, eine gute Zeit mit
ihm zu verbringen.”
“met.”
20 “Stephanie ist Tiermedizinerin und meldet sich bei einem
Pflegedienst an. Sie kümmert sich im Zoo um eine verletzte,
schüchterne atlantische Robbe und füttert sie regelmäßig. Sie ist sehr
überrascht zu sehen, dass die Robbe unglaublich schlecht gelaunt ist,
und nichts fressen will. Nichtdestotrotz versucht sie, eine gute Zeit
mit ihr zu verbringen.”
“literal”
20 “Stephanie ist Single und meldet sich bei einer Dating-Website an.
Sie flirtet im Internet mit einem netten, angeblich gutaussehenden
Mann und lädt ihn zum Essen ein. Sie ist sehr überrascht zu sehen,
dass der Mann unglaublich fettleibig ist, und kaum durch die
Wohnungstür passt. Nichtdestotrotz versucht sie, eine gute Zeit mit
ihm zu verbringen.”
“met.”
21 “Christian geht am Nachmittag in die Schule um seine Tochter
abzuholen, da es ihr nicht gut geht. Sie ist sehr zerbrechlich und
emotional, und sie wird anfangen zu weinen, sobald Christian sie
anfasst. Er wird aber trotzdem seine Arme ausstrecken und die Zeit
mit der sensiblen Tochter genießen. Es wird danach ein toller Tag
werden.”
“met.”
21 “Christian geht im Winter in den Park um die Eiskristalle zu sehen,
die vom Himmel fallen. Sie sind sehr symmetrisch und einzigartig,
und sie werden anfangen zu schmelzen, sobald Christian sie anfasst.
Er wird aber trotzdem seine Arme ausstrecken und den tollen
Anblick der Eiskristalle genießen. Es wird danach ein toller Tag
werden.”
“literal”







21 “Christian geht am Nachmittag in die Schule um seine Tochter
abzuholen, da es ihr nicht gut geht. Sie ist sehr zerbrechlich und
emotional, und sie wird anfangen zu weinen, sobald Christian sie
anfasst. Er wird aber trotzdem seine Arme ausstrecken und die Zeit
mit der sensiblen Tochter genießen. Es wird danach ein toller Tag
werden.”
“met.”
21 “Christian geht im Winter in den Park um die Eiskristalle zu sehen,
die vom Himmel fallen. Sie sind sehr symmetrisch und einzigartig,
und sie werden anfangen zu schmelzen, sobald Christian sie anfasst.
Er wird aber trotzdem seine Arme ausstrecken und den tollen
Anblick der Eiskristalle genießen. Es wird danach ein toller Tag
werden.”
“literal”
22 “Petra ist Ermittlerin und ist mit einem schwierigen Fall beschäftigt.
Neulich entdeckte sie einen Holzsplitter am Tatort und wusste nicht,
ob er für den Fall entscheidend ist. Er ist klein, angebrochen und
blutverschmiert. Sie wird das Ganze nicht ernstnehmen.”
“literal”
22 “Petra ist Trainerin einer Rugby Mannschaft und freut sich über neue
Zugänge. Neulich entdeckte sie einen Teenager und wusste nicht, ob
er ins Team passt. Er ist sehr dünn, zerbrechlich und den anderen
körperlich unterlegen. Sie wird das Ganze nicht ernstnehmen.”
“met.”
22 “Petra ist Ermittlerin und ist mit einem schwierigen Fall beschäftigt.
Neulich entdeckte sie einen Holzsplitter am Tatort und wusste nicht,
ob er für den Fall entscheidend ist. Er ist klein, angebrochen und
blutverschmiert. Sie wird das Ganze nicht ernstnehmen.”
“literal”
22 “Petra ist Trainerin einer Rugby Mannschaft und freut sich über neue
Zugänge. Neulich entdeckte sie einen Teenager und wusste nicht, ob
er ins Team passt. Er ist sehr dünn, zerbrechlich und den anderen
körperlich unterlegen. Sie wird das Ganze nicht ernstnehmen.”
“met.”
23 “Lukas ist verbeamtet und arbeitet in einem kleinen Team. Eines
Tages hat ein Feuerwehrmann, der nie auf die anderen hört, eine
riskante Entscheidung getroffen, obwohl Lukas ihm davon abgeraten
hat. Es hat sich aber gezeigt, dass der Feuerwehrmann Recht hatte,
und Lukas wird ihm dafür gratulieren müssen. Die Beziehung
zwischen den beiden ist nicht leicht.”
“met.”
23 “Lukas ist Bauer und arbeitet in einem kleinen Bauernhof. Eines
Tages hat ein Nutztier, das nie auf Lukas hört, absolut nichts fressen
wollen, obwohl Lukas es dazu animiert hat. Es hat sich aber gezeigt,
dass das Nutztier gespürt hat, dass das Futter faulig war, und Lukas
wird ihm dafür gratulieren müssen. Die Beziehung zwischen den
beiden ist nicht leicht.”
“literal”







23 “Lukas ist verbeamtet und arbeitet in einem kleinen Team. Eines
Tages hat ein Feuerwehrmann, der nie auf die anderen hört, eine
riskante Entscheidung getroffen, obwohl Lukas ihm davon abgeraten
hat. Es hat sich aber gezeigt, dass der Feuerwehrmann Recht hatte,
und Lukas wird ihm dafür gratulieren müssen. Die Beziehung
zwischen den beiden ist nicht leicht.”
“met.”
23 “Lukas ist Bauer und arbeitet in einem kleinen Bauernhof. Eines
Tages hat ein Nutztier, das nie auf Lukas hört, absolut nichts fressen
wollen, obwohl Lukas es dazu animiert hat. Es hat sich aber gezeigt,
dass das Nutztier gespürt hat, dass das Futter faulig war, und Lukas
wird ihm dafür gratulieren müssen. Die Beziehung zwischen den
beiden ist nicht leicht.”
“literal”
24 “Jonas interessiert sich sehr für Design und entscheidet sich, zu einer
Messe zu gehen. Er sieht ein Möbelstück, das fast doppelt so hoch ist
wie alle anderen. Er wird sehr begeistert von ihm sein und wird
glauben, dass das Möbelstück den Wettbewerb gewinnen wird. In
wenigen Minuten wird es tatsächlich passieren.”
“literal”
24 “Jonas interessiert sich sehr für Basketball und entscheidet sich, ins
Stadion zu gehen. Er sieht ein Spieler, der fast doppelt so groß und
schwer ist wie die anderen. Er wird sehr begeistert von ihm sein und
wird wetten, dass der Spieler das Spiel gewinnen wird. In wenigen
Minuten wird es tatsächlich passieren.”
“met.”
24 “Jonas interessiert sich sehr für Design und entscheidet sich, zu einer
Messe zu gehen. Er sieht ein Möbelstück, das fast doppelt so hoch ist
wie alle anderen. Er wird sehr begeistert von ihm sein und wird
glauben, dass das Möbelstück den Wettbewerb gewinnen wird. In
wenigen Minuten wird es tatsächlich passieren.”
“literal”
24 “Jonas interessiert sich sehr für Basketball und entscheidet sich, ins
Stadion zu gehen. Er sieht ein Spieler, der fast doppelt so groß und
schwer ist wie die anderen. Er wird sehr begeistert von ihm sein und
wird wetten, dass der Spieler das Spiel gewinnen wird. In wenigen
Minuten wird es tatsächlich passieren.”
“met.”
25 “Emily ist Studentin und besucht eine Vorlesung. Der Professor der
Vorlesung ist ein Vertreter von veralteten Theorien, und wird von
den jungen Generationen nicht mehr ernst genommen. Emily aber
meldet sich ständig im Kurs, und stellt die Weltsicht des Professors
in Frage. Dies wird ihr übelgenommen werden.”
“met.”
25 “Emily ist Studentin und besucht ein Museum. Die Versteinerungen
des Museums sind Überreste vergangener Zeiten, und werden von
jungen Generationen nicht mehr geschätzt. Emily aber schießt Bilder
von einer Versteinerung, und setzt sich über das Fotoverbot des
Museums hinweg. Dies wird ihr übelgenommen werden.”
“literal”







25 “Emily ist Studentin und besucht eine Vorlesung. Der Professor der
Vorlesung ist ein Vertreter von veralteten Theorien, und wird von
den jungen Generationen nicht mehr ernst genommen. Emily aber
meldet sich ständig im Kurs, und stellt die Weltsicht des Professors
in Frage. Dies wird ihr übelgenommen werden.”
“met.”
25 “Emily ist Studentin und besucht ein Museum. Die Versteinerungen
des Museums sind Überreste vergangener Zeiten, und werden von
jungen Generationen nicht mehr geschätzt. Emily aber schießt Bilder
von einer Versteinerung, und setzt sich über das Fotoverbot des
Museums hinweg. Dies wird ihr übelgenommen werden.”
“literal”
26 “David geht im Winter in eine Ausstellung im Freiem, um sich
Skulpturen aus Schnee anzusehen. Er ist sehr betrunken und merkt
nicht, dass die Skulptur, die er für einen Menschen hält, ein Teil der
Sammlung ist. Nach einer Weile wird er es merken und sich
schämen.”
“literal”
26 “David geht im Winter in eine Bar in der Gegend, um Frauen
kennenzulernen. Er ist sehr betrunken und merkt nicht, dass die
Blondine, die an der Theke alleine trinkt, nicht reden will und ihn
gefühllos ignoriert. Nach einer Weile wird er es merken und sich
schämen.”
“met.”
26 “David geht im Winter in eine Ausstellung im Freiem, um sich
Skulpturen aus Schnee anzusehen. Er ist sehr betrunken und merkt
nicht, dass die Skulptur, die er für einen Menschen hält, ein Teil der
Sammlung ist. Nach einer Weile wird er es merken und sich
schämen.”
“literal”
26 “David geht im Winter in eine Bar in der Gegend, um Frauen
kennenzulernen. Er ist sehr betrunken und merkt nicht, dass die
Blondine, die an der Theke alleine trinkt, nicht reden will und ihn
gefühllos ignoriert. Nach einer Weile wird er es merken und sich
schämen.”
“met.”
27 “Vanessa arbeitet für eine Wohnungsgesellschaft und muss demnächst
eine freigewordene Wohnung besichtigen. Sie geht in die Wohnung
hinein und merkt, dass alles chaotisch ist. Die ist zugemüllt und
schwer begehbar. Sie wird eine schwierige Aufgabe haben.”
“met.”
27 “Vanessa arbeitet für einen Sender und muss demnächst eine
bezaubernde Dokumentation über den Regenwald drehen. Sie geht
in den Regenwald und merkt, dass alles chaotisch ist. Der ist sehr
dunkel und schwer begehbar. Sie wird eine schwierige Aufgabe
haben.”
“literal”







27 “Vanessa arbeitet für eine Wohnungsgesellschaft und muss demnächst
eine freigewordene Wohnung besichtigen. Sie geht in die Wohnung
hinein und merkt, dass alles chaotisch ist. Die ist zugemüllt und
schwer begehbar. Sie wird eine schwierige Aufgabe haben.”
“met.”
27 “Vanessa arbeitet für einen Sender und muss demnächst eine
bezaubernde Dokumentation über den Regenwald drehen. Sie geht
in den Regenwald und merkt, dass alles chaotisch ist. Der ist sehr
dunkel und schwer begehbar. Sie wird eine schwierige Aufgabe
haben.”
“literal”
28 “Karoline arbeitet in einem Krankenhaus und freut sich immer
darauf, Patienten in Not helfen zu können. Eines Tages kommt ein
alter Mann, der eine offene Wunde hat, zu ihr in die Notaufnahme,
und will einen Wundverband bekommen. Karoline weiß, dass die
Binde ihm kaum nützen wird, will ihm aber trotzdem helfen. Die
Hilfe wird nur eine Weile anhalten.”
“literal”
28 “Karoline arbeitet in einem Unternehmen und freut sich immer
darauf, ihren Angestellten helfen zu können. Eines Tages kommt ihr
Assistent, der eine starke Depression hat, zu ihr ins Büro, und will
eine Arbeitsauszeit bekommen. Karoline weiß, dass der Urlaub ihm
kaum nützen wird, will ihm aber trotzdem helfen. Die Hilfe wird nur
eine Weile anhalten.”
“met.”
28 “Karoline arbeitet in einem Krankenhaus und freut sich immer
darauf, Patienten in Not helfen zu können. Eines Tages kommt ein
alter Mann, der eine offene Wunde hat, zu ihr in die Notaufnahme,
und will einen Wundverband bekommen. Karoline weiß, dass die
Binde ihm kaum nützen wird, will ihm aber trotzdem helfen. Die
Hilfe wird nur eine Weile anhalten.”
“literal”
28 “Karoline arbeitet in einem Unternehmen und freut sich immer
darauf, ihren Angestellten helfen zu können. Eines Tages kommt ihr
Assistent, der eine starke Depression hat, zu ihr ins Büro, und will
eine Arbeitsauszeit bekommen. Karoline weiß, dass der Urlaub ihm
kaum nützen wird, will ihm aber trotzdem helfen. Die Hilfe wird nur
eine Weile anhalten.”
“met.”
29 “Laura arbeitet als Sportlehrerin in einem Gymnasium. Einer ihrer
Schüler ist besonders begabt in der Leichtathletik. Er ist unglaublich
schnell und gewinnt mühelos alle Wettbewerbe. Laura will ihm
helfen, seine Zeiten weiter zu verbessern. Die Mühe wird sich
auszahlen.”
“met.”







29 “Laura arbeitet als Tierpflegerin in einem Tierpark. Eine der
Raubkatzen ist besonders aggressiv zu den Pflegern. Sie ist
unglaublich reizbar und erschreckt ständig alle Parkbesucher. Laura
will ihr helfen, ihr Benehmen weiter zu verbessern. Die Mühe wird
sich auszahlen.”
“literal”
29 “Laura arbeitet als Sportlehrerin in einem Gymnasium. Einer ihrer
Schüler ist besonders begabt in der Leichtathletik. Er ist unglaublich
schnell und gewinnt mühelos alle Wettbewerbe. Laura will ihm
helfen, seine Zeiten weiter zu verbessern. Die Mühe wird sich
auszahlen.”
“met.”
29 “Laura arbeitet als Tierpflegerin in einem Tierpark. Eine der
Raubkatzen ist besonders aggressiv zu den Pflegern. Sie ist
unglaublich reizbar und erschreckt ständig alle Parkbesucher. Laura
will ihr helfen, ihr Benehmen weiter zu verbessern. Die Mühe wird
sich auszahlen.”
“literal”
30 “Philipp ist neu im Dorf und will eine Freizeitbeschäftigung haben.
Er fängt an, Zeit mit einem Kriechtier zu verbringen, das den Ruf
hat, gefühllos und tödlich zu sein. Ihn interessiert es nicht und
entwickelt langsam Vertrauen dem Tier gegenüber. Er wird es nicht
einschätzen können, wie groß sein Fehler ist.”
“literal”
30 “Philipp ist neu im Dorf und will nette Leute kennenlernen. Er fängt
an, Zeit mit einer Hausfrau zu verbringen, die den Ruf hat,
hinterlistig und heimtückisch zu sein. Ihn interessiert das nicht und
er entwickelt großes Vertrauen der Frau gegenüber. Er wird nicht
einschätzen können, wie groß sein Fehler ist.”
“met.”
30 “Philipp ist neu im Dorf und will eine Freizeitbeschäftigung haben.
Er fängt an, Zeit mit einem Kriechtier zu verbringen, das den Ruf
hat, gefühllos und tödlich zu sein. Ihn interessiert es nicht und
entwickelt langsam Vertrauen dem Tier gegenüber. Er wird es nicht
einschätzen können, wie groß sein Fehler ist.”
“literal”
30 “Philipp ist neu im Dorf und will nette Leute kennenlernen. Er fängt
an, Zeit mit einer Hausfrau zu verbringen, die den Ruf hat,
hinterlistig und heimtückisch zu sein. Ihn interessiert das nicht und
er entwickelt großes Vertrauen der Frau gegenüber. Er wird nicht
einschätzen können, wie groß sein Fehler ist.”
“met.”
31 “Nadine ist Angestellte und mag ihren Vorgesetzten nicht. Er ist ein
großer, wütender Mann, der äußerst aufdringlich ist und seinen
Willen über alle anderen gnadenlos durchsetzt. Eines Tages wird es
Nadine nicht mehr aushalten und ihren Vorgesetzten anschreien, weil
er sie zu sehr nötigen wird. Es wird zu einer tödlichen Stille
kommen.”
“met.”







31 “Nadine ist Soldatin und mag ihren Kampfwagen nicht. Der ist eine
große, veraltete Maschine, die äußerst langsam ist und selten
verlässlich funktioniert. Eines Tages wird es Nadine nicht mehr
aushalten und ihren Kampfwagen wiederholt anschreien, weil er sich
nicht mehr fortbewegen wird. Es wird danach zu einer tödlichen
Stille kommen.”
“literal”
31 “Nadine ist Angestellte und mag ihren Vorgesetzten nicht. Er ist ein
großer, wütender Mann, der äußerst aufdringlich ist und seinen
Willen über alle anderen gnadenlos durchsetzt. Eines Tages wird es
Nadine nicht mehr aushalten und ihren Vorgesetzten anschreien, weil
er sie zu sehr nötigen wird. Es wird zu einer tödlichen Stille
kommen.”
“met.”
31 “Nadine ist Soldatin und mag ihren Kampfwagen nicht. Der ist eine
große, veraltete Maschine, die äußerst langsam ist und selten
verlässlich funktioniert. Eines Tages wird es Nadine nicht mehr
aushalten und ihren Kampfwagen wiederholt anschreien, weil er sich
nicht mehr fortbewegen wird. Es wird danach zu einer tödlichen
Stille kommen.”
“literal”
32 “Sebastian liebt eine berühmte Adlige. Er hat sie in einem Schloss
kennengelernt und seitdem sind sie unzertrennlich. Die Adlige ist
schwach und abhängig, und kann sehr hilfsbedürftig sein. Deswegen
tut Sebastian alles für sie, wenn sie etwas braucht. Er wird sich
immer um sie kümmern wollen.”
“literal”
32 “Sebastian liebt eine wunderschöne Katze. Er hat sie in einem
Tierheim adoptiert und seitdem sind sie unzertrennlich. Die Katze
ist verwöhnt und launisch, und kann sehr wählerisch sein. Deswegen
würde Sebastian alles für sie tun, wenn sie etwas braucht. Er wird
sich immer um sie kümmern wollen.”
“met.”
32 “Sebastian liebt eine berühmte Adlige. Er hat sie in einem Schloss
kennengelernt und seitdem sind sie unzertrennlich. Die Adlige ist
schwach und abhängig, und kann sehr hilfsbedürftig sein. Deswegen
tut Sebastian alles für sie, wenn sie etwas braucht. Er wird sich
immer um sie kümmern wollen.”
“literal”
32 “Sebastian liebt eine wunderschöne Katze. Er hat sie in einem
Tierheim adoptiert und seitdem sind sie unzertrennlich. Die Katze
ist verwöhnt und launisch, und kann sehr wählerisch sein. Deswegen
würde Sebastian alles für sie tun, wenn sie etwas braucht. Er wird
sich immer um sie kümmern wollen.”
“met.”







33 “Fabian arbeitet in einer Kita und begrüßt die neu hinzugekommenen
Kinder. Ein Junge ist sehr laut und redselig und kann einfach nicht
aufhören, die anderen Kinder nachzuahmen. Der Junge scheint sehr
große Freude am Reden zu haben. Fabian wird sich für diesen Fall
besonders viel Zeit nehmen.”
“met.”
33 “Fabian arbeitet in einem Tierheim und begrüßt die neu
hinzugekommenen Vögel. Einer ist sehr laut und redselig und kann
einfach nicht aufhören, die anderen Vögel nachzuahmen. Der Vogel
scheint sehr große Freude am Streiten zu haben. Fabian wird sich für
diesen Fall besonders viel Zeit nehmen.”
“literal”
33 “Fabian arbeitet in einer Kita und begrüßt die neu hinzugekommenen
Kinder. Ein Junge ist sehr laut und redselig und kann einfach nicht
aufhören, die anderen Kinder nachzuahmen. Der Junge scheint sehr
große Freude am Reden zu haben. Fabian wird sich für diesen Fall
besonders viel Zeit nehmen.”
“met.”
33 “Fabian arbeitet in einem Tierheim und begrüßt die neu
hinzugekommenen Vögel. Einer ist sehr laut und redselig und kann
einfach nicht aufhören, die anderen Vögel nachzuahmen. Der Vogel
scheint sehr große Freude am Streiten zu haben. Fabian wird sich für
diesen Fall besonders viel Zeit nehmen.”
“literal”
34 “Alexander ist Touristenführer und leitet gerade einen Ausflug auf
einem Boot am Amazonas. Einer der Fische im Fluss wirkt plötzlich
sehr hungrig und aggressiv, und versucht, alle anderen Fische
einzuschüchtern. Alexander wird zweifelsohne einschreiten.”
“literal”
34 “Alexander ist Unternehmensberater und leitet gerade einen
Workshop über Kommunikation am Arbeitsplatz. Einer der
Teilnehmer wirkt arrogant und egoistisch, und versucht, alle anderen
Teilnehmer einzuschüchtern. Alexander wird zweifelsohne
einschreiten.”
“met.”
34 “Alexander ist Touristenführer und leitet gerade einen Ausflug auf
einem Boot am Amazonas. Einer der Fische im Fluss wirkt plötzlich
sehr hungrig und aggressiv, und versucht, alle anderen Fische
einzuschüchtern. Alexander wird zweifelsohne einschreiten.”
“literal”
34 “Alexander ist Unternehmensberater und leitet gerade einen
Workshop über Kommunikation am Arbeitsplatz. Einer der
Teilnehmer wirkt arrogant und egoistisch, und versucht, alle anderen
Teilnehmer einzuschüchtern. Alexander wird zweifelsohne
einschreiten.”
“met.”







35 “Simone ist eine einflussreiche Senatorin und hat sich einen
politischen Ziehsohn ausgesucht. Er ist sehr klug, aber neigt dazu,
habgierig zu sein und die Schwächen anderer Menschen auszunutzen.
Simone wird sich deswegen um seinen Ruf bemühen müssen. Sie wird
dafür hart arbeiten.”
“met.”
35 “Simone ist eine einflussreiche Tiermedizinerin und hat einen seltenen
Greifvogel erforscht. Er ist sehr klug, aber neigt dazu, aggressiv zu
sein und die Schwächen der anderen Vögel auszunutzen. Simone wird
sich deswegen um seinen Ruf bemühen müssen. Sie wird dafür hart
arbeiten.”
“literal”
35 “Simone ist eine einflussreiche Senatorin und hat sich einen
politischen Ziehsohn ausgesucht. Er ist sehr klug, aber neigt dazu,
habgierig zu sein und die Schwächen anderer Menschen auszunutzen.
Simone wird sich deswegen um seinen Ruf bemühen müssen. Sie wird
dafür hart arbeiten.”
“met.”
35 “Simone ist eine einflussreiche Tiermedizinerin und hat einen seltenen
Greifvogel erforscht. Er ist sehr klug, aber neigt dazu, aggressiv zu
sein und die Schwächen der anderen Vögel auszunutzen. Simone wird
sich deswegen um seinen Ruf bemühen müssen. Sie wird dafür hart
arbeiten.”
“literal”
36 “Niklas konkurriert häufig um einen sehr berühmten Sportpokal. Er
will den Wettbewerb gewinnen nur um sein Ego zu stärken. Er
genießt es auch sehr, damit vor seinen Freunden zu prahlen. Es wird
für ihn ein harter Kampf sein.”
“literal”
36 “Niklas flirtet häufig mit einer berühmten Sängerin. Er will ihre
Liebe erobern nur um sein Selbstwertgefühl zu stärken. Er genießt es
auch sehr, damit vor seinen Freunden zu prahlen. Es wird für ihn ein
harter Kampf sein.”
“met.”
36 “Niklas konkurriert häufig um einen sehr berühmten Sportpokal. Er
will den Wettbewerb gewinnen nur um sein Ego zu stärken. Er
genießt es auch sehr, damit vor seinen Freunden zu prahlen. Es wird
für ihn ein harter Kampf sein.”
“literal”
36 “Niklas flirtet häufig mit einer berühmten Sängerin. Er will ihre
Liebe erobern nur um sein Selbstwertgefühl zu stärken. Er genießt es
auch sehr, damit vor seinen Freunden zu prahlen. Es wird für ihn ein
harter Kampf sein.”
“met.”
B.2 Critical Items for Experiment 5-6
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1 “Sarah kontert einen Bulldozer, und wird
offensichtlich den Angestellten aufhalten.”
“early” “metaphoric”
1 “Sarah kontert einen Bulldozer, und wird
offensichtlich das Raupenfahrzeug aufhalten.”
“early” “literal”
1 “Sarah wird einen Bulldozer kontern, und
wird offensichtlich den Angestellten
aufhalten.”
“late” “metaphoric”
1 “Sarah wird einen Bulldozer kontern, und
wird offensichtlich das Raupenfahrzeug
aufhalten.”
“late” “literal”
2 “Michael wird einen Drachen belästigen, und
wird vorsichtig die Feuerechse besänftigen.”
“late” “literal”
2 “Michael belästigt einen Drachen, und wird
vorsichtig die Bibliothekarin besänftigen.”
“early” “metaphoric”
2 “Michael belästigt einen Drachen, und wird
vorsichtig die Feuerechse besänftigen.”
“early” “literal”
2 “Michael wird einen Drachen belästigen, und
wird vorsichtig die Bibliothekarin
besänftigen.”
“late” “metaphoric”
3 “Thomas wird einen Roboter liebkosen und
wird hoffentlich die Oma zum Lächeln
bringen.”
“late” “metaphoric”
3 “Thomas wird einen Roboter liebkosen und
wird hoffentlich die Maschine zum Lächeln
bringen.”
“late” “literal”
3 “Thomas liebkost einen Roboter und wird
hoffentlich die Oma zum Lächeln bringen.”
“early” “metaphoric”
3 “Thomas liebkost einen Roboter und wird
hoffentlich die Maschine zum Lächeln
bringen.”
“early” “literal”
4 “Karin trainiert ein Altersheim, und wird
erwartungsvoll die Senioren kräftigen.”
“early” “literal”
4 “Karin wird ein Altersheim trainieren, und
wird erwartungsvoll die Fußballspieler
kräftigen.”
“late” “metaphoric”
4 “Karin wird ein Altersheim trainieren, und
wird erwartungsvoll die Senioren kräftigen.”
“late” “literal”
4 “Karin trainiert ein Altersheim, und wird
erwartungsvoll die Fußballspieler kräftigen.”
“early” “metaphoric”










5 “Andreas berät einen Engel und wird
wiederholt die Nonne ansprechen.”
“early” “metaphoric”
5 “Andreas berät einen Engel und wird
wiederholt das Gemälde ansprechen.”
“early” “literal”
5 “Andreas wird einen Engel beraten und wird
wiederholt die Nonne ansprechen.”
“late” “metaphoric”
5 “Andreas wird einen Engel beraten und wird
wiederholt das Gemälde ansprechen.”
“late” “literal”
6 “Stefan wird eine Hyäne interviewen und wird
unerbittlich das Raubtier porträtieren.”
“late” “literal”
6 “Stefan interviewt eine Hyäne und wird
unerbittlich den Makler porträtieren.”
“early” “metaphoric”
6 “Stefan interviewt eine Hyäne und wird
unerbittlich das Raubtier porträtieren.”
“early” “literal”
6 “Stefan wird eine Hyäne interviewen und wird
unerbittlich den Makler porträtieren.”
“late” “metaphoric”
7 “Susanne wird einen Dinosaurier grüßen und
wird lange Zeit den Politiker anlächeln.”
“late” “metaphoric”
7 “Susanne wird einen Dinosaurier grüßen und
wird lange Zeit das Riesenskelett anlächeln.”
“late” “literal”
7 “Susanne grüßt einen Dinosaurier und wird
lange Zeit den Politiker anlächeln.”
“early” “metaphoric”
7 “Susanne grüßt einen Dinosaurier und wird
lange Zeit das Riesenskelett anlächeln.”
“early” “literal”
8 “Martin empfindet einen Riss, und wird
schließlich die Villa erneuern.”
“early” “literal”
8 “Martin wird einen Riss empfinden, und wird
schließlich die Verlobung erneuern.”
“late” “metaphoric”
8 “Martin wird einen Riss empfinden, und wird
schließlich die Villa erneuern.”
“late” “literal”
8 “Martin empfindet einen Riss, und wird
schließlich die Verlobung erneuern.”
“early” “metaphoric”
9 “Nicole verhaftet einen Gorilla, und wird
sicherlich den Raufbold hart anpacken.”
“early” “metaphoric”
9 “Nicole verhaftet einen Gorilla, und wird
sicherlich das Männchen hart anpacken.”
“early” “literal”
9 “Nicole wird einen Gorilla verhaften, und
wird sicherlich den Raufbold hart anpacken.”
“late” “metaphoric”
9 “Nicole wird einen Gorilla verhaften, und
wird sicherlich das Männchen hart anpacken.”
“late” “literal”
10 “Eva wird einen Hai vertreten, und wird
augenscheinlich den Raubfisch beschützen.”
“late” “literal”














10 “Eva vertritt einen Hai, und wird
augenscheinlich den Raubfisch beschützen.”
“early” “literal”




11 “Tobias wird eine Schildkröte beschimpfen
und wird erbittert die Greisin betrachten.”
“late” “metaphoric”
11 “Tobias wird eine Schildkröte beschimpfen
und wird erbittert das Reptil betrachten.”
“late” “literal”
11 “Tobias beschimpft eine Schildkröte und wird
erbittert die Greisin betrachten.”
“early” “metaphoric”
11 “Tobias beschimpft eine Schildkröte und wird
erbittert das Reptil betrachten.”
“early” “literal”
12 “Astrid belügt einen Vulkan und wird
erfolgreich dem Berg entkommen.”
“early” “literal”
12 “Astrid wird einen Vulkan belügen und wird
erfolgreich dem Kollegen entkommen.”
“late” “metaphoric”
12 “Astrid wird einen Vulkan belügen und wird
erfolgreich dem Berg entkommen.”
“late” “literal”
12 “Astrid belügt einen Vulkan und wird
erfolgreich dem Kollegen entkommen.”
“early” “metaphoric”
13 “Maria küsst ein Chamäleon und wird
versehentlich den Partner verängstigen.”
“early” “metaphoric”
13 “Maria küsst ein Chamäleon, und wird
versehentlich das Lieblingstier verängstigen.”
“early” “literal”
13 “Maria wird ein Chamäleon küssen, und wird
versehentlich den Partner verängstigen.”
“late” “metaphoric”
13 “Maria wird ein Chamäleon küssen, und wird
versehentlich das Lieblingstier verängstigen.”
“late” “literal”
14 “Florian wird einen Löwen bekämpfen, und
wird auf jeden Fall das Raubtier besiegen.”
“late” “literal”
14 “Florian bekämpft einen Löwen, und wird auf
jeden Fall den Boxer besiegen.”
“early” “metaphoric”
14 “Florian bekämpft einen Löwen, und wird auf
jeden Fall das Raubtier besiegen.”
“early” “literal”
14 “Florian wird einen Löwen bekämpfen, und
wird auf jeden Fall den Boxer besiegen.”
“late” “metaphoric”
15 “Beate wird einen Zirkus umsorgen, und wird
binnen kurzem die Schule verachten.”
“late” “metaphoric”










15 “Beate wird einen Zirkus umsorgen und wird
binnen kurzem die Manege verachten.”
“late” “literal”
15 “Beate umsorgt einen Zirkus, und wird
binnen kurzem die Schule verachten.”
“early” “metaphoric”
15 “Beate umsorgt einen Zirkus, und wird
binnen kurzem die Manege verachten.”
“early” “literal”
16 “Charlotte jagt ein Gespenst, und wird
hoffnungslos den Onkel fortlassen.”
“early” “literal”
16 “Charlotte wird ein Gespenst jagen, und wird
hoffnungslos den Bären fortlassen.”
“late” “metaphoric”
16 “Charlotte wird ein Gespenst jagen, und wird
hoffnungslos den Onkel fortlassen.”
“late” “literal”
16 “Charlotte jagt ein Gespenst, und wird
hoffnungslos den Bären fortlassen.”
“early” “metaphoric”
17 “Katharina verzehrt einen Stein und wird
schnellstmöglich das Fleisch erbrechen.”
“early” “metaphoric”
17 “Katharina verzehrt einen Stein und wird
schnellstmöglich den Felsbrocken erbrechen.”
“early” “literal”
17 “Katharina wird einen Stein verzehren und
wird schnellstmöglich das Fleisch erbrechen.”
“late” “metaphoric”
17 “Katharina wird einen Stein verzehren und
wird schnellstmöglich den Felsbrocken
erbrechen.”
“late” “literal”
18 “Daniel wird einen Schmetterling begehren
und wird zweifelsohne das Insekt
wiedersehen.”
“late” “literal”
18 “Daniel begehrt einen Schmetterling und wird
zweifelsohne die Tänzerin wiedersehen.”
“early” “metaphoric”
18 “Daniel begehrt einen Schmetterling und wird
zweifelsohne das Insekt wiedersehen.”
“early” “literal”
18 “Daniel wird einen Schmetterling begehren
und wird zweifelsohne die Tänzerin
wiedersehen.”
“late” “metaphoric”
19 “Robert wird einen Virus komponieren, und
wird erfolgreich den Song vermarkten.”
“late” “metaphoric”
19 “Robert wird einen Virus komponieren, und
wird erfolgreich den Erreger vermarkten.”
“late” “literal”
19 “Robert komponiert einen Virus, und wird
erfolgreich den Song vermarkten.”
“early” “metaphoric”
19 “Robert komponiert einen Virus, und wird
erfolgreich den Erreger vermarkten.”
“early” “literal”










20 “Stephanie bekocht ein Walross, und wird
permanent die Robbe anlächeln.”
“early” “literal”
20 “Stephanie wird ein Walross bekochen, und
wird permanent den Mann anlächeln.”
“late” “metaphoric”
20 “Stephanie wird ein Walross bekochen, und
wird permanent die Robbe anlächeln.”
“late” “literal”
20 “Stephanie bekocht ein Walross, und wird
permanent den Mann anlächeln.”
“early” “metaphoric”
21 “Christian umarmt eine Schneeflocke und
wird ohne Zweifel die Tochter bewundern.”
“early” “metaphoric”
21 “Christian umarmt eine Schneeflocke und
wird ohne Zweifel die Eiskristalle bewundern.”
“early” “literal”
21 “Christian wird eine Schneeflocke umarmen
und wird ohne Zweifel die Tochter
bewundern.”
“late” “metaphoric”
21 “Christian wird eine Schneeflocke umarmen
und wird ohne Zweifel die Eiskristalle
bewundern.”
“late” “literal”
22 “Petra wird einen Zahnstocher ignorieren, und
wird unverzüglich den Holzsplitter vergessen.”
“late” “literal”
22 “Petra ignoriert einen Zahnstocher, und wird
unverzüglich den Teenager vergessen.”
“early” “metaphoric”
22 “Petra ignoriert einen Zahnstocher, und wird
unverzüglich den Holzsplitter vergessen.”
“early” “literal”
22 “Petra wird einen Zahnstocher ignorieren, und
wird unverzüglich den Teenager vergessen.”
“late” “metaphoric”
23 “Lukas wird einen Esel beglückwünschen und
wird verständlicherweise den Feuerwehrmann
bewundern.”
“late” “metaphoric”
23 “Lukas wird einen Esel beglückwünschen und
wird verständlicherweise das Nutztier
bewundern.”
“late” “literal”




23 “Lukas beglückwünscht einen Esel und wird
verständlicherweise das Nutztier bewundern.”
“early” “literal”
24 “Jonas favorisiert einen Schrank, und wird
schwärmend das Möbelstück betrachten.”
“early” “literal”
24 “Jonas wird einen Schrank favorisieren, und
wird schwärmend den Spieler betrachten.”
“late” “metaphoric”










24 “Jonas wird einen Schrank favorisieren, und
wird schwärmend das Möbelstück
betrachten.”
“late” “literal”
24 “Jonas favorisiert einen Schrank, und wird
schwärmend den Spieler betrachten.”
“early” “metaphoric”
25 “Emily beleidigt ein Fossil und wird von nun
an den Professor verpönen.”
“early” “metaphoric”
25 “Emily beleidigt ein Fossil und wird von nun
an die Versteinerung verpönen.”
“early” “literal”
25 “Emily wird ein Fossil beleidigen und wird
von nun an den Professor verpönen.”
“late” “metaphoric”
25 “Emily wird ein Fossil beleidigen und wird
von nun an die Versteinerung verpönen.”
“late” “literal”
26 “David wird eine Eisstatue belabern, und
wird allmählich die Skulptur in Ruhe lassen.”
“late” “literal”
26 “David belabert eine Eisstatue, und wird
allmählich die Blondine in Ruhe lassen.”
“early” “metaphoric”
26 “David belabert eine Eisstatue, und wird
allmählich die Skulptur in Ruhe lassen.”
“early” “literal”
26 “David wird eine Eisstatue belabern, und
wird allmählich die Blondine in Ruhe lassen.”
“late” “metaphoric”
27 “Vanessa wird einen Dschungel begutachten
und wird gnadenlos die Wohnung
verunglimpfen.”
“late” “metaphoric”
27 “Vanessa wird einen Dschungel begutachten
und wird gnadenlos den Regenwald
verunglimpfen.”
“late” “literal”
27 “Vanessa begutachtet einen Dschungel und
wird gnadenlos die Wohnung verunglimpfen.”
“early” “metaphoric”
27 “Vanessa begutachtet einen Dschungel und
wird gnadenlos den Regenwald
verunglimpfen.”
“early” “literal”
28 “Karoline bewilligt ein Pflaster, und wird
gleichzeitig den Wundverband absichern.”
“early” “literal”
28 “Karoline wird ein Pflaster bewilligen, und
wird gleichzeitig die Arbeitsauszeit
absichern.”
“late” “metaphoric”
28 “Karoline wird ein Pflaster bewilligen, und
wird gleichzeitig den Wundverband
absichern.”
“late” “literal”
28 “Karoline bewilligt ein Pflaster, und wird
gleichzeitig die Arbeitsauszeit absichern.”
“early” “metaphoric”










29 “Laura coacht einen Leoparden und wird mit
Vergnügen den Schüler unterrichten.”
“early” “metaphoric”
29 “Laura coacht einen Leoparden und wird mit
Vergnügen die Raubkatze unterrichten.”
“early” “literal”
29 “Laura wird einen Leoparden coachen und
wird mit Vergnügen den Schüler
unterrichten.”
“late” “metaphoric”
29 “Laura wird einen Leoparden coachen und
wird mit Vergnügen die Raubkatze
unterrichten.”
“late” “literal”
30 “Philipp wird eine Schlange lobpreisen, und
wird unüberlegt dem Kriechtier vertrauen.”
“late” “literal”
30 “Philipp lobpreist eine Schlange, und wird
unüberlegt der Hausfrau vertrauen.”
“early” “metaphoric”
30 “Philipp lobpreist eine Schlange, und wird
unüberlegt dem Kriechtier vertrauen.”
“early” “literal”
30 “Philipp wird eine Schlange lobpreisen, und
wird unüberlegt der Hausfrau vertrauen.”
“late” “metaphoric”
31 “Nadine wird einen Panzer verärgern, und
wird unverzüglich dem Vorgesetzten
entfliehen.”
“late” “metaphoric”
31 “Nadine wird einen Panzer verärgern, und
wird unverzüglich dem Kampfwagen
entfliehen.”
“late” “literal”
31 “Nadine verärgert einen Panzer, und wird
unverzüglich dem Vorgesetzten entfliehen.”
“early” “metaphoric”
31 “Nadine verärgert einen Panzer, und wird
unverzüglich dem Kampfwagen entfliehen.”
“early” “literal”
32 “Sebastian füttert eine Prinzessin, und wird
unablässig der Adligen beistehen.”
“early” “literal”
32 “Sebastian wird eine Prinzessin füttern, und
wird unablässig der Katze beistehen.”
“late” “metaphoric”
32 “Sebastian wird eine Prinzessin füttern, und
wird unablässig der Adligen beistehen.”
“late” “literal”
32 “Sebastian füttert eine Prinzessin, und wird
unablässig der Katze beistehen.”
“early” “metaphoric”
33 “Fabian erzieht einen Papagei, und wird
selbstverständlich dem Jungen zujubeln.”
“early” “metaphoric”
33 “Fabian erzieht einen Papagei, und wird
selbstverständlich dem Vogel zujubeln.”
“early” “literal”
33 “Fabian wird einen Papagei erziehen, und
wird selbstverständlich dem Jungen zujubeln.”
“late” “metaphoric”










33 “Fabian wird einen Papagei erziehen, und
wird selbstverständlich dem Vogel zujubeln.”
“late” “literal”
34 “Alexander wird einen Piranha belehren, und
wird furchtlos dem Fisch entgegentreten.”
“late” “literal”
34 “Alexander belehrt einen Piranha, und wird
furchtlos dem Teilnehmer entgegentreten.”
“early” “metaphoric”
34 “Alexander belehrt einen Piranha, und wird
furchtlos dem Fisch entgegentreten.”
“early” “literal”
34 “Alexander wird einen Piranha belehren, und
wird furchtlos dem Teilnehmer
entgegentreten.”
“late” “metaphoric”
35 “Simone wird einen Geier protegieren, und
wird sich wiederholt für den Ziehsohn
einsetzen.”
“late” “metaphoric”
35 “Simone wird einen Geier protegieren, und
wird sich wiederholt für den Greifvogel
einsetzen.”
“late” “literal”
35 “Simone protegiert einen Geier, und wird sich
wiederholt für den Ziehsohn einsetzen.”
“early” “metaphoric”
35 “Simone protegiert einen Geier, und wird sich
wiederholt für den Greifvogel einsetzen.”
“early” “literal”
36 “Niklas umwirbt eine Trophäe, und wird
unbeirrt den Pokal anvisieren.”
“early” “literal”
36 “Niklas wird eine Trophäe umwerben, und
wird unbeirrt die Sängerin anvisieren.”
“late” “metaphoric”
36 “Niklas wird eine Trophäe umwerben, und
wird unbeirrt den Pokal anvisieren.”
“late” “literal”
36 “Niklas umwirbt eine Trophäe, und wird




C.1 Pilot Study of Experiment 5
Before conducting Experiment 5, a pilot study was run with 12 participants in order
to (1) be able to make more precise predictions regarding the possible outcome
of the main experiment and (2) determine the number of participants necessary
for the study to have more than 80% power.
The original analysis scheme was set up as can be seen in Table C.1 below. The
time-windows (regions) for analysis were determined by focusing on a comparison
of what the first and second metaphoric element would be in each condition. This
resulted in Region 1 comparing the verb (early-verb condition) and vehicle (late
verb condition) and Region 2 the vehicle (early-verb condition and the verb (late
verb condition). I report the results of the pilot study using this original analysis,
as well as the results of regions 1 and 2 of Experiment 5. Regions 3-5 are reported
in Chapter 5, since no changes were made here.
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Another crucial difference was the dependent measure used for analysis. Instead
of examining log-gaze ratios of looks to the metaphoric picture divided by looks to
the literal picture, I originally took the log-gaze ratio of looks to the target picture
divided by looks to the competitor picture. Target and competitor varied between
conditions: The metaphoric picture was the target and the literal picture was
the competitor in the metaphoric conditions and the opposite was the case in
the literal conditions.
C.1.1 Participants
The pilot study was conducted with 12 participants (7 female) ages 18-31. One of
the participants was removed from the analysis prior to data inspection based on
the results of their post-experiment questionnaire. This participant was replaced,
keeping the totla number at 12. None of the participants of this pilot study
participated in any of the norming tasks or in Experiments 5 or 6. All participants
were right handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. This study
was approved by the ethics vote of the psycholinguistics lab of the Humboldt-
Universität zu Berlin.
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C.1.2 Predictions
The first set of predictions referred to the effect of context on the gaze record.
If the contextually-derived mental representations affect participants’ eye-gaze
differently in the two different context bias conditions (literal and metaphoric),
we should find that there is an overall preference for inspecting the target image
across conditions (i.e. the metaphoric picture in the metaphoric conditions and
the literal picture in the literal conditions).
This could, however, be modulated by the way that context interacts with
the selection restrictions of the verb in the critical sentence: In the early verb
conditions, it could be the case that the verb’s selectional preferences are stronger
than contextual biases. If this is the case, then we should find a difference in log-gaze
ratios between literal and metaphoric context bias levels of the early verb condition:
This would suggest that in the literal condition, participants looked more at the
picture most associated with the verb (the metaphoric picture, competitor image)
than at the one most associated with the context (the literal picture, target image).
The second set of predictions referred to the effect of the position of the verb in
the sentence. Broadly speaking, if presentation order of the metaphoric elements is
important for the construction of metaphoric meaning (as claimed by class inclusion
models), we would expect participants to settle on a figurative interpretation sooner
when they first hear the verb and then the direct object than when presentation
order is reversed. This could translate to differences in the time in which participants
establish reference with the target image (metaphoric picture) in the metaphoric
conditions: It could be the case that the point in time in which log-gaze ratios become
positive will occur during region 2 for the metaphoric early verb condition, whereas
this could happen in later regions only for the metaphoric late-verb condition.
C.1.3 Results
The results are shown in Figures C.1, C.2, C.3, C.4 and C.5. The results of the
models, shown in Table C.2 show an overall preference for the target picture in
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all conditions with the exception of the late-verb metaphoric condition in region
1, which shows a slight preference for the competitor, literal picture. This pattern
suggests that participants settled on a metaphoric interpretation of the sentence
more easily in the early-verb compared to late-verb metaphoric conditions: In
region 1, upon hearing the metaphoric vehicle Prinzessin (late-verb metaphoric
condition), participants showed a preference for the competitor literal picture (the
princess) that resulted in a large difference in log-ratios compared to the literal
late-verb condition. In region 2, on the other hand, upon hearing the metaphoric
vehicle (early-verb metaphoric condition), participants showed a slight preference
for the metaphoric picture (the cat), which resulted in a less pronounced difference
in log-ratios compared to the literal early condition.
Concretely, this differential pattern in the two regions translated into an
interaction between the two factors in region 1: The difference between log-ratios
in the late-verb conditions was significantly larger than the difference between
log-ratios in the early conditions. Conversely, there was no significant interaction
inn region 2: The difference between log-ratios in the late-verb metaphoric condition
was not significantly larger than the difference between the early-verb conditions.
On the other hand, the log-ratio for both early-verb conditions was positive in
region 1, suggesting that contextual expectations might be stronger than verb expec-
tations: Participants preferentially inspected the target picture in both conditions,
which was compatible with the verb’s selectional preferences in the metaphoric
conditions, but incompatible with these in the literal conditions. However, this
preference was more pronounced in the metaphoric condition, which might indicate
that verb-driven expectations do interfere to a certain degree with contextually-
driven expectations: Contextual and verb expectation are aligned in the early-verb
metaphoric condition, encouraging participants to look towards the target, whereas
contextual and verb-driven expectations were at odds in the early-verb literal
condition, potentially causing a momentary uncertainty, which translated into
lower proportion of looks to target.
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Figure C.2: Original Results of Region 2, pilot study of Experiment 5
The results for the remaining 3 regions showed that participants quickly identified
the target image and settled on this until the end of the trial: Overall, the intercept
of every model was positive and significantly different from zero, meaning that there
as an overall preference for target picture throughout these three regions.
























viewing pattern when hearing 'und'
























viewing pattern when hearing 'adv'
Figure C.4: Original Results of Region 4, pilot study of Experiment 5
























viewing pattern when hearing 'dis'
Figure C.5: Original Results of Region 5, pilot study of Experiment 5
Table C.2: Regression results for regions 1-5, pilot study of Experiment 5
Dependent variable:
logratio of looks to target/looks to competitor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Context Bias −0.069 −0.134 0.056 0.106 0.082
(−0.215, 0.077) (−0.249, −0.020) (−0.093, 0.205) (−0.033, 0.245) (−0.069, 0.234)
t = −0.922 t = −2.298∗ t = 0.734 t = 1.499 t = 1.064
Verb constraint 0.042 −0.059 −0.030 −0.040 −0.053
(−0.068, 0.153) (−0.162, 0.043) (−0.180, 0.120) (−0.162, 0.082) (−0.156, 0.050)
t = 0.749 t = −1.131 t = −0.390 t = −0.647 t = −1.013
Trial Order 0.001 0.003 −0.00003 0.005 0.002
(−0.0001, 0.001) (0.002, 0.003) (−0.001, 0.001) (0.004, 0.005) (0.001, 0.002)
t = 1.665 t = 8.667∗∗∗ t = −0.069 t = 15.190∗∗∗ t = 6.794∗∗∗
Interaction −0.371 −0.035 −0.100 0.145 −0.007
(−0.509, −0.233) (−0.310, 0.240) (−0.283, 0.082) (−0.027, 0.317) (−0.024, 0.011)
t = −5.271∗∗∗ t = −0.247 t = −1.079 t = 1.649 t = −0.730
Intercept 0.054 0.080 0.101 0.045 0.224
(0.041, 0.067) (0.066, 0.093) (0.086, 0.116) (0.032, 0.058) (0.214, 0.234)
t = 8.086∗∗∗ t = 11.865∗∗∗ t = 13.455∗∗∗ t = 6.917∗∗∗ t = 44.634∗∗∗
Analysis region 1 2 3 4 5
Observations 29,700 32,472 24,875 30,096 51,084
Log Likelihood −20,589.470 −24,094.700 −18,230.870 −20,296.230 −35,610.500
Akaike Inf. Crit. 41,200.930 48,211.400 36,483.750 40,614.450 71,241.010
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 41,292.220 48,303.670 36,573.080 40,705.890 71,329.420
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
values shown per cell are regression coefficients, confidence
intervals and t-values ( in that order)
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C.2 Changes Made Prior to Conducting Exper-
iment 5
Based on the results and analysis of the pilot study, some changes were made
prior to conducting the main Experiment.
The first change concerned the type of fillers used in the experiment. By
comparing the gaze patterns of participants during the first and second half of
the pilot study a pattern appeared suggesting that participants developed an
adaption strategy throughout the study. During the first half of the experiment,
the literal picture attracted more looks in the metaphoric conditions upon hearing
the metaphoric vehicle (in region 1 for the late-verb and in region 2 for the early-
verb condition) than in the second half of the experiment. This could be due to
participants anticipating the correct target image based solely on the information
provided by the linguistic context: In all critical and almost all filler trials, the
information about which picture to select did not come from the spoken sentence
but from the written text. Participants could have therefore learned to suppress
the incoming information from the sentence and focus only on what they had read.
To address this issue, 36 of the filler items were changed in order to make sure
that the information needed to decide which picture to click on came exclusively
from the spoken sentence and not from the written context. This should force
participants to pay close attention to the sentences and not settle on an interpretation
based on the context alone.
Further changes concerned the analysis scheme. In order to simplify the
analysis and interpretation, I decided to change the dependent measure from
log(target/competitor) to log(metaphoric picture/literal picture). This should
facilitate the interpretation of the comparison of results in the metaphoric and
literal conditions.
Furthermore, I decided to pot for a different contrast coding scheme to analyze
the data from Experiment 5: Instead of using an ANOVA-style sum-contrast coding
scheme, I chose to instead use treatment contrast coding. The logic for this was as
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follows: The results of the pilot study suggested a different pattern of construction
of metaphoric meaning in the early vs late metaphoric conditions: Whereas in
the late-verb condition, upon hearing the metaphoric vehicle Prinzessin (region
1) participants showed an overall preference for looking at the literal picture (the
princess), such preference was not visible when the same word was heard in the
early-verb conditions (i.e. in region 2). Here, participants showed a preference
for the target metaphoric picture (the cat).
One way to quantify this difference is to tailor the statistical model to the
following question:
(i) When participants hear the metaphorical vehicle, do they preferentially look
at the literal picture, at the metaphoric picture, or do they show no preference at all?
This question can be directly addressed by taking advantage of the flexibility in
contrast coding offered by linear models, which is fundamentally different to the
one used in an analysis of variance analysis (ANOVA) (Schad, 2020; Gelman & Hill,
2007; Barr et al., 2013). When using linear models with categorical predictors, the
experimenter must specify a baseline to which all of the experimental groups are
compared, which is known as the process of contrast coding. One such contrast
coding strategy is the so-called treatment or “dummy” contrast, in which one
specific group is used as a baseline, with the coefficients of the predictor variables
representing direct comparisons between a predictor and the baseline group while
keeping all other predictors at a fixed level. This differs from the sum-contrast
used for the pilot study (which most resembles the contrast coding scheme used
in ANOVA-style analyses), in which the baseline represents the overall mean of
all conditions, and the coefficients of the predictor variables represent the effect
of a specific factor compared to the overall mean.
Importantly, when using treatment contrast the coefficient of the intercept
tests the null-hypothesis of whether the outcome value (i.e. log-gaze probability
ratio) for the group chosen as the intercept differs significantly from zero or not.
Recall, that log-gaze probability ratios are centered around zero, with positive
numbers signifying a preference for the metaphoric picture and negative numbers
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a preference for the literal picture. This means that interpreting the intercept
term in a linear model using treatment contrast will tell us if for the specific group
we have chosen as the baseline (i.e the intercept) of the model there is a looking
preference for one or the other picture.
In region 1, participants heard the vehicle of a metaphor in the late-verb
metaphoric condition, whereas in region 2 this happens in the early-verb metaphoric
condition. Thus, if we code the metaphoric early-verb and the metaphoric late-
verb conditions as the baseline conditions for the statistical models of region 1
and region 2 respectively, we will be able to directly answer question (i): If the
intercept coefficient is significantly positive, it will mean that participants had an
overall preference for looking at the metaphoric picture (the cat) upon hearing
the metaphoric vehicle (Prinzessin); if the intercept coefficient is significantly
negative, it will mean that participants preferred to look at the literal picture (the
princess) upon hearing the metaphoric vehicle.
The interpretation of the coefficients using treatment contrast is different than
the interpretation when using sum contrast for all effects except for the highest
order one (i.e. the interaction term) (Levy, 2014). This means that care must be
taken when formulating the predictions and analyzing the results. What follows is
a reformulation of the predictions for the main experiment considering the findings
of the pilot study and the new coding scheme for the statistical analysis.
C.3 Predictions for Experiment 5 with the Orig-
inal Analysis Scheme
C.3.1 Region 1
The main prediction here was that when coding the late-verb metaphoric condition as
the intercept of the model, this should be negative and potentially also significantly
different from zero. This would reflect that participants either preferentially
inspected the literal picture (if significantly different from zero) or that they were
uncertain about which image was the correct referent (if not different from zero).
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Furthermore, there should be significant differences between metaphoric and
literal conditions: Both metaphoric conditions should have significantly more
positive log-gaze ratios compared to their literal counterparts, signifying that
participants spent more time looking at the metaphoric picture than at the literal
one in the metaphoric conditions.
C.3.2 Region 2
I predicted that, when coding the early-verb metaphoric condition as the intercept,
this should be positive and significantly different than zero. This would reflect an
overall preference for the metaphoric picture in this condition. There should also
be differences between corresponding literal and metaphoric conditions.
C.4 Determining the Number of Participants Needed
for Experiment 5
In order to determine the number of participants for the main experiment, a
simulation approach was used, following the recommendations of Vasishth et al.
(2018) as well as Green and MacLeod (2016). This was done using the R package
Simr (Green & MacLeod, 2016). Using the results of the maximal linear mixed-
effects model for region 1, 100 simulated experiments were run with with artificial
data. This data was created using the extracted parameters obtained from the
statistical model fitted to region 1. Crucially, these parameters were slightly altered
prior to the creation of the artificial data sets: The interaction effect, which had a
value of Cohens’d of 0.38, was reduced to one with the value of Cohen’s d of 0.2.
This way, I intended to find the number of participants needed to have at least 80%
power assuming a more conservative effect size. The simulations suggest that with
32 participants, the experiment should be sufficiently powered to achieve this goal.
Given that the analysis scheme was also changed after the results of Experiment
5 were known (see the final section of this appendix), this power analysis was re-run
to ensure that Experiment 5 was sufficiently powered to detect a difference between
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early and late metaphoric conditions when the data was realigned to the onset of
the metaphoric vehicle (as described in chapter four). Again, the effect size for this
specific difference in the pilot study was changed to one of 0.2 (in Cohen’s d units)
prior to conducting the simulations. The simulations showed that, based on the
results of the pilot study, Experiment 5 would also be sufficiently powered to find
an effect of at least 0.2 (in Cohen’s d units) with 32 participants.
C.5 Results of Experiment 5 with the Original
Analysis
C.5.1 Region 1
Three versions of the same model were fitted to the data, coding the early metaphoric,
late metaphoric and early literal conditions as the intercept respectively. The models
show that the early metaphoric condition was positive and significantly different
from zero. This condition was also significantly different from the early-literal
condition and from the metaphoric-late condition. These results can be visualized
in Figure C.6 and in Table C.3.
When coding the late-verb metaphoric as the intercept, this was found to be neg-
ative and significantly different from zero. This means that participants looked more
at the literal picture than at the metaphoric in this condition throughout this region.
Participants also looked significantly more to the literal picture in the literal late
condition than in the metaphoric late condition, given the negative and significant
difference between these conditions.
C.5.2 Region 2
Three version of the same model were fitted to the data, coding the early metaphoric,
late metaphoric and early literal conditions as the intercept respectively. The models
show that the early metaphoric condition was positive and significantly different
from zero. This condition was also significantly different from the early-literal
condition and from the metaphoric-late condition. When coding the late-verb
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viewing pattern in Region 2 (onset2−onset und)
Figure C.7: Original Results of Region 2, Experiment 5
metaphoric as the intercept, this was found to also be positive but not significantly
different from zero. These results can be visualized in Figure C.7 and in Table C.4.
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Early-Metaphoric vs. Early-Literal −0.116
(−0.218, −0.014)
t = −2.236∗
Early-metaphoric vs. Late-metaphoric −0.127
(−0.207, −0.047)
t = −3.124∗∗
Late-metaphoric vs. late-literal −0.141
(−0.151, −0.131)
t = −28.128∗∗∗
Early-literal vs. Late-literal −0.163
(−0.225, −0.101)
t = −5.159∗∗∗
Trial Order −0.001 −0.0004 −0.0005
(−0.001, −0.0004) (−0.001, −0.00005) (−0.001, −0.0001)




Intercept 0.075 −0.063 −0.045
(0.007, 0.144) (−0.111, −0.015) (−0.084, −0.006)
t = 2.166∗ t = −2.580∗∗ t = −2.261∗
condition at intercept early-met late-met early-lit
Observations 82,536 82,536 82,536
Log Likelihood −57,408.830 −60,661.300 −61,459.250
Akaike Inf. Crit. 114,845.700 121,342.600 122,936.500
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 114,976.200 121,435.800 123,020.400
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
values shown per cell are regression coefficients, confidence
intervals and t-values ( in that order)
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Early-Metaphoric vs. Early-Literal −0.313
(−0.394, −0.231)
t = −7.512∗∗∗
Early-metaphoric vs. Late-metaphoric −0.013
(−0.077, 0.051)
t = −0.394
Late-metaphoric vs. late-literal −0.309
(−0.390, −0.227)
t = −7.419∗∗∗
Early-literal vs. Late-literal −0.009
(−0.073, 0.055)
t = −0.278
Trial Order 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002, 0.002) (0.002, 0.002) (0.002, 0.002)




Intercept 0.065 0.053 −0.247
(0.008, 0.123) (−0.005, 0.110) (−0.304, −0.190)
t = 2.232∗ t = 1.792 t = −8.440∗∗∗
condition at intercept early-met late-met early-lit
Observations 90,138 90,138 90,138
Log Likelihood −70,868.620 −70,868.620 −70,868.620
Akaike Inf. Crit. 141,759.200 141,759.200 141,759.200
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 141,862.700 141,862.700 141,862.700
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
values shown per cell are regression coefficients, confidence
intervals and t-values ( in that order)
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C.5.3 Discussion
When comparing regions 1 and 2 it is possible to obtain indirect evidence supporting
an asymmetric processing of metaphoric meaning: When hearing the metaphoric
vehicle (Prinzessin), participants’ viewing pattern was different as a function of
whether or not they had previously heard the verbal topic: When they had heard it
(region 2, early-verb metaphoric condition), participants preferentially inspected the
metaphoric picture throughout the region. When they hadn’t heard it yet (region
1, late-verb metaphoric condition), participants preferentially inspected the literal
picture throughout the region.
Furthermore, both regions showed differences between metaphoric and literal
conditions: as a function of contextual bias, participants preferred to inspect
the metaphoric picture in the metaphoric conditions and the literal picture in
the literal conditions.
C.5.4 Reasoning behind changing the analysis
This interpretation of the results is tentative and must be taken with care: For
one, it is based on a comparison between the analyses of regions 1 and 2, which
are, in turn, the result of comparing gaze patterns when hearing two different
words: the verb and the object of a sentence. This is less than ideal because it
leaves us only with indirect evidence for our main hypothesis, which is that a
metaphor will be processed differently as a function of the position of the elements.
In order to test this hypothesis in a more direct way, it would be better to compare
participants’ looking behavior across conditions upon hearing the same word. This
could be achieved by re-aligning the time-course of participants’ viewing patterns
to the onset of the metaphoric vehicle (the word Prinzessin) and to the onset
of the verb (the word füttert).
This way of analyzing the data has the big advantage that it allows for a direct
comparisons of differences in processing the same words in order to analyze how
C. Appendix C 280
their processing differs as a function of the word’s position in the sentence. This
is the final analysis that is reported in chapter four.
D
Appendix D
D.1 Complementary Analyses for Experiment 6
Experiment 6 focused on the results for the Vehicle and Verb regions. The remaining
regions (UND, ADV, and DIS) were analyzed analogously to the Verb and Vehicle
regions: Models including verb constraint as a fixed effect as well as trial order
as a control were fitted to the log-gaze probability ratios of looks to metaphoric
picture over looks to literal picture. All models used a treatment contrast coding
scheme. They were each fitted twice, changing the intercept of the model from
the early to the late verb constraint condition respectively.
For the DIS region, the model included the factor “Disambiguation”, with the
levels “metaphoric” and “literal”, in addition to the factor “verb constraint”. This
is because for this region only, there were differences in the information given to
participants about the likely visual referent: In the literal conditions, participants
heard the literal word (“noble woman”) and in the metaphoric conditions participants
heard the metaphoric word (“cat”).
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D.1.1 Results of Experiment 6
UND region
Results from the “und” region showed an overall preference for the literal over the
metaphoric picture. This is shown by the fact that both conditions displayed a
negative log-gaze ratio that was significantly different from zero, meaning that,
in both conditions, participants preferred to look at the literal picture than at
the metaphoric picture. There was no significant difference in viewing behavior
between conditions in this region. These results are displayed in Figure D.1 and
the model output is shown in Table D.1.
ADV region
Similarly to the results of the previous region, both conditions were negative and
significantly different from zero, indicating a preference for the literal picture
throughout the region. There was no difference between the two conditions. These
results are displayed in Figure D.2 and the model output is shown in Table D.2.
DIS region
The analysis for this region was different than the previous analyses since it included
the additional two-level factor Disambiguation (literal vs. metaphoric). The model
for this region thus included the two factors (verb constraint and disambiguation)
as predictors, together with their interaction. The data was therefore analyzed
in the same way as it was in Experiment 5.
The results were somewhat similar to those found in Experiment 5 for this same
time region, as can be seen in Figure D.3: Participants directed their gaze towards the
picture representing the word heard in the disambiguating region. This translated
to significant effects of disambiguation for both early and late verb constraint
conditions. Furthermore, there was also a significant difference between early and
late metaphoric conditions: Participants looked more at the literal picture compared
to the metaphoric picture in the metaphoric late verb condition compared to the
metaphoric early-verb condition. However, as can be seen by the raw effect sizes

















viewing pattern when hearing 'und'

















viewing pattern when hearing 'adv'
Figure D.2: Summary of results for the ADV region, Experiment 6
reported in Table D.3, this effect was much smaller than the effect of Disambiguation.
The intercept in the metaphoric conditions was positive and significantly different
from zero, while the intercepts in the literal conditions was negative and significantly
different from zero. All model outputs are shown in Table D.3.


















viewing pattern when hearing 'dis'
Figure D.3: Summary of results for the DIS region, Experiment 6





Early-Metaphoric vs. Early-Literal 0.074
(−0.039, 0.186)
t = 1.281
Trial Order 0.003 0.003
(0.002, 0.003) (0.002, 0.003)
t = 11.405∗∗∗ t = 11.405∗∗∗
Intercept −0.191 −0.117
(−0.248, −0.133) (−0.174, −0.060)
t = −6.533∗∗∗ t = −3.990∗∗∗
condition at intercept early-met late-met
Observations 46,930 46,930
Log Likelihood −39,411.490 −39,411.490
Akaike Inf. Crit. 78,834.970 78,834.970
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 78,887.510 78,887.510
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
values shown per cell are regression coefficients, confi-
dence intervals and t-values ( in that order)
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Early-Metaphoric vs. Early-Literal 0.003
(−0.096, 0.102)
t = 0.059
Trial Order 0.003 0.003
(0.003, 0.003) (0.003, 0.003)
t = 12.901∗∗∗ t = 12.901∗∗∗
Intercept −0.158 −0.155
(−0.223, −0.093) (−0.215, −0.095)
t = −4.762∗∗∗ t = −5.062∗∗∗
condition at intercept early-met late-met
Observations 55,594 55,594
Log Likelihood −43,987.670 −43,987.670
Akaike Inf. Crit. 87,991.340 87,991.340
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 88,062.750 88,062.750
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
values shown per cell are regression coefficients, confi-
dence intervals and t-values ( in that order)
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Early-Metaphoric vs. Early-Literal −0.387
(−0.442, −0.333)
t = −14.025∗∗∗
Early-metaphoric vs. Late-metaphoric −0.090
(−0.100, −0.080)
t = −17.256∗∗∗
Late-metaphoric vs. late-literal −0.282
(−0.336, −0.228)
t = −10.197∗∗∗
Early-literal vs. Late-literal 0.016
(0.006, 0.026)
t = 3.085∗∗
Trial Order 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001, 0.002) (0.001, 0.002) (0.001, 0.002)




Intercept 0.142 0.052 −0.246
(0.078, 0.206) (−0.012, 0.116) (−0.309, −0.182)
t = 4.357∗∗∗ t = 1.598 t = −7.541∗∗∗
condition at intercept early-met late-met early-lit
Observations 93,136 93,136 93,136
Log Likelihood −77,977.010 −77,977.010 −77,977.010
Akaike Inf. Crit. 155,970.000 155,970.000 155,970.000
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 156,045.500 156,045.500 156,045.500
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
values shown per cell are regression coefficients, confi-
dence intervals and t-values ( in that order)
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